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I doubt. . .that the Impetus for writing anything 
but a textbook can ever be rationalized. Eric Erikson
Ideally, a dissertation is written primarily for 
the benefit of the researcher, for the experience gained in 
the exercise of research, and the knowledge which may be 
acquired not only in the subject matter but the writing 
process itself. In contrast to a thesis, which is a hy­
pothesis to be defended, the dissertation is expected to be 
a contribution to knowledge. The topics for such intellectual 
exercises vary considerably from university to university 
as well as from discipline to discipline within the university 
structure and range from the most obscure to topics which 
reach the zenith of intellectual activity. Due to the stage 
and state of our profession, most political science dis­
sertations are very specialized. This one is not.
This particular study includes a survey of political 
leadership - a conceptual focus and distinct field of po­
litical inquiry theoretically immature, albeit slowly evolving, 
Beliefs, attitudes, and political styles of individual po­
litical leaders have received less research attention then 
they deserve, primarily due to inadequate methodologies for 
acquiring the raw data necessary for scientific analysis.
The objective herein, however, is to consider the influence 
upon Charles de Gaulle of such political leadership "inputs" 
as his culture, acculturation and motivations, and political
iii
beliefs and style. Basically this has necessitated an 
eclectic analysis not unlike, in some aspects, the popular 
approach used in the field of International Relations, the 
decision-making study. The ultimate aim here is to explore 
a framework within which a researcher can generalize for 
predictability - a long suffering neglect of our "science" - 
rather than merely permit a reconstruction of any particular 
political action or decision.
General de Gaulle has interested, indeed fascinated, 
this writer since the heyday of "Gaullism" in the 1960’s 
when the doctoral general examinations were completed. It 
was during that study period that most information on France, 
indeed much of what was written on Europe, inevitably focused 
critically on President de Gaulle. Most of the American 
literature on the subject presented predominately vehement 
opinions of this particular political leader. Because of 
this lack of objectivity by social scientists and laymen 
alike, the first of many attempts to explain, generalize, 
and understand de Gaulle’s international behavior and hence 
the American reaction to him began. Various "methodologies" 
were selected, partially implemented and then rejected when 
essential data was either unavailable or research findings 
invariably inconclusive. Often the use of one methodology 
resulted in more problems being "found" than questions 
answered. It was only since I968 and the information
iv
explosion of diverse political leadership studies and my 
students' constant clamoring for essentially "personality" 
explanations of Presidential leadership behavior that the 
"problems" of previous attempts at analysis were diminished. 
Perhaps this is the most important "finding." Political 
leaders can not be adequately "understood" or predictive 
analysis undertaken by "a" methodology or "a" discipline, 
but only by open-ended or eclectic approaches involving 
interdisciplinary talents and resources. By incorporating 
the major features of a leader's cultural background, his 
personality and life experiences to adulthood, his personal 
philosophy and political style (as herein applied to Charles 
de Gaulle), we may better understand the complexities of 
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A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS FOR PREDICTING INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR:
A PERSON-CENTERED PRETHEORY OP POLITICAL LEADERSHIP—
CHARLES DE GAULLE 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: AN OVERVIEW 
Political Leadership Models
George Sabine writes that a political theory, and 
thus a pretheory or a core concept such as political leader­
ship, "contains among Its elements certain judgments of fact, 
or estimates of probability which time proves perhaps to be 
objectively right or w r o n g . T h i s  Is particularly true In 
doctoral studies, which are essentially experimental regard­
less of subject matter. Insofar as this research analyzes 
one political leader, Charles de Gaulle, with little compar­
ative analysis, the result Is a "pretheory" of political 
leadership. The conclusions of one study do not permit the 
drawing of needed prescriptions, which Is a recognized 
limitation.
Practically and theoretically, political leadership 
Is a complex, multl-dlmenslonal subject, with few concurring
^George Sabine, Preface to the First Edition, A History 
of Political Theory (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 
1937), p. V.
theses.^ Still, it is a subject studied and written upon by
more and more social scientists; for political leadership—
whether viewed as leaders collectively or a leader alone, the
2
great men studies, is a phenomenon of all governments, whether 
democracies or dictatorships. That is, in all instances the 
masses, the many, are governed by political elites, the few, 
regardless of the nomenclature applied to the power distributions
According to Murray Edelman, political leadership has 
three major attributes: 1) reciprocity or a mutual dependence 
relationship between the demands of followers and a leader's 
actions (stressed by most contemporary social scientists), 2) 
environmental setting, a specific situation and 3) influence 
or the shaping of opinions. He does not believe leadership 
is found in the "static characteristics of individuals." See 
his The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press^ 1964), pp. 73-94. However, as will be noted in this 
dissertation, leadership is also an "attitudinal" phenomenon, 
necessarily incorporating consideration of a leader's person­
ality. See Lewis Edinger, Kurt Schumacher: A Study in Person­
ality and Political Behavior (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1965), p. 4. Also Donald D. Searing, "Models 
and Images of Man and Society in Leadership Theory," The Journal 
of Politics 31 (February 1969): 6. The complexity of the sub­
ject is evident in the panel topics considered by the American 
Political Science Association program committee for the 197% 
convention: "The Chief Executive in the Modern State," "Political 
Recruitment: Paths and Credentials," "Personality and Motivation," 
"Power Elite Revisited," "Elites and Dependent Nations," and 
"Elite-Mass Linkages:New Directions," to cite a few. ^  6 
(Summer 1973):337-8. This is not as evident in the 1975 con­
vention program.
^See, for example, Harold Lasswell and C. Easton Rothwell, 
The Comparative Study of Elites: An Introduction and Bibliography 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1952). Also, 
Edgar P. Borgatta, Robert F. Bales and Arthur S. Couch, "Some 
Findings Relevant to the Great Man Theory of Leadership," The 
American Sociological Review 19 (December 195%):755-9; Sidney 
Hook, The Hero in History; A Study in Limitation and Possibility 
(New York: John Day, 1943); Morris R. Cohen, The Meaning of 
Human History (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.,
1947), see particularly his chapter, "Great Men in History.
within particular nation-states.^ Although this division in­
to masses and elites is universal, the behavior, interaction 
and even the basic values and attitudes of these "groups" may 
differ markedly. Yet many "leadership studies" continue to 
be essentially "common man"^ studies, varying only in the 
"models" employed. For while the phenomenon of a political 
leader and leadership is universally accepted by both historicism 
and functionalism, the "models" and images of man and society as
Importantly, an elite as a political elite seems to 
be an American innovation. Frenchmen, for example, view only 
the intellectual as an individual as an elite, although this 
is changing. See Michalina Clifford-Vaughan, "Some French 
Concepts of Elites," The British Journal of Sociology 11 
(December I960):327. Also, Kenneth Prewitt, The Recruitment 
of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-PolitTcs (Indian- 
apolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970): "From the Many areChosen the 
Pew," American Behavioral Scientist 13 (November/December I969): 
169-187; or The Ruling Elites: Elite Theory, Power, and American 
Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, Pubs., 1973). The latter was 
written with Alan Stone.
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See Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and 
Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1950). This seems particularly true in the 
United States, where the emphasis is on "groups." Many con­
temporary American political scientists and sociologists view 
leaders and leadership as primarily determined by social forces, 
in contrast to an earlier emphasis on a leader's superior traits 
as determinants of "followship." See Harmon Zeigler and Thomas R. 
Dye, "Editors' Note," American Behavioral Scientist 13 (November/ 
December 1969): 167-8.
^See Robert E.' Lane, Political Ideology: Why the American 
Common Man Believes as He Does (New York: Free Press, 1962).
^By this is meant generally the "great man" studies.
See David Easton, The Political System (New York: Knopf, 1953);
A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1965) and A Systems Analysis of Political Life 
(New York: John Wiley, I965)•
applied by social scientists in their study of the concept^ 
often result in differing conclusions from identical raw 
data. In its extreme, two distinct "images" of man are 
evident in studies of leadership: the mechanistic and the 
organismic.
In succinct terms, the mechanistic approach regards 
leaders and society as basically atomistic parts, with con- 
flict relationships prevailing in a subsystem dominance.
That is, there is an emphasis upon the institutional aspects 
of society while both man and society are considered un­
changing or static. As the "parts" are emphasized above any
Concept is understood here in the traditional sense, 
as a mental tool employed to understand, and thus eventually 
a conceptual system to control, the mental universe. Or as 
Charles 0. Lerche, Jr. and Abdul A. Said note, it is a "work­
able scheme for classification of data." See their Concepts 
of International Politics. 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, INc., 1970), pp. 4-5. Typical concepts Include 
man, power, state, authority and, of course, political leader­
ship.
^Thus when Robert Redfield (Tepoztlan, A Mexican Village: 
A Study of Folk Life /Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
19331 and The Little "Community and Peasant Society and Culture 
Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 195ë& studied the Mexican 
village of Tepoztldh, it was termed "harmonious," as that was 
Redfield's theoretical direction. However, Oscar Lewis (Life 
in a Mexican Village: Tepoztlan Restudied /Ürbana; University 
of Illinois Press, 195ÏS) studied the same village and found it 
full of violence and corruption, as his emphasis was on "dis­
harmony." This methodological weakness could have been diminished 
somewhat if the village had been analyzed as to whether social 
interaction could be characterized overall as harmonious or 
disharmonious. See Searing, "Models," Politics, p. 3*
^Searing, "Models," Politics, pp. 8-15 and 19.
" w h o l e , s t u d i e s  employing the mechanistic model emphasize
personality, particularly childhood effects on adult beliefs 
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and attitudes. This includes the works of Carlyle and his 
contemporary variations. Tucker, Lasswell, George and George, 
and Barber.^ The "personality" emphasized in this study is
1
In reality, this alludes to one of the major pit­
falls of most social science research. That is, in order 
to study a complex subject adequately, it is "taken apart." 
However, most systems, whether an individual or a nation­
state, operate as a unity. To divorce elements from each 
other, then, is to destroy essential linkages and vital 
relationships.
2
Like many terms, the concept "personality" has so 
many definitions it has become "inoperative." See Gordon 
Allport, Personality: A Psychological Interpretation (New 
York: Holt"^ 1937), pp. 24-54. What is worse, the diverse 
definitions vary so much from discipline to discipline that 
political scientists do not agree definitionally with 
psychologists, who in turn disagree among themselves. Even 
further, political scientists tend to "color" personality as 
part of the conflict and ego defenses most evident in the 
clinician's work, yet paradoxically view political attitudes, 
as part of voting behavior, as excluded from personality 
studies and therefore within the realm of political studies.
See Fred I. Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics:
An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush," The American Political 
Science Review 6l (September I967): 629-541.
^Carlyle's aristocratic view is that leaders are heroes 
of exceptional powers. Divinity, Prophet, Poet, Priest, and 
Man of Letters. See Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes, Hero-Worship 
and the Heroic In History, ed. Archibald MacMechan (Boston:
The Athenaeum Press, I9OI). See also Robert C. Tucker, The 
Soviet Political Mind: Studies In Stalinism and Post-Stalin 
Change (New York: Praeger, 1963); Harold D. Lasswell, Power 
and Personality (New York: Norton, 1948); Alexander George 
and Juliette George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A 
Personality Study (New York: John Day, 1956); and James David 
Barber, The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in 
the White House (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall, 1972).
The current psychopolltlcal trend is often "traced" to Lasswell, 
with the best example of a "neo-Lasswellian" being Barber. The 
mechanistic approach is also employed by Erwin C. Hargrove, 
Presidential Leadership:Personality and Political Style(New York: 
Macmillan, 1966) and E. Victor Wolfensteln,The RevolutTonary 
Personality : Lenin, Trotsky, Gandhi(Princeton : Princeton University 
Press, 1957a).
an attempt to explain consistent individual behavior, re­
gardless of situational variables, and thus does not follow 
either "pure" psychology as interpreted by political scien­
tists or political science and personality, again as inter­
preted by political scientists.
In contrast, the organismically-oriented studies of 
leaders and leadership argue that society is composed of inter­
dependent parts. Thus the complete social matrix must be 
analyzed in its changing evolution. The dominance of the system, 
then, is typified in the efforts of Hegel, Erikson, Burns, and 
Edinger.^ As previously noted above, however, what is missing 
for methodological strengthening is a combination of these
extreme "models." Although a growth of such "pairing" has
2
begun on a limited scale, it has not yet received universal 
acceptance by the academic community. Yet importantly, such 
a "combination of opposites," even as attempted in this study, 
could result in research becoming complementary, rather than
See Georg Hegel, Philosophy of History, tr. J. Sibree 
(London: Bell, 1905); Edinger, Schumacher; James MacGregor 
Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York: Harcourt.
Brace & World, 195&); Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther: A 
Study in Psychoanalysis and History (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1958). Not all studies, even the ones noted, fit perfectly 
in one "type" or another, perhaps because the "images"are 
superimposed on too much data until .the "minor" exceptions 
magnify themselves. Still, there exists a general nonrecog­
nition of the inherent weaknesses of single-purpose research 
and analysis.
2gee Half Dahrendorf’s discussion of "paired models" 
in Class and Class Conflict In Industrial Society (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1959); Reinhard Bendix and Bennett 
Berger on "dual tendencies" in "Images of Society and Problems 
of Concept Formation in Sociology," in Llewellyn Gross (ed.). 
Symposium on Sociological Theory (New York: Harper & Row, 1959)
and the combination of opposites," in Redfield, Community.
mutually exclusive in character as is so often evidenced 
in nonpaired or mono-modal research.^ For by insisting on 
remaining "pure," researchers intensify not only the metho­
dological problem of which "image" to use, but permit valu­
able research to be Influenced by an overall a priori image
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of social reality, which further obscures objective analysis.
This a priori image of social reality may be seen in 
the tendency of many American political scientists, although 
using innovative methodologies of the discipline, to permit 
an unconscious advocacy of classical democratic theory to 
color not only how they study, but what is studied. In other 
words, the predominant emphasis is on "groups," in part re­
sulting from the belief held by many of our social scientists 
that "the interactions of . . .’groups* ^ e r e  again, masses/ 
elites^ is the very heart of the governing process," and 
further, that leadership is a process of communication or 
connection— again, between these groups.3 Human behavior.
The need for complementary approaches is explored 
further by Fred I. Greenstein in "Personality and Politics: 
Problems of Evidence, Inference and Conceptualization," American 
Behavioral Scientist 11 (November/December 1967):38-53.
^Searing, "Models," Politics, p. 29»
^Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of 
Political Communication and Control (New York: The Free Press, 
1963), pp. 157-60, 72-6. Emphasis supplied. The reality is that 
leadership theory, since the beginnings of psychological theory 
applications to social science in the role theories of George H. 
Mead, Charles H. Cooley and John Dewey, although termed "indi­
vidual" holds that man cannot be considered apart from his 
society and social relations. Thus in the social sciences, man
then, is molded by social Interaction, i.e., roles are 
"satisfied mutual expectations of leaders and followers."^
This emphasis upon group and situational components calls 
for the leadership role to change with the particular situ­
ation at hand, although leadership behavior is conceived as 
determined "by the nature of the particular environment in 
which the leader perceives himself as functioning as well as 
by the characteristics of the person who is doing the leading.
This obvious methodological limitation is compounded 
when the values of the researcher, usually pro-democracy,
O
"are not always made as explicit as they should b e . " The 
normally "unstated" initial research premise of many political 
leadership studies, and most political science tracts in general, 
is found in the basic Lockean concepts of political democracy, 
popular sovereignty, equality, majoritarianism, and freedom. The 
idea is that no one rules or governs, but rather power is a
"apart" results in alienation and anomie. This is not to be 
confused with studying man "as a part." See also Allport, 
Personality, and Eric Fromm, Escape From Freedom (New York:
Farrer & Rinehart, 1941).
^Cecil A. Gibb, Arnold S. Tannenbaum and Lester G. 
Seligman, "Leadership" in David L. Sills (ed.). The Inter­
national Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 9 (New York:
The Macmillan Co. & The Free Press, 1968): 91-113.
^Ibid. , emphasis supplied.
Thus, "research oriented to action, or policy, as some 
political leadership studies are requires both an analysis of 
reality and a definite choice of values." Stanley Hoffmann, The 
State of War (New York: Praeger,1965), p.19* Emphasis supplied. 
Also F.S.C. Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities 
(New York: Meridian Books, 1959/prig. 1947^)•
shared or "group" commodity.^ Yet our requirements, at
least so-stated by some behavioral methodologists, include
a value-free science from a theoretically-bound value-
2
ridden political science. The essential fact is that by 
unconsciously holding to subjective selection of democracy 
as "the" best form of government, political scientists 
automatically prejudice any theory or analyses of phenomena 
which run counter to the classical concepts of "majority 
rule, minority dissent." One area of concentration which 
has suffered as a consequence is interpretative and pre- 
dictive analysis^ of the individual leader, whether in a
See Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. "On Heroic Leadership 
and the Dilemma of Strong Men and Weak Peoples," Encounter 
(London) 15 (December I96O): 3-11.
^See John Paul Duncan, "The Political Philosophy of 
American Political Scientists" (Paper presented at South­
western Social Science Convention, Dallas, Texas, March 25, 
1967). Also Heinz Eulau, Micro-Macro Political Analysis:
Accents of Inquiry (Chicago: Aldine Pub. Co., 1969), p. 
xii. Eulau believes "value neutrality" is neither a fact 
nor an attainable goal. Also Ole R. Holsti, Crisis, Escalation, 
War (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1972), p. 3 
where he comments on the lack of a "value free" science.
Lerche and Said, International Politics, p. 12 comment further, 
that the "political world is not free of values."
3or what is coming to be called "futurism." See Section 
1: "Forecasting Techniques" and Section 12: "Decision Making" 
in The Future: A bibliography of Issues and Forecasting Tech­
niques by Peter Padbury and Diane Wilkins. (Ontario 2000- 
Alternative Futures, April, 1972). Also John McHale, The Future 
of the Future (New York: George Braziller, 1969).
10
micro/peer group or macro/nation-state. Thus a theory of 
a individual ^  an individual is viewed subjectively, whether 
consciously or unconsiously, as an "elitist" philosophy. Such 
a philosophy is counter to the very core of Lockean democracy 
and must then be considered a corrupt or deviant political 
form from classical democracy at most^ and a temporary boil on 
the body politic at least, in other words, irrationalism or a 
cult of leadership as a Hitler or Stalin.^ The fact that 
there has been little academic consideration of individual 
political leaders is most evident in surveying political science 
dissertation abstracts from January, 1968, to the present (June, 
1975).3 Although 5,500 political science doctorates have been 
awarded during the past seven and a half years, dissertations 
directly researching executive or Head of Government political 
leadership and its variables, such as performance in office, 
political role socialization, personality and perceptions, number
Thus power motives seem destined to automatic charac­
terization as nondemocratic, as for instance in Alexander L. 
George, "Power as a Compensatory Value for Political Leaders,"
The Journal of Social Issues 24 (July 1968): 29-49.
p
See Raymond F. Hopkins and Richard W. Mansbach,
Structure and Process in International Politics (New York:
Harper and Row, 1973).
^Dissertation Abstracts: The Humanities and Social 
Sciences (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, A Xerox Company,
1968 to June, 1975). Vol. "A:" The Humanities and Social Sciences.
^Precise figures on earned doctorates in political science 
vary with the source consulted. A minimum would be 5,500 according 
to figures in Table II:"Distribution of Doctorates for the Years," 
American Doctoral Dissertations (Ann Arbor: Compiled for the 
Assocation of Research Libraries by University Microfilms, I968 
to the present).
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less than two dozen.^ Consequently, American democratic
philosophy, theory, or practical politics has rarely con-
2
sidered personal/positive individual leadership as a con­
ceptual focus, and thus few specialists in the area exist. 
Indeed most American social scientists seem to agree, at 
least tacitly, with Henry Kissinger that "a structure which 
can be preserved only if there is a great man in each gen­
eration is inherently fragile," and is thus of less impor­
tance for academic focus.^ The supremacy of the individual 
leader then remains applicable traditionally to those political 
systems dominated by a Hitler or a Mussolini or a Stalin, 
rather than a George Washington or Abraham Lincoln or Franklin
D. Roosevelt. Thus, although the Twentieth Century is dis­
tinguished by the influences exerted, by individual political
With duplications of comparative analyses, indi­
vidual political leadership studies include: United States - 
4 : Harry Truman, Andrew Jackson, Dwight Eisenhower, John 
Kennedy, George Washington; USSR-2: Khruschev, Stalin;
China-4 : Maso; India-3 : Mahatma Gandhi; Africa-2:Kenyatta,
Nkrumah; South American-1 : Betancourt ; Cuba-1’.Castro; Middle 
East-1:Nasser; Europe-1:Hitler; Great Britain-2 : Churchill; 
Phillipines-l:Magsaysay, Garcia, Mecapagal and Marcos.
2
The term "personal/positive individual leadership" 
is a redunancy necessitated by two major factors. First, 
leadership study is so clouded by emphases on interaction 
processes and strata analysis that some focusing on a person, 
an individual, needs to be sharpened. Secondly, when the 
latter ^  done, the results tend to be negative, i.e.,"a 
personal leadership" connotes authoritarianism to many, 
scholar and peasant alike, hence the need for the term "positive."
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 
U.S. Policy Toward Europe and Related Matters, Hearings, 80th 
Cong., 2d Sess., 19^6, p.131. Interestingly,during recent nego- 
giations, European news sources were heard to comment that Middle 
Eastern peace is where the man Kissinger is.
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leaders such as Roosevelt, Churchill, Hitler, de Gaulle, 
Nasser or the contemporary effects of a Mao, Qadafi, I. 
Ghandi, Sadat and even Ford, American studies of political 
leaders remain firmly grounded on groups and processes or 
even situational contexts, that is, the particular environ­
ment existing during the decision-making process.^
Much of the primary research in political leadership 
analysis has been micro-analysis of small groups, a focus on
the parts of the whole (reductionism) with study conclusions
2
merely elevated to the macro level. Still, such a procedure 
has some validity, as Raymond Aron noted ^  re^  international 
studies :
See Schlesinger, Leadership," Encounter and Lasswell 
and Kaplan, Power. Also, Morton Deutsch, Albert Pepitone and 
Alvin Zander, "Leadership in the Small Group," The Journal of 
Social Issues 4 (Spring 1948): 31; John J. Hemphill, Situational 
Factors in Leadership (Columbus, OhiorOhio State University,
1949) and Alvin W. Gouldern (ed.). Studies in Leadership (New 
York: Harper & Bros., 1950).
2
Holsti, Crisis, p. 70 notes that important differences in 
individuals are often neglected when individual data are 
merely aggregated as a means to test hypotheses relating to 
international system behavior. See the emphasis on differences 
in James N. Rosenau,"Private Preferences and Public Responsi­
bility: The Relative Potency of Individual and Role Variables 
in the Behavior of U.S. Senators" in J. David Singer (ed.). 
Quantitative International Politics :Insights and Evidence (New 
York: Free Press of Glencoe, I967). Also Gibb, "Leadership," 
lESS, pp. 108-9 . Or to attack a "god," although man-the-micro 
is a power-seeker in some instances according to Hans Morganthau, 
we can not assume that the nation-state or macro likewise seeks 
power. However, reductionism is not without its proponents. See 
Eulau, Political Analysis where he discusses reaucing to "funda­
mentals." Another classic example is Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs : 
Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1961), pp. v-vi.Dahl makes analogies of the United States 
national party system based on his study of New Haven’s party 
system.
13
. . .the principal actors Ration states^ • •
. ^ e t ermin^ the/JnternationaTQi system more than 
they have been determined by It. Thus events or 
actors in the ’microsystem’ are appropriate for 
study in that-, they determine what the ’macrosystem' 
will be like.
What is argued here, however, is that the weight of political 
science research should be more equitably distributed. Al­
though organizational and situational variables are vital 
aspects of understanding political processes, current trends 
of continuing centralization of executive power and the crisis- 
centered orientation of many, if not all, governments neces­
sitates a focusing, or refocusing, of some of our professional 
attention on the individual political leader, his personality 
and role.
Political Leadership Studies
Such a focusing may be found in a growing body of 
literature labeled "political leadership" studies, which 
attempt to erase the general conceptual neglect of so vital 
an areal focus. However, the undertaking of research in the 
field has been slowed in part by the m^rky conceptualizations 
of the single word, "leadership." This one word has been 
identified as a "position, office, task or function" involving 
power and influence either explicitly or implicitly, and in 
formal or informal groups. Such a traditional definition of 
leadership as a position or positional-ascriptive is simple In
^Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of Inter­
national Relations (Garden City: Doubleday, 19^6), p.
14
comparison to some behavioral conceptualizations distin­
guishing leadership as "permissive/coercive, authoritarian/ 
democratic, responsive/irresponsive" with leadership traits 
as "static and universal or dynamic and particularistic."^
Here behavioral-descriptive emphasis is on performance in a 
stimulus-response process or social interaction. We are then 
back to the methodological weaknesses inherent in the "models" 
or images of man and society and an emphasis on assemblies 
of persons or groups. More pertinent for this study is a 
third conceptual variation of political leadership, the 
cognitive-attitudinal, where the subjective perception of an 
individual results In self-orientation a leader. The 
personality of a political leader, plus role analysis, best 
suits the understanding of the interrelationship between in­
dividual and situation in the cognitive-attitudinal analysis. 
Leadership, for our purposes here, is both objective and 
subjective insofar as it is both a goal and a fact. Political 
leadership is further delineated by Glenn Paige, who views 
its conceptual framework as consisting of "personality, role, 
organization, task, values and setting" interacting in the
four dimensions of human behavior— power, affect, instrumentality,
2
and association, a construct that has been recognized only 
recently.
Lewis J. Edinger, "Political Science and Political Bio­
graphy : Reflections on the Study of Leadership:II,"The Journal 
of Politics 26 (August 1964):648-6/6.
^Glenn D. Paige (ed.). Political Leadership:Readings for 
An Emerging Field(New York:The Free Press, 1972), pp. 69-84.
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The origins of the attempts to reduce the gap be­
tween political leadership behavior and its explanatory methods 
are found primarily in the application of psychology and 
social psychology to both domestic and international politics 
by examining the "nature of belief systems, images, image 
formation and perception."^ In international relations re­
search, the change from the traditional image of man as a 
rational being to one of a man of images or values (i.e., 
fluid settings) began with Richard Snyder and Herbert Simon 
in their reconstructive analyses of executive decision­
making, emphasizing processes of decisions rather than 
2
policies. Importantly, this decision-making approach is 
grounded in the belief that decision-making is a two-level 
process. It is rational insofar as an individual calculates 
a decision based in part on the situational context he believes 
to exist, and secondly, it has an inner emotional level which
This really began with Bentley and was turned to for 
explanations of behavior which could not be understood by other 
means, that is, the previously noted so-called irrational be­
havior. Too, these studies, generically biographical in nature, 
attempt to provide analyses of cross-sectional attributes such 
as styles, characteristics and skills. Analyses of individuals 
in power positions by Hegel and Carlyle do predate the disci­
pline contemporarily termed political. The seminal study of 
personality and politics is that of Harold D. Lasswell, Psycho­
pathology and Politics (New York: Viking, I96O wherein man is 
viewed as a compensatory power seeker.(Orig. 1940 by University 
of Chicago Press)
2The main criticism of this method is that of the Greek 
philosopher Heraclitus, who noted that one "can not step twice 
in the same river." See Philip Wheelwright, Heraclitus (Princeton, 
N.J.:Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 29(Fragment 21). "Re­
constructions" then are fraught with perils. But more importantly, 
bhey seldom measurably aid in approximating any predictability 
of future decisions.
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has received less attention due to the theoretical problems 
involved.^ It is evident then that the concept of political 
leadership does not lend itself to simplification. This is 
readily apparent in Paige's review of the great diversities 
of studies on the subject. An "overview" of the varieties 
of leadership studies requires repeating not only for its 
intrinsic value, but as indicative of the diverse theoretical 
and methodological directions employed in political leader­
ship studies in general, and in some partial measure in this
2
particular study.
Paige distinguishes between eleven varieties of 
political leadership studies. Generally, this literature
Paige, Readings, p. 6 enumerates ten reasons for the 
past failures of graduate emphasis, and thus few specialists, 
in the "field" of political leadership. The American political 
culture and academic subculture have 1) an anti-leadership bias 
which is compounded by 2) "chronic mutual disdain" between 
politicians and professors, impeding research in this field.
This is evident by 3)few specialized schools for political 
leaders. Throughout all is the thread of 4)a strain of deter­
minism among social scientists and the political culture where­
in leaders are not believed to have the capacity to exert in­
dependent impact upon political life, with 5) politics viewed 
as resulting from basic economic and social forces. 6)Politicians 
merely represent these basic interests. Thus 7)leaders are 
helplessly trapped in the web of institutions. Still, 8)cross­
level, cross-cultural and cross-historical comparisons in the
scientific study of politics has begun, although only recently. 
Unfortunately, these studies have often been clouded or ob­
scured, for 9)explanative analysis of political leaders' be­
havior has been as taboo as discussion of sex during the Victorian 
era. Too, 10) political "science," which began with voting be­
havior studies of "followers," continues to orient itself so, 
rather than emphasize individual political leaders.
^See Glenn D. Paige, The Study of Political Leadership
(New York: The Free Press, forthcoming).
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may be grouped as research having a predominately group 
emphasis and favored by American social scientists until 
the past decade, those emphasizing individual variables,
and a combination of the above orientations.^
The emphasis on groups is found in:
1. Institutional role studies. Here the formal
positions of political leadership, such as the American Pres­
idency, Congressmen, Senators, and Governors are explored. By 
far the greatest emphasis has been on studies of the American 
Presidency, with a general neglect of not only many other 
positions, but other national presidencies or premierships.
The dominant consideration has been the "whole" of the office, 
although there is some evidence that the international and
domestic "roles" may be distinct in many aspects and in im-
2
portant ways.
2. Political elite studies. A single dominant 
power circle, a minority, is emphasized here. Originating 
with Mosca, Pareto and Michels, aggregative political elite 
studies have been done by Lasswell, Lerner and Rothwell, among 
others. Since 1968, an overwhelming emphasis in the academic 
community has been research of political elites in the United
As with most studies, the "varieties" are not mutually 
exclusive. However, the dominant thesis of each work determines 
its inclusion under a particular group. The indivldual-group- 
combination division is by this writer. See Paige, Readings, 
pp. 8-9, 13-17 for further bibliographical references.
p
See the numerous articles in The Journal of Peace 
Research (Oslo), Johan Galtung (ed.).
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States and Soviet Union.^
3. Community influentials. A variation of the 
political elite studies, but analyzed as community power by 
emphasizing particular power structures or leadership groups, 
this research includes both an emphasis on political elites
I
as oligarchical and pluralistic in such cities as Atlanta 
and New Haven. In all, the political leadership group, power 
structure and regime present infinite study variations.
4. Follower response studies. How and why leaders
or issues elicit political responses from "followers" dominate 
our discipline, and to date provide the only reliable pre­
dictability in political science. Exemplifying this extensive 
research is Campbell’s The American Voter, an analysis of
p
interrelationships of personalities, styles and issues.^
Emphasis on individual political leaders or comparative 
research thereof is evident in:
1. Didactic studies. The thesis of this "how to" 
literature is to teach survival in the individual political 
leadership role, although not necessarily a study of particular 
leaders per se. Such literature ranges from Machiavelli’s The 
Prince to Don Cass’ contemporary How to Win Votes and Influence 
Voters. 3
^See Dissertation Abstracts, "Political Science."
P
Angus Campbell, et al_. The American Voter (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, I960).
^Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, tr. Luigi Ricci, rev.
E.R. P. Vincent. Intro. Christian Gauss. (New York: The New
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2. Political biographical and autobiographical 
materials. Although both are widespread, by far the more 
important scientifically for political scientists is the 
political autobiography, which includes such primary sources 
as the writings of Charles de Gaulle and Winston Churchill.^ 
Biographical materials, written not only by social scientists 
but in virtually all disciplines, vary from selective to ex­
haustive detail. The "factual" detailing of historical in­
formation in these studies, however, is often contradictory 
and thus self-limiting for unqualified inclusion in scientific 
analyses.^
Combinations of the above two "varieties" of studies 
exist in:
1. Area surveys. Political leadership characteristics 
of either countries or regions are explored by combining various 
elements of the previously noted methodologies. Variations in­
clude John Wilson Lewis’ study of political leadership in China 
and Willard Hanna’s analysis of Southeast Asian leaders.^
American Library, 1952); Donald P. Cass, How to Win Votes and 
Influence Elections (Chicago: Public Administrative Service,1962).
^Even with the reality that autobiographies sometimes 
fail to meet objective standards, such literature often con­
stitutes a major portion of the data available on various aspects 
of a leader’s "operational code." Too, such works may contain 
valuable insight to the variable of personal relationships be­
tween political leaders, such as personal perceptions of each other 
held by de Gaulle, Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill during their 
wartime conferences.
^See Lelia Biggs Helms, "De Gaulle’s Foreign Policy: Theory 
and Practice." (PhD dissertation. Tufts University, 1968).
3john W. Lewis (ed.) Party Leadership and Revolutionary
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2. Leadership studies emanating from other socio- 
behavioral sciences and applied fields. This rapidly growing 
body of leadership literature includes specialties in anthro­
pology, economics, industrial science, labor relations, re­
ligious leadership, military, public executive, psychology, 
and sociology, among other fields.
3. Political leadership ideas and values. Comparative 
ideological surveys and systematic comparative inquiries into 
the relationships between values and other aspects of political 
leadership behavior are combined in this category with the 
original writings of political leaders themselves.
4. Charisma. A rather nebulous compilation of studies 
are included under the concept of charisma, the unique leader­
ship quality which elicits popular support. Such research 
varies from Max Weber to Ann Ruth Wilner and perceives polit­
ical leaders possessing such a quality as falling somewhere
on a continuum between the "misslonatic" prophet to the activist- 
planner endowed with superlative practical leadership powers.
5. Style. Attempts to determine not only what patterns 
exist between personality and political leadership but the 
"operational codes''^ of individual political leaders is
Power In China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); 
Willard Hanna, Eight Nation Makers: Southeast Asia's Charis­
matic Statesmen (New York: St. Martaln’s Press, 1964).
^Alexander L. George, The "Operational Code": A Neglected 
Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making. 
(Santa Monica: The Rand Corp., 1967).
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analyzed as leadership style. Often this particular type of 
literature is essentially theoretical, although case studies 
of individual political leaders are beginning to be included.^ 
From a perusal of the aforementioned political leader­
ship literature, it becomes evident that certain basic variables
or issues emerge. One question or "issue" is whether political
2
leadership is an individual attribute or trait. Do leaders
have like abilities or hold any physical or mental traits in
common? Or is political leadership determined by the situation, 
with leaders merely pawns of prevailing social forces? Thus 
the big question is exactly how much historical influence do
"great" individuals have?^ All this leads into the more
theoretically relevant questions of the highest order, such as 
what are the basic factors in world politics— the forces of 
ideologies, economics, or the "power of individuals?"^
^Studies by Barber and Hargrove in particular would 
be relevant here.
^Alvin Gouldner views the division of leadership studies 
as a dictomy: the "traits school" versus the "situationist 
school." He concludes that an interplay of traits and situation 
is most realistic. See his Leadership, passim.
^Robert C. Tucker, "The Dictator and Totalitarianism,"
World Politics 1? (July 1965): 555-584. Also Gouldner, Leader­
ship . The theoretical and methodological issue of personality and 
politics, including the relationships of individual personality to 
political behavior, is explored by Daniel J. Levinson as the 
"mirage" and "sponge" theory. See Fred I. Greenstein, "Role, 
Personality, and Social Structure in the Organizational Setting," 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 55(1959): 170-9•
^See Rosenau*s"variables" in Singer, International Politics .
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These fundamental questions are significant to des­
cribe and analyze individual political leadership and thus 
ultimately facilitate the comprehension of international 
politics. Most importantly, by using the conceptual frame­
work of individual political leadership, rather than merely 
explaining a decisional event, our ability to theorize on 
general tendencies and ascertain probable trends in inter- 
national political behavior is enhanced. We can probably 
never achieve complete predictability, but we can move closer 
to it. The success or failure of a leadership need not con­
cern us. Although time is a crucial dimension in the leader­
ship process, success or failure is a time-perspective, thus 
everchanging.
This lack of predictability, contemporarily at a low
2
level both normatively and empirically, is particularly 
noticeable in studies of the chief formulator of a nation­
state's foreign policies.^ To know more about this individual
^See Lasswell's five objectives for social scientists 
in Hopkins and Mansbach, International Politics, p. 30.
^For a discussion of the need of predictability to 
permit our discipline to be termed a political science, see 
Vernon Van Dyke, Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis 
(Stanford:Stanford University Press, 1962), Ch. 15:"The Study 
of Politics: A Science?" pp 191-205. It is necessary not only 
to understand a situation, but to be able to do something about it.
^Kenneth N, Waltz, "The Relation of States to Their 
World," paper presented at Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, Chicago, September 5-9, 1967. Waltz reit­
erates a previous point, that thTere exists a tendency on the part 
of many American political scientists to separate international 
relations and domestic politics, not only as what to study, but 
how. Thus international politics is viewed often as relationships
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actor would enable the construction of theories or conceptual 
systemization of international politics in general. However, 
as noted, in Rosenau's analysis of the variables in foreign 
policy formulation— external, individual, role, governmental, 
and societal— -the least studied is the individual, his person­
ality, experience, intellect, values and political style.^
We now turn to how to study this particular factor in political 
leadership, the individual himself.
The Research Design: Assumptions, Aims, Sources and Structure
In order to warn the reader of the prejudices en­
countered herein, notice should be taken of some major re­
search assumptions.
1. International politics is reduced to the political 
behavior of individuals, who by their relationships and inter­
action determine the performance of the political system in 
maintaining order, stability, and national unity. George E. G. 
Gatlin definitively expressed this assumption in 1927 when 
saying: "The subject matter of politics is the acts of indi­
viduals, not of states; the individual will is the political
between nation-states while domestic politics is analyzed al­
most exclusviely in sociological terms.
^James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy 
(New York: Free Press, 1971), PP- 95-150 or Rosenau, "Fre- 
Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" in R. Barry Farrell (ed.), 
Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 27-92. Lerche and Said, 
International Politics, pp. xi-xii note that international politics 
may be analyzed on three levels: the individual political actor, 
the political system structure and the substance of political action.
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unlt."^ In particular instances. International behavior then 
"becomes" a particular individual's behavior, in what DeRivera 
has termed, "the psychological dimension of foreign policy."
2. Today many American social scientists believe that 
the goals of the individual political leader and leadership 
itself are processes of action-reaction-interaction. However, 
in international behavior, process is often, if not predomin­
ately, secondary. This is an important assumption, but one 
beyond the scope of this study to explore in any depth. Still, 
it must be remembered that domestic and foreign behaviors have 
distinct patterns of their own, with no, or at most little, 
correlation between the two. In either case, foreign political 
behavior is primarily individual behavior and not necessarily 
to be analyzed as subject to the same forces as domestic 
leadership behavior.
^George E. G. Gatlin, Science and Method of Politics 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927), pp. 141-2.
^Joseph H. DeRivera, The Psychological Dimension of 
Foreign Policy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Pub. Co.,
1968)7 pp."'2^.
3gee the multitude of Peace Research Society Papers, 
including those published since 1964 in The Journal of Peace 
Research (Oslo), Johan Galtung (ed). Thus R. J. Rummel, "Re- 
search Communication: Some Attributes and Behavioral Patterns 
of Nations," The Journal of Peace Research (Oslo) 4(No. 2 1967): 
196-206 at p. 197 states that domestic and foreign conflict are 
unrelated to each other, although in his earlier papers a "small" 
correlation was found. Yet Jonathan Wilkenfeld (in "Domestic and 
Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations," The Journal of Peace 
Research (Oslo) 5(No. 1 1968):56-69) believes that some corre­
lation exists, but with an unexplanable time lag.
25
3. Individuals in political decision-making roles 
operate within the confines of a particular view of politics 
in general, often expressed as values and ideologies. This 
"operational code"^ not only includes basic orientations toward 
society and politics, but the "personality, values and aims"
of the individual and his political style.^ As "the State" 
at most or "the government" at least, these "actors" formulate 
political policies or actions resulting from such beliefs, 
which in foreign policy decision-making includes a unique view 
of world politics. Too, the political style of an actor is 
determined by the content of his philosophy at the time of 
initial political role-taking.^ Decision-makers respond to 
their own perceptions of an international event rather than
2i
necessarily the action itself.
4. By understanding the assets and liabilities of
the central actor in a political process, here the Chief Foreign 
Policy Maker, more valid comparisons of the actions of a
^Leltes, Operational Code, passim.
2
James B. Christoph (ed.). Cases in Comparative Politics 
(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., I965). See Bernard E. Brown article 
on France, pp. 129-205 at 129. Also Joel Edward Anderson, Jr., 
"The 'Operational Code' Belief System of Senator Arthur H. 
Vandenberg:An Application of the George Construct." (PhD disser­
tation. The University of Michigan, 1974).
^Robert D. Putnam, "Studying Elite Political Culture:
The Case of 'Ideology',"The American Political Science Review 65 
(September 1971):65I-68I.
h
DeRivera, Foreign Policy, p. 31.
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particular government or the goals and behavior of the larger 
international political system are permitted. This is parti­
cularly true when the cultural environment peculiar to a 
specific decision-maker is considered.
5. Thus the primary or key assumption of this dis­
sertation is that in crisis situations and with a centralization 
of power in the political executive, international political 
behavior is predominately indicative of the character of the 
Chief Executive. In other words, reciprocal relationships as 
either decision-making analyses, leader/follower analyses, or 
any other taxonomy employed, are inadequate forms for research 
and study. The political pattern of international executive 
behavior is determined during crisis/power centralization periods 
by the beliefs, attitudes, and style of the individual leader.
But this continues only so long as such institutional variables 
prevail, either practically or in the perceptions of the leader. 
Personal/positive leadership, then, in contrast to political 
process leadership, is influenced in many ways by factors tra­
ditionally characterized as "personality."^ This is not to 
say that all political behavior is determined exclusively by 
psychological factors with situational factors of little or no 
consequence. What does result, however, is expressed best by 
Greenstein:
^Greenstein, "Personality,"APSR, p. 629.
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It is. . .sometimes instructive to think of atti­
tude and situation as being in a kind of push-pull 
relationship: the stronger the attitudinal press 
for a course of action, the less the need for 
situational stimuli, and vice versa.^
As Jacques Maritain noted, it then becomes possible during
"periods of crisis, birth, or basic transformation that the
role of the inspired servants, the prophets of the people,
takes on full importance." Thus it is that political leaders
are most important when "societies first come to birth, /ÿrhen])
it is the leaders who produce the institutions of the republic.
Later, it is the institutions which produce the leaders."3
Yet even then the particular character of the leader "produced"
is of prime importance. This significance was expressed
succinctly by Eric Severid upon the transfer of executive
power from our thirty-seventh to thirty-eighth President. He
commented that:
. . .our vast complex instituions of law and govern­
ment can protect us as they have just done, but they 
can not lead the people. This immense varied society 
always requires a man, one man. We have no king, no 
Delphic oracle, nn Platonic academy of the all wise. 
What we have is the President of the United States.
One man's character will be the key to what happens 
with us, as one man's character was the key to what 
has been happening. .
^Pred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics: Problems of 
Evidence, Inference and Conceptualization.(Chicago:Markham,1969).
2
Jacques Maritain, Man and State (ChicagorUniversity of 
Chicago Press, 1951), P- l40.
^Montesquieu quoted by Schlesinger in "Leadership," 
Encounter, p. 10.
^Eric Severid, "Commentary," CBS Nightly News (Friday, 
August 9, 197%), transcribed from television by this writer.
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This "reality" is not as widely accepted in America as 
elsewhere, particularly in Prance.
During the past two or more decades, the institu­
tionalized structure of political Prance under the 5th Re­
public, including the presidency, parliament, bureaucracy, 
political parties, pressure groups, and military, are re­
flective of one leader, Charles de Gaulle. He is one man 
who not only governed, but founded a Prench Republic. Yet 
de Gaulle's attitudes, beliefs, values, habits, and style 
have been neglected, as has the "operational code" of other 
major political leaders. Primarily this neglect results 
from the existence of the many methodological difficulties 
involved in gathering or using data on the perceptions, ideals, 
and assumptions about reality held either by the international 
political elite or by an individual political leader.^ Direct 
testing and interviews are impossible. Only indirect study 
is possible or even permissible, necessitating the multi- 
methodological or cross-disciplinary approach. Thus many of
the techniques used in the mass of literature on political
2
leadership are used in this one study.
George Modelski, "The World's Poreign Ministers: A 
Political Elite," The Journal of Conflict Resolution l4(June 
1970) : 135-175.See also Ole R. Holsti, Richard A. Brody and 
Robert C. North,"Measuring Affect and Action in International 
Reaction Models: Empirical Materials from the 1962 Cuban Crisis," 
The Journal of Peace Research (Oslo) 1(1964):170-109•
^Because it is emphasized in many disciplines, political 
leadership as an areal focus has the potential to unify the 
diverse fields of study with the possibility of understanding, 
and thus coping with, the future.
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In the case of de Gaulle, the amount of data that
could be analyzed is overwhelming. Much of this sheer volume
of material is not only contradictory, but largely unveri-
fiable. Lelia Helms addresses this problem in her study by
dividing this "book form data" into distinct biographical,
descriptive, historical, polemical, ideological, doctrinal,
and methodological sections.^ Yet even with such abundant
data, large information gaps still exist, particularly con-
2
cerning the important years of childhood socialization.
However, by using the multi-method approach and indirection, 
these problems are diminished somewhat.
The data emphasized, therefore, is primary source 
materials. A major portion of these materials are found in 
the speeches, press conferences, and books by Charles de Gaulle. 
But also included are resources supplied by the New York City 
based French News Services, the United States State Department, 
the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the staff 
of the Library of Congress, and the Interlibrary Loan Service. 
Access to source materials under these respective jurisdictions 
was invaluable. Innumerable professional journals, parti­
cularly those dated from 1968 to the present were used ex­
tensively, as were doctoral dissertations and other unpublished
^Helms, "De Gaulle," pp. 8-20.
Zibid., pp. 374-8. Appendixes I, II, and III compare 
selected author’s often contradictory biographical accounts of 
de Gaulle's activities.
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materials from the same period. The intent here was to tap 
that wealth of empirical and normative studies on Prance, 
de Gaulle, and political leadership that seldom filter down 
to the widest academic level.
The majority of these documents are readily avail­
able in both French and English. However, in the case of 
the de Gaulle materials, comparative analyses of texts in 
the two languages rarely reveal any discrepancies. This is 
due essentially to the General's long-established practice 
of personally editing his speeches, press-conferences, and 
books, including "official" English translations of his works, 
with the jaundiced eye of a research historian, negating any 
necessity of post-editing. Thus in most instances, the 
English translation is utilized, although the use of such 
primary materials is not without its problems.^ When Prench 
language sources are employed, translations are by this 
writer, unless otherwise noted. Usage of the Prench texts 
is not without merit, for often the deeper and more subtle 
meanings of a statement are revealed in the use of Prench 
rules of grammar or in the various symbols of the unspoken 
language of Prench culture.
DeRivera terms these "distortion" problems. Such 
would include the passage of time from the point of a 
political action to the writing about it, plus the reasons 
for so writing. See his Foreign Policy, pp. 6-9.
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The direction of this study is two-fold. First, 
it seeks an "explanation” of de Gaulle’s political behavior, 
an emphasis on his "political psychology" or "operational 
code" in order to realize which values governed foreign 
policy decisions during his political tenure in terms of 
his norms. Such a study is not meant to apply unequivocally 
to the France of Presidents Pompidou and Giscard. Today 
France is in a socio-politico-economic structure of a trans­
ition nature, one de Gaulle did not face, although he did 
"begin." In other words, the current crisis-center is pri­
marily domestic, not international. Thus forces predominate 
other than those prevailing during the 19^0-1944 and 1958- 
1969 eras. However, many of de Gaulle’s "policies" survive, 
although whether this is by mere coincidence or design is, 
of course, debatable, as is the proposition that the reason 
his "policies" do survive is their cultural basis. Still, 
it is only with a developmental study of the individual that 
we may assess whether political behavior is indeed basically 
power compensatory or determined by role expectations.^ 
Secondly, this study seeks to emphasize political 
leadership as a conceptual focus, applicable to particular 
environmental variables. This personal/positive leadership 
is necessitated by the variables of crisis-centered and
^See George, "Power," Social Issues, and Lasswell’s
various works.
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executive power-concentrated political societies.
Decision-makers, to reiterate, can not be studied 
In Isolation. Some consideration must be made of govern­
mental Institutions. However, when a declslon-maker estab­
lishes political Institutions, as de Gaulle did, and a crisis 
situation exists, the decision-maker Is able to operate 
Irrespective of Institutional and environmental variables, 
particularly In the foreign policy arena. The methodological 
Issue here Is personality and politics, not only the concern 
of the Individual In politics, but the relationship of the 
Individual personality to political behavior. In searching 
for the answers to these questions ^  re de Gaulle, It should 
be noted that concrete foreign policies as reflections of 
his beliefs, attitudes and style are not considered In any 
depth. Policy sciences, that Is, particular political actions 
or case studies of particular decisions, are presented only 
as Illustrations of the theoretical generalizations being 
discussed. This Is necessary not only because his specific 
foreign policies have been studied, but conceivably some 
political actions may actually violate an actor's philo­
sophical alms.
Chapter Outline
Chapter II proceeds from the assumption that "political 
events have their roots In civilization and culture, the sum
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total of a people’s activities."^ Therefore, to present the
average beliefs, attitudes and perceptions of the Prench
community at large, whether termed Prench political ideas,
themes, or perspectives, permits us later to indicate whether
2
a leader deviates from these averages. Importantly, theories 
of international behavior are not grounded as much in a nation­
state’s size or geography as in a people’s relatively stable 
basic attitudes^ and perceptions reflected in culture and held
il
by the principle decision-makers. This chapter, then, seeks 
the Prench metaphysics— the world view, theology and religion 
which express ultimately the "culture-bound" nature of all 
political ideas and styles of individuals. The individual 
political leader, therefore, is not only a "product" of this 
culture, or socialized by and in it, but becomes "bound"
Albert Guerard, Prance: A Modern History (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1950), p. vli. Note 
that in this instance the broader term culture is employed, 
rather than "political culture." The latter most often is 
used not only to define the limits for political action, 
but also to indicate propensity for change in a political 
system.
2
Alfred 0. Hirschman, "The Search for Paradigms as 
a Hindrance to Understanding," World Politics 22 (April 
1970): 329-343.
^DeRivera, Poreign Policy, p. 4l.
^Hopkins and Mansbach, International Politics,
p. 95.
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by its limits in decision-making processes.^
The individual, of course, is Charles de Gaulle, 
whose political socialization and recruitment are reflected 
in Chapter III. Using autobiographical writings and bio­
graphies, this chapter briefly presents de Gaulle’s social 
background, his socialization, and adult career pattern.
Unlike historical biography where detail is used extensively, 
the attempt here is to reconstruct only salient behaviors to 
determine political role socialization variables as well as 
psychological-personality variables. This was accomplished
after researching the basic categories for biography set
2
forth by Lasswell, Edinger, and others. In large part, 
this political profile of family, school, church and peer 
group becomes an "abstract," a life history employing per­
sonality and political psychology theory, a psychobiography^ 
seeking the relationship of childhood learning and experiences
George Kateb, Political Theory: Its Nature and Uses 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), p. A good contem-
porary example is the firing of Special Watergate Prosecutor 
Cox by President Nixon, with the subsequent American reaction. 
The boundary in that instance was the concept of justice or 
fair play, although institutionally the President was acting 
legally.
2
Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics, pp. 26-7; 
Lewis Edinger and Donald D. Searing, "Social Background in 
Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry," The American Po­
litical Science Review 6l (June 196?):428-4^15; Edinger, 
"Biography:1,11,'* Journal of Politics.
^See Betty Glad, "Contributions of Psychobiography," 
in Jeanne N. Knutson (ed.). Handbook of Political Psychology 
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973), PP* 296-32lT
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to adult political behavior.^ De Gaulle's motivational values
will be analyzed within the framework of Abraham Maslow's
generalized theory of basic human "drives." To reiterate,
this chapter is required insofar as the experiences of a man's
life help account for many of the peculiarities of his thought
2
and political action as to both strengths and weaknesses.
De Gaulle's "thought" is expressed in Chapter IV.
After extensive study of the corpus of de Gaulle's writings, 
speeches and press conferences, an initial intuitive analysis 
was made of the major ideas or themes presented. Then a 
summary of selected political "value words" was included,^ 
with special emphasis on such symbols and concepts as strength, 
independence, leadership, and the nation-state. In the in­
stance of the nation-state, for example, de Gaulle's perceptions
of other countries are examined in light of Boulding's framë-
4
work of images of friends, enemies, and neutrals. By under­
standing the character traits and the normative value system
The premise that knowledge of a political leader's 
perceptions aids in the analysis of his political behavior 
raises the basic problem of obtaining such data. Thus the 
prevalence In this particular area of study of content analysis. 
See Holsti, "Cuban Crisis," Peace Research (Oslo).
^DeRivera, Foreign Policy; Ross Stagner, Psychological 
Aspects of International Conflict (Belmont,Calif.:Brooks-Cole 
Pub., 1967).
^Ralph K. White, Value-Analysis: The Nature and Use of 
Method (Glen Gardner, N.J.: Libertarian Press for the Society 
for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, 1951).
^Kenneth E. Bouldlng, The Image (Ann Arbor: The Uni­
versity of Michigan Press, 1956).
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of a leader, together with style, some predictability of
political behavior during an individual political tenure can
occur.^ John Plamenatz notes that social and political theory
does affect how individuals conduct their lives, whereas what
they believe about the physical universe does not change the
2
nature of that universe. Thus a decision-maker’s definition 
of a situation is shaped by his values, which in turn determine 
goal-choice, or foreign policy. Men's images of the world a- 
round them not only affect the way they behave, but help ex­
plain their actions. This chapter, therefore, explains de 
Gaulle's images.
How the images are manifested is the subject of 
Chapter V, the analysis of de Gaulle's leadership style and 
relationships, his personal way of responding to the demands 
of his political role as foreign policy maker. The attempt 
here is to relate behavior and values in a general sense.
The emphasis, however, is upon style, how de Gaulle did things 
in contrast to the foregoing chapter on what he thought. A 
summary of the chapter considers Barber’s paradigm of active- 
positive, active-negative, passive-positive and passive-negative
Thus Dorothy June Rudoni in her doctoral study,
"Harry S. Truman: A study in Presidential Perspective"(PhD 
dissertation. Southern Illinois University, 1968) concludes 
that Truman's perception of his presidential responsibility 
was the key determinant of his political tenure, or political 
performance. His perception was grounded in memory, imagination, 
social and political experience to form consistent beliefs or a 
personal ideology.
^See John Plamenatz,Ideology (New Ycrk.Praeger Pubs,1970)
3see Putnam,"Political Culture,"APSR,pp. 651-681.
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to discern whether as President de Gaulle enjoyed political
life. Further, was his style one manifested In "roles?"^
A"role system," If evident. Is a valid concept, that in Its
Individualistic and collectlvlstlc sense permits an essential
linkage In studying individual behavior. That Is, role
theory Intertwines or combines the "opposites" of behavlorallsm
2
and Institutionalism.
The concluding chapter. Chapter VI Integrates the 
research findings by relating de Gaulle's "operational code" 
to the predictive endeavors of our discipline. That Is, 
given his cultural background, personal Ideology, and style, 
what In a general sense could be expected In foreign policy 
during his political tenure? More Importantly, what con­
clusions may be drawn for future French policy In general 
and the study of other political leaders by the method 
employed here.
^See Barber, Presidential Character.
^See Eulau, Political Analysis, pp. vil-vill,
CHAPTER II
THE FRENCH CULTURAL MILIEU: BOUNDARIES 
OP INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR^
Introduction
Men pass, but France Is eternal. Henri-Honore Glraud.
Almond and Verba in their study. The Civic Culture, 
note that although "great Ideas of democracy," such as free­
dom, equality, and Individuality are Inspiring, the principles
2
by which the democratic polity functions are less understood. 
These "principles" Include the "norms and attitudes" of both 
the political elites and nonpolitical citizenry, actually 
"subtler cultural components" controlling the declslon-maklng 
process In general.3 Hopkins and Mansbach concur, stating 
that "International behavior theories are grounded In atti­
tudes and perceptions of culture," with major world cleavages
il
resltlng more from attitudes than geography."
Laws, customs. Institutions, and other social patterns 
broadly defined as an environment constitute a "milieu," 
although In actuality the term Is untranslatable. See Harold 
Sprout and Margaret Sprout, "Environmental Factors In the Study 
of International Politics," Journal of Conflict Resolution 1 
(December 1957):311.
^Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: 
Political Attitudes and Democracy In Five Nations (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1963), p . 3.
~^Ibld. , emphasis supplied.




In the sense of the western political systems, a
"world culture" must be acknowledged,^ even if merely viewed
or treated as a projection of the self as France has always 
2
understood it. This western world culture is identified as
a cosmopolitan one, which includes secularism, rationalism,
scientism, technology and industrialism in a basically human­
's
istic and popularistic set of political values. These 
values are reflected in diverse international goals, whether
il
considered as power, wealth and peace or glory and idea.
This "culture" is grounded on the western idea of a nation­
state as a natural phenomena of political life, a collective 
identity or integrated community held together by ethnic 
similarity, linguistic compatibility, shared traditions and 
common culture.^ Still, substantial variations in individual
^Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: 
Little, Brown & Co., 1966), pp. 9-11, 198-9.
2
Herbert Luethy, Prance Against Herself: A Perceptive 
Study of France's Past, Her Politics and Her Unending Crisis.
2d ed. tr. Eric Mosbacher. (New YOrk:Praeger,1955) j P* 12"^
o
Pye, Political Development, p. 105; Politics, Person­
ality and Nation Building (New Haven:Yale Univ. Press,1962),Ch.1.
^Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations, 4th ed 
(New York: Knopf, 1967); Aron, Peace and War; A.F.K. Organski, 
World Politics (New York:Knopf, 1958); Robert Aron, On War, tr. 
Terence Kilmartin (Garden City,N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959).
5pye, Political Development, p. 11.
^See Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1959).
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national cultures do exist. Therefore, although most states 
are concerned with preserving national security and pro­
moting general welfare in a basic foreign policy goal of
peace, the means to do so are diverse. Reaching this "common"
goal is influenced by such factors as the type of government, 
culture, and economy. Mead noted this thirty years ago:
To know the differences among the ways in which 
Frenchmen and Germans, Englishmen and Italians 
view human relationships in the family, the 
community, the nation, and the world become
differences to be taken into account in pre­
dicting whether an international conference will 
fail or succeed or in gauging the changes which 
any international plan has for acceptance.
Cultural variations then produce different policies 
or types of diplomacy. Importantly, systematic analysis of 
these variations in national culture could result in compre­
hending the "periodic tensions and misunderstandings that
p
/fFiave^ arisen between individual members." To ignore the 
cultural aspects of a nation-state in general and political 
leadership in particular is to omit a keystone of political 
analysis, particularly in world or global politics.^ This
Margaret Mead in Margaret Mead and Rhoda Metraux 
(eds.). Themes in French Culture: A Preface to a Study of 
French Community.(Stanford: The Hoover Institute and Library 
on War, Revolution and Peace: Stanford University Press, 1954. 
Hoover Institute Studies Series D : Communities, No. 1 April 
1954), p. xi. The studies were begun during the mid-1940*s.
^George A. DeVos, "National Character, 11 lESS, p.l4.
3James N. Rosenau, David Vincent and Maurice A. East, 
The Analysis of International Politics (New York: Free Press, 
1972), pp. 16-7.
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omission, however, pervades our discipline, or when con­
sidered is not taken very seriously. Still, international 
studies, in particular those employing decision-making or 
political leadership analyses, must take into consideration 
the fact that political events or national behavior originate 
in the sum of a people’s activities. Spitzer terms this the 
"totality of meanings, values and norms possessed by the 
interacting persons and vehicles," more commonly referred to 
as culture and civilization.^ All explanations of natural 
events and human behavior then are " c u l t u r e - r e l a t i v e . Not 
only are political Ideas affected, and effected, by culture, 
but the Individual political style of leadership Is culture- 
bound. That Is, the leadership role must be analyzed as a 
phenomena of political culture modified by personality. Re­
gardless of who or what the leadership Is, culturally imposed 
limitations or mores In political action exist. Conceivably, 
these expressions of a way of life of a given region and 
time could have more universal applicability.3
In some Instances, then, general social forces set 
boundaries for the Individual’s overt behavior, although as
^Stephen P. Spitzer, The Sociology of Personality: An 
Enduring Problem In Psychology (New York: Van Nostrand Relnhold 
Co., 1959), pp. 203-4.
^Karl M. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Har- 
court, Lrace, 1949), pp. 129-130.
3see Hopkins and Mansbach, International Politics, p.l45
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Eulau notes, "the future Is always a combination of causal 
Influences from the past with unpredictable elements."- Yet 
social forces or culture Influence how an Individual per­
ceives his environment and how he copes with perceptions
2
such as authority, obedience, loyalty or friendship. Such 
historically affected symbols as national pride. Identity 
goals, myths, education, language, experience and Ideology 
should be considered.3 To reiterate, culture must be a 
prime consideration for political analysts In so far as a 
political leader Is assumed, generally speaking, to be 
socialized In the particular culture he leads. Too, every 
age and country has had powerful personalities. However, 
the development of these figures Is favored or hindered by 
the specific cultural climate. This significance for Inter­
national studies Is recognized In Kelman's statement that:
The culture Into which the Individual becomes 
socialized makes available to him certain national 
self-images. Images of the outsider In general. 
Images of specific other nations, and Images of 
an Intersocletal order.
The development of these Images Is part and parcel of the
1
Eulau, Political Analysis, p. 359. Also Andrew S. 
McFarland, Power and Leadership In Pluralist Systems (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 174.
^Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of 
International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1962), p. 500, 503.
^Hopkins and Mansbach, International Politics, p. l45.
^Herbert C. Kelman, International Behavior: A Social- 
Psychological Analysis (New York: Rinehart & Winston, 19&5), p.43.
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culture or subculture which develops them.^ Duljker terms
these character-images shaped by a particular culture as
"cultural character," uniformities which arise during the
2
socialization process in a particular cultural milieu.
Whether termed cultural differences or national 
character, the cultural applications to political commentary 
are not easy ones to make. First, personal qualities, 
whether considered on the individual plane or as national and 
social character, do not permit the ready use of precise 
analysis by political scientists. Therefore we often leave 
vital elements, including political leadership analysis in 
general, to other disciplines, particularly disciples of 
Clio, the Muse of History. Still, as Knorr and Rosenau 
comment :
Political science should move into historical 
research so the understanding of the past will 
not be in the exclusive hands of the literati 
and subject to first one revisionist or counter­
revisionist interpretation after another.3
Secondly, difficulty results from the proliferation of the 
meaning of the term "culture" and such sister and subcon­
cepts as "society," "political culture," and "national
^Boulding, The Image, p. l6.
^Hubertus C. J. Duijker and N. H. Frijda, National 
Character and National Sterotypes: A Trend Report Prepared 
for the International Union of Scientific Psychology (UNESCO : 
Amsterdam North-Holland Pub. Co., I960), pp. 12-29?
^Kiaus Knorr and James D. Rosenau (ed.), Contending 
Approaches to International Politics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, I969, The Center for International Studies), 
p. 82. Emphasis supplied.
character," among others. Unfortunately, the working defi­
nitions of such concepts relate more information about tlu' 
author or observer of a study than the concept or nation 
being analyzed.^ Thus the differences between "culture," 
"society," and other concepts are essentially theoretical 
and methodological variations of the sister disciplines of 
American sociology and anthropology. For example, anthro­
pologists view culture pattern as the basic concept, while
2
sociologists use social structure as the key. Add to this 
the political scientist with his emphasis on political 
culture, which includes general acculturation, political 
socialization and political recruitment, and the concept be- 
comes more complex. For example, Almond and Verba employ 
the "narrower" application of "political culture," terming 
it the attitudes, beliefs and sentiments prevailing in 
the total population yet fundamental to those distinct parts 
termed political behavior and the political process.^ "Child
Claude Lévi-Strauss, Les structures élémentaires 
de la parent/ (Paris: Presses Universitaries de France,
1949). Also Lévi-Strauss quoted in Laurence Wylie and 
Armand Begu^, Deux villages (Anthropologie Structurale de 
Paris: 1958), p. 22.
^Milton Singer, "Culture," lESS. Vol. 3, p. 528.
O
More specifically, political culture is that "system 
of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which 
defines the situation in which political action takes place.
It provides the subjective orientation to politics." Verba, 
Political Culture, p. 513.
/I
Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, p. 32; Pye, Political 
Development, p. 104.
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development" then is replaced by the concept "political 
socialization," while "national character" or its subcon­
cept "modal personality" is ignored. Mead and Metraux, 
rather than using "character" or "culture," turn to the 
term "cultural character structure."^ George totally dis­
regards culture and role in favor of "predisposition," 
"environment," and "response." It is little wonder that 
the concept "culture," even "political culture," may or 
even has become unusable as currently employed. In light 
of the current study's emphasis. Lane's explanation of 
change in political ideology is important as an attempt to 
clear the air. He says:
For any society: an existential base creating 
certain common experiences interpreted through 
certain cultural premises by men with certain 
personal qualities in the light of certain social 
conflicts produces certain political ideologies.3
This too is culture, for both concepts emphasize group ex­
perience over individual experience, social over case history,
il
and the shared institutional and common bonds over the unique. 
Yet "political culture," just as the generalized term 
culture, includes such basic elements as economics, history.
Margaret Mead in Margaret Mead and Rhoda Metraux, 
The Study of Culture at a Distance (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1953), p. 4.
p
See his Operational Code or Woodrow Wilson.
3hane, Political Ideology, pp. 415-6.
^Ibid., p. 10 and 4l6.
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politics and social structure with the principal components 
of values, beliefs and emotional attitudes. Still, regard­
less of the concept employed, what is right or normative, 
cognitive or existential— that is, how things actually are 
in the real world, and affective or emotional reactions or 
feelings are never clearly delineated. We then come full 
circle from the view expressed in I871 that culture^ is a 
complex whole which includes many "capabilities and habits 
acquired by man as a member of society" to the contemporary 
American political science emphasis on "political culture."
The latter concept encompasses "many others, including polit­
ical ideology, national ethos and spirit, national political 
psychology and the fundamental values of a people."-* To 
repeat, culture, even "political" culture, has many variations, 
usually in direct relationship to the professional orientation 
or theoretical bent and methodologies employed. It is there­
fore possible for different observers of the same national 
behavioral patterns to reach diametrically opposed conclusions.^ 
For purposes herein, particularly in relation to the French,
Will Durant and Ariel Durant, The Story of Civilization: 
The Age of Voltaire, IX(New York: Simon & Schuster, I965). See 
their discussion of the French term "civilization," a word coined 
to signify an advancement in social culture with progress in 
the arts, science and statecraft.
2
Edward Tylor, Primitive Culture: Researches into the 
Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art 
and Custom (New York: Harper, 1958), p. 1 of Vol. I(orig. TÏÏ71-4),
^DeVos, "Political Culture,"lESS, 12, p. 2l8.
^Sprout and Sprout, International Politics, pp. 500-3*
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"culture" has a more valid application than "political culture," 
although by American "standards" the latter is included in 
what is being discussed. However, the French themselves 
emphasize culture or civilization above all other concepts.
In simplest terms, then, what may be called either culture 
or national character is a general spirit or a genius of a 
national civilization^ resulting from the independent but 
interpenetrating status of social, personality, and culture
p
systems. In broadest terms, French culture may be defined 
as a perspective shared in a particular group, whether viewed 
as a community at large or elites.  ^ That "perspective" or 
attitude includes the basic beliefs or ideology^ of identity, 
goals, and expectations of others, including nations and 
roles. It may be termed a "basic personality structure"^ or 
a "national character," a concept generally refined as those
^E. Sapir, "Culture, Genuine and Spurious," American 
Journal of Sociology 29 (January 1922): 401-429.
2
Talcott Parsons, "Some Comments on the General Theory 
of Action," American Sociological Review 18 (1953):618-63I.
^See Hirschman, "Search for Paradigms," World Politics.
^Ideology was originally a French word meaning the 
science or study of ideas.
^Abram Kardiner, "The Concept of Basic Personality 
Structure as an Operational Tool in the Social Sciences" in 
Ralph Linton (ed.). The Science of Man in the World Crisis 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), p p . 459-483.
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"relatively enduring personality characteristics and patterns 
that are modal among the adult members of the society."^ This 
national character or "basic personality structure" includes 
man's genius, his world view or Weltanschauung, and values, 
as either "social character" or "personal qualities." Cul­
tural values, goals or perspectives are "publicly recognized" 
in either a positive or negative way, but always intelligible
to the audience. These "value orientations" or ethics in­
fluence all individual and group behavior, including man- 
environment relationships, the expectations of one individual 
toward another, and individual role perceptions in conjunction
o
with perceptions of other nations. What a society or culture 
is, then, is determined by the underlying "conjunction of 
forces, habits, interests, and i d e a s , w h i c h  gives life 
meaning, that world view termed by many as ideology.
This complex semantic jungle leaves us with no satis­
factory concept of either culture or national character.
Alex Inkeles and Daniel J. Levinson, "National Char­
acter: The Study of Modal Personality and Sociocultural Systems" 
in Gardner Lindzey (ed.). Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. II 
(Cambridge, Mass.:ADdison-Wesley Pub. Co., Inc., 1954), pp. 
977-1020.
2
Anthony F. C. Wallace, Culture and Personality, 2d ed. 
(New York: Random House, 1970 (orig. 1940)); Robert Lane, 
Political Thinking and Consciousness: The Private Life of the 
Political Mind (Chicago: Markham Pub. Co., 1969).
^Lane, Political Thinking,p. 20.
^August Heckscher in Raymond Aron and August Heckscher,
A Diversity of Worlds:France and the United States Look at Their 
Common Problems (New York: Reynal & Co., 1954), p. 159.
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Explicit or Implied Is the meaning of that which has been 
acquired through a lifetime's learning and Interaction with 
other Individuals.^ Enduring personality characteristics 
and unique life styles are traceable to formative Influences 
of a cultural character.^ Essentially national character Is 
beliefs, not reality. As such. It Is often expressed as an 
Ideal adult character of major Importance for parents and 
other adults In authority to use as behavioral examples In 
child-rearing techniques. These beliefs or values seem to 
be a hierarchical arrangement. The "top" Is comprised of a 
small number of broadly defined values, then a "middle range" 
or more specific norms and values held by subsections of the 
population, and finally the "base" or Individual personality. 
This Is true only If we first accept the Idea that a "degree 
of uniformity of character structure occurs among the Indi­
viduals who participate In any given set of cultural behaviors.
^Duijker and Prljda, National Character, p. 165.
^DeVos, "National Character," JESS, p. 15.
^Geoffrey Gorer, The Concept of National Character 
(Middlesex, England: Harmondsworth for Penguin Books, 1950),
p. 77.
^Bateson, "Systematic Approaches," Journal of Person­
ality 11, p. 131.
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Still, "national" character is a given set, with individual 
character differing from another more in relative strength 
and mutual interplay than mere tendencies. Cultural behaviors 
can be explained by examining how the learning process is 
"rigged," i.e., what the context for learning cultural vari­
ations is. Here will be found not only the content of thought 
in a society, but the way of thinking— those "pervasive patterns 
of sensing and thinking, of believing and orienting, that are 
characteristic of human behavior in a particular place at a 
particular time. Thus in any complex society several "levels" 
of culture exist, each transmitted primarily through the family,
with the aid of such other social groups as religious associations,
2
philosophical schools, and academies.
To understand specific objectives of a country's foreign 
policy, whether expressed as national interest, purpose, or 
destiny, requires some consideration of culture, including the 
symbols and nonlegal restraints of national myths and national 
ideas or traditions of the national past with its heroes.3
^Eulau, Political Analysis, p. 355. In other words, 
what is being discussed is ethos.
^Thomas Bottomore, Elites and Society (New York: Basic 
Books Inc., 1965)J pp. 1-9* See also Eliot, Notes Toward the 
Definition of Culture.
^Sprout and Sprout, International Politics, p p .
500-503.
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French Culture: A Research Dilemma
Such an analysis of cultural characteristics or 
national character suggests a Pandora's box at best. The 
ideal research precondition would be to study a homogeneous 
society, with little societal fragmentation. As Pye notes, 
a political culture relatively homogeneous with a stable 
political system presents factual evidence to validate the 
normative statement that such a society would have core 
values that directly effect its foreign policy. In such a 
culture, each generation is socialized out of common exper­
ience and against a common memory of past traditions, with 
family, religion, etc. reinforcing each other.^ However, we 
are not to consider here the realities of whether any society, 
in particular a French society, is homogeneous or heterogeneous 
or whether indeed there exists within French culture one dominant 
structure (highly unlikely) or many subcultures. Empirical 
data and normative considerations undeniably are evident to 
support the existence or nonexistence of any number of these 
combinations, just as it is possible to "prove" national 
character is nonexistent.2
It is not the intent here to discuss all aspects of 
French national character. To do so would require examination
^Pye, Political Development, p. 105.
^William R . Schpnfeld, Youth and Authority in France: A 
Study of Secondary Schools (Beverly Hills, Calif.:A Sage Pro- 
fessional Paper, 1971), p. 8; Duijker and Frijda, National 
Character, pp. 31-2.
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of such simple cultural patterns as diet, dress, and work 
habits,and the more complex habitual thought patterns, in­
cluding any rationalized religious system, political and 
social patterns.1 Too, common values of all systems, such 
as the universal will to survive, will be assumed without 
further discussion. Rather, the consideration here is to 
analyze the dominant cultural characteristics from which, 
in which, and through which the political leadership functions,
but recognizing that "individual" variations are merely vari-
2
ations on the same theme. Neither is it within the scope 
of this chapter, if indeed any study, to verify the validity 
of the existence of the characteristics being examined.
What is established empirical fact is not as important to 
understanding human behaviors, whether individual or cultural 
behaviors and particularly decision-making behavior, as the 
reality of what is perceived to be fact by the culture or 
individual. Using our own experiences, then, whether Americans 
are group-oriented, indeed social corporatists in practice (albeit 
limited), does not negate the reality that many perceive them­
selves as rugged individualists, shaped by a frontier spirit
^Singer, "Culture," lESS. p. 529.
^Importantly, cultural backgrounds provide a basis 
for comparative analysis. Knowing this data could result in 
meaningful comparative relationships of such things as artistic 
backgrounds of political leaders. See Paige, Readings.
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which few have experienced firsthand. Yet such a myth has
definite effects on public policy, both domestic and foreign.
One of the earliest "warnings" of the difficulties in
attempting to analyze French culture came in 1907. Bodley
referred to France as "the most complex product of civilization
on the face of the globe," and "the last country in the world
about which it is possible to generalize."^ Complexity often
leads to oversimplification, and even further to caricature
2
or stereotype, i.e., undifferentiated judgment. Such dif­
ficulties are contextual in so far as a stereotype exists only 
if the situation or context is one which favors the caricature.
In other words, the same concepts or terminology mean different 
things to different people in different contexts. This is not 
to say that auto-stereotypes or self-images and hetero-stereotypes 
or foreign images are unimportant, for "relatively stable 
opinions of a generalizing and evaluative nature" do exist.^
Yet to describe the French as both very amorous and highly 
rationalistic provides a stereotype of contradictory proportions. 
What the French society Is, of course. Is a special conjunction 
of forces, habits. Interests, and Ideas that too readily submit 
to easy caricature and oversimplification,^ partlculrly when.
159.
^J. E. C. Bodley, France (London: Macmillan, 1907), pp.3-4
2
Duijker and Frijda, National Character, p. 115.
^Ibld.
^Heckscher In Aron and Heckscher, Diversity of Worlds,
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as Bagehot warned, the illustrating of a principle requires
that a writer "exaggerate much. . .and omit much."^
To study French culture requires indirect methods of
observation, but then research in international politics and
political leadership depends to a greater extent on such 
2
methods. In some respects, all cultures are studied at a 
distance, even if one is physically there. The major problem, 
however, is that in trying to assess French culture and 
character, the measures of our own culture are employed.
One other research limitation should be noted. This 
analysis of French national character or culture applies more 
readily to the pre-1970 period and the political leadership 
thereof. Statistical data and studies since I968 are revealing 
more about an evolutionary, even revolutionary change, of the 
French culture. Since culture is never static, this natural 
evolution will eventually affect the core values, attitudes, 
etc. of France, which has been undergoing profound changes in 
her entire socio-economic structures since the 1960*s, modi­
fications actually begun as the result of the impact of World 
War II. However, these "changes," if they become such rather 
than faddish cultural experimentation, have yet to make major 
changes in the French national character.3 Too, those being
^See Norman St. John-Stevas, Walter Bagehot (Indiana:np,1958)
^Knorr and Rosenau, International Politics, pp. 10-1); Singer, 
International Politics. Decision-making, event-interaction analysis, 
and content analysis studies require indirect methodologies.
Indeed, as Lane notes, within a culture, the easiest 
and fastest to change is government. See his Political Ideology,p203.
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most affected by the changing socio-economic-political struc­
tures are still under thirty years of age and do not dominate 
the political or elite positions where cultural change would 
be reflected.
Before exploring the generalized culture or national 
character of Prance, it would be well to make brief note of 
how such characteristics have been investigated. Duijker 
broadly divides the diverse conceptions of national character 
into two main types, personality-centered and culture-centered. 
The former emphasize general patterns of personality charac­
teristics while the latter focus on habits, norms, values and 
practices. These "camps" encompass all studies in the spectrum 
(cultural, individual, and institutional), analyzing the same 
phenomena from different perspectives, with other studies 
centering on the linkages between the "types." Within these 
ranges of study, there have evolved six main conceptions, which 
may also be considered as methodologies, of national character.^ 
It is useful to review briefly these various orientations to 
culture or national character, particularly the French variation.
1). Essayistic literature from ancient to modern 
times has sought to understand and explain national character 
by the only conceptual tool available, the recording or des­
cribing a people with an emphasis on those psychological traits
^Duijker and Frijda, National Character, pp. 12-29
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supposedly characteristic of a given nation-state. Although 
a popular form, essayistic literature often falls Into stereo­
types reflecting the writer's biases or cultural references. 
However, these materials do provide unproven hypotheses, even 
Intuitive direction, for those empirical studies seeking common 
or standardized characteristics In a society.^
2). "Modal personality" Is a research strategy em­
ploying statistical concepts and presumes national character
as relatively enduring personality characteristics and patterns
2
occurlng most often among adult members of society. These 
studies Indicate not only unlmodal but multimodal personalities 
within the same national population, but more as a "character 
of a nation" than "national character." Although such a modal 
personality does seem to exist, the studies employing this 
psychological technique are not definite enough to preclude 
cultural differentiation over Individual psychological responses 
during testing. This methodology does, however, provide for 
subcultural variations In Its pluralistic variations.3 Still, 
frequency distributions of personality patterns are as hard to 
come by as essayist objectivity.
See for example Salvador de Madariaga, Englishmen, 
Frenchmen. Spaniards; An Essay In Comparative Psychology ("New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1928); Alexis de Tocquevllle, 
Democracy In America (New York: Knopf, I960).
^See Linton, Science of Man; Lindsey, Social Psychology; 
Alex Inkeles and Levinson, "National Character and Modern Political 
Systems" In F. Hsu (ed.). Psychological Anthropology: Approaches 
to Culture and Personality (Homewood:The Dorsey Press, I960), pp. 
981-3.
^Lindsey, Social Psychology, I, pp. 5-6.
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3). Basic Personality Structure Is a similar orien­
tation, but one that does take Into consideration cultural 
variations. The emphasis Is upon the belief that different 
cultures "generate" different personality types to Insure 
self-preservation. The basic beliefs or nationality are 
shared by groups as a set of symbols, an Identity. For 
example, France must "generate" acquisitive personality 
types with high discipline and acceptance of structure, such 
as punctuality. In order to be an effective Industrial society.
Basic Personality Structure Is a very generalized concept, basic 
to the culture but not necessarily to personality. Such 
cultural aspects as the family structure, childhood, and 
education are studied. It Is therefore an experience or 
explanatory concept rather than a statistical one. Impor­
tantly, It provides International relations researchers with a 
more valid use-concept Insofar as the emphasis Is on a 
nation-wide culture rather than a modal class. Gorer, however, 
views the concept as an unfortunate term, an attempt to describe 
the shared societal motives, habits, and culture of a society.^ 
To reiterate, common. Individual personality structures of 
motives or a combination of traits or motives Is the research 
focus. Thus the concept may be used with many different
See Geoffrey Gorer, The American People: A Study In 
National Character (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 19##) 
or his Exploring English Character (New York: Criterion Books, 
1955).
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personality or other theories, although that of psycho­
analytic theory is more prevalent and notorious.
4). National character may also be analyzed as
"systems of attitudes, values and beliefs held in common by
the members of a given society," or a "social personality."^
This concept variation permits analysis of the conscious
aspects of adult personality that political scientists are
more familiar with, rather than delving into the deeper
more fundamental aspects. The emphasis is on the "more or
less conscious idea-systems: beliefs, attitudes, values,
sentiments"^ obtained from representative samples of par-
■a
ticular national populations.
5). National character may also be examined from the 
standpoint of culture and personality, the psychological aspects 
of a national culture drawn from anthropological analyses.
This methodological orientation includes not only such cultur­
ally learned behavioral data as folkways, institutional practices 
and behavior, including of course political behavior, but also 
systems of norms and values evident in the culture. Thus those 
collective social patterns Important in shaping man's experiences-
^Duijker and Frijda, National Character, p. 20.
2
Alex Inkeles, "Some Sociological Observations on Culture 
and Personality Studies" in C. Kluckhohn, H. A. Murray and 
D. M. Schneider (eds.). Personality in Nature, Society and 
Culture, rev. ed. (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1953), pp- 577- 
592.
^See Sondages, Institut Français d*Opinion Publique. 
Vols. 19-31.
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religious systems, education, commerce, and observation of 
family interactions-are studied.^ Actually, within the 
culture and personality studies three approaches are evident: 
those seeking relationships between child-learning and later 
behavior, the cultural restraints of interpersonal interactions,
and the simple descriptions of a "single cultural configuration,"
2
that is, a surface description of some aspect of the life style. 
The values being observed result from a collective study of the 
"national way of life, the characteristic behaviour / s i ^  and 
the attitudes of the national p o p u l a t i o n , b a s e d  on the belief 
that certain qualities of intellect and character occur more 
frequently and are more highly valued in one society than a- 
nother. It then becomes possible to describe what pressures 
the individual will face in a political role.
6). The most restricted "meaning" of national character 
refers to the mentality reflected In a nation’s cultural 
products. Its literature, art, and philosophy. The "genius of
See Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword 
(Boston: Houghton-Mlfflln, 1946); Mead and M o r aux, Culture; 
Gorer, National Character; Lane, Political Ideology, p. 215; 
also Benedict’s Patterns of Japanese Culture (Boston:Houghton- 
Mifflin, 1934).
2 %
Mead in Mead and Metraux, Study of Culture at a
Distance, p. 15.
^Duijker and Frijda, National Character, p. 27.
^Joseph A. and V. F. Murray, Chamorros and Carolinians 
of Saipan; Personality Studies (Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard Unl- 
verslty Press, 1951); also Wylie, Deux villages.
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a people” expresses the dominant values of a culture. In 
reality, this may be more the dominant values of an elite 
rather than the whole of the population.^ In broadest 
terms, elites are source-symbols of a cultural common life, 
embodying the values that maintain that culture. Still, 
these elites might represent cultural values more clearly 
than other strata of the population. Duijker notes that 
this methodology is rarely used except by those who have 
more than a second hand knowledge of psychology, and then 
to rehash current stereotypes.  ^ Still this type of study 
could provide the key to national character, particularly 
since content analysis has been applied to such diverse media 
as speeches, mass television and children's stories.3
It should be evident that national character studies 
involve a complexity of methods. To review such methods 
makes us aware of the necessity of selectivity in what is to 
be discussed. Regardless, the phenomena of national character 
or culture can not be ignored.
During his political tenure Charles de Gaulle was 
often characterized as an aberration, a throwback to the 
nationalistic era of the nineteenth century, an ''unmodern''
^See Madariaga, Englishmen, Frenchmen, Spaniards.
2gee David C. McClelland, "Measuring Motivation in 
Phantasy; The Achievement Motive," In Harold Guetzhow(ed.), 
Groups, Leadership and Men (Pittsburgh: Carnegie Press, 1951), 
pp. 191-205. Also Duijker and Frijda, National Character, p.29.
3
Movies are a popular topic for this analysis. See pp. 
267-316 in Mead and Metraux, Study of Culture at a Distance.
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political leader. Franklin Roosevelt called de Gaulle his 
"cross of Lorraine" while Congressmen called him a "mortal 
enemy." Newsweek reported that the General ruled "like some 
popularly elected medieval monarch."^ An underlying question 
then is whether indeed de Gaulle was so different than his 
countrymen. That is, did this political leader deviate from 
French cultural norms, and if so, how? If, however, his 
actions are found to be "culturally compatible," particularly 
in re foreign policy values, what could such a "conclusion" 
have on the subsequent political leadership of Pompidou and 
Giscard?
French Culture:
Stable Instability and Contradictory Similarities
Cultural phenomena are those underlying presuppositions 
that have evolved over the generations to give life meaning, a 
world view or ideology. The elementary factor in the beliefs 
and ideals of any ideology is, of course, historical conscious­
ness.^ This brings us full circle, for the forces of the 
past are called, by some, national character. Such forces 
may either conflict, coexist or synthesize. Still, the im­
portant factor is that every society shares a history that
^"End of an era: France after de Gaulle," Newsweek 
(May 12, 1969), p. 4l.
^Mullins, "Concept of Ideology," APSR. pp. 500, 510.
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Is not experienced by any other peoples. Within this history
are deeply embedded cultural norms continually being refined
and passed from one generation to the next, culminating in the
predispositions shared by the present generation.^ When
these norms Include an "elaborate. Integrated and coherent"
belief system, there exists justifications for the exercise
of power, judgments and explanations of historical events,
differentiation between political right and wrong,causal and
moral connections between behavior and other activities, and
2
guidelines for action.
Every culture has a rhythm, an organization of the 
cycle of life Into stages from childhood to marriage to death. 
There exists a particular cultural pace of either punctuality 
(U.S.A.) or leisure (France), a historical focus on either the 
past, present (U.S.A.) or future (Prance combines all) and 
generational relationships on the use of the family (U.S.A.- 
nuclear; France-extended). These factors are reflected In
■2
the political mind as a sense of time, place, and community.^
Or to use political theory concepts, within cultural premises 
will be found time, focus, nature-Metaphyslcs; morallty-Ethlcs; 
and boundaries of knowledge-Eplstemology.^
^Rosenau, International Politics, p. l46.
^Mullins, "Concept of Ideology," APSR, pp. 500, 510, 
^Lane, Ideology. pp. 284-295.
^Ibld., p. 433.
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In short, the major cultural factors In the deter­
mination of "Frenchness" constitutes the focus here. This 
venture is limited by an inability to quantify much of the 
research phenomena being examined. However, as Brinton 
notes, this does not mean it is "unreal. The discussion 
begins with a brief examination of the general structure 
and characteristics of French culture, including selected 
aspects of the acculturation process. Some discussion will 
be made of the dominant social (family, education) and 
political (history and philosophy) determinants of French 
culture. This analysis includes those French ideal values 
and qualities which should bind its population in varying 
degrees, and in particular Charles de Gaulle during his 
political tenure.
General Structure and Characteristics of French Culture
Novice students of French society and its politics 
are immediately cognizant of the existence of numerous 
contrasts, so much so that it is impossible to use simple 
categories to classify "the way the French do or think about 
anything."2 Even self-acknowledged simple interpretations 
reveal the same author advocating contradictory characteristics
^Crane Brinton, The Americans and the French (Cambridge 
Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 29.
^Schonfeld, Youth and Authority in France, p. 8.
su
as simultaneously existing, but as the dominant French
cultural characteristic. Tocqueville, one of the first
students of national character per se recognized this:
The French character is full of contrasts, con­
stantly doing worse or better than what was ex­
pected of it, at times above, at times below, the 
level of mankind. . .temperamentally rebellious, 
better able to put up with the arbitrary and even 
violent rule of one sovereign than with the orderly 
and free government of the chief citizens; to-day 
the sworn foe of all obedience, tomorrow serving 
with a sort of passion; never so free as to go be­
yond the reach of slavery, or so enslaved as to be 
unable to break a yoke - a worshipper of change, 
of power, of success, of noise, of glamour, rather 
than of true glory, more capable of heroism than 
of virtue, of genius than of commonsense. . .the 
most brillant and dangerous of all European nations, 
the most fitted to become in turn an object of 
admiration, of pity, of terror - but never of 
indifference.^
French civilization since Tocqueville*s observations
has changed. As early as 1929, the major element of "progress'*
was recognized as a negative force of change. Siegfried
wrote that machine industrialization would destroy French 
2
individualism. Therefore to survive, France must change 
her "outlook on life, the character of her population, her 
manner of living, and her ancient conception of political 
life."3 Although Industrialization has affected French
Alexis deTocqueville, Recollections. See the new 
translation by George Lawrence, ed. J. P. Mayer and A. P.
Kerr. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1971), pp. 91-2.
^See Andre Siegfried, France: A Study in Nationality 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930).
^Heckscher in Aron and Heckscher, Diversity of Worlds, 
pp. 108-9.
65
society, the change^ Is far from complete, with many aspects 
of French civilization and its distinct personality surviving. 
Yet even with the growth of industrialization, there exists 
the French choice of values and ends. Thus contemporary 
French culture seems designated best by the Chinese symbol 
for crisis. That is, both disaster and opportunity exist in 
a ying-yang relationship. Even with the formalism and strati­
fication of the French traditional society, basic changes do 
occur. These changes, particularly those involving social 
attitudes, have been difficult for the French people to 
accept, and acceptance when accomplished is slow. For ex­
ample, in 1959 a New Franc was instituted, yet as long as 
eight years later many educated people continued to calculate 
in Old Francs.^ Thus "change," or more specifically the 
"universalizing of phenomena linked to the development of 
material civilization"^ is viewed negatively. So-called 
"inevitable" innovations are believed destructive of the 
French:
. . .flair for style and care for quality, ^ t ^  
honoring of individual prowess, the ethos of in­
dividual fulfillment; lucidity of thought, a 
passion for ideas, a certain concept of liberty, 
of human proportion, of harmony amid diversity; 
gn(3i the enrichment of the present through the past.
^See J. E. Flower, Prance Today, 2d ed (London:Methuen 
& Co., Ltd., 1973), passim.
p
John Ardagh,The New French Revolution (New York:
Harper & Row, 1968), p. 231.
^Robert Aron et al. As Others See Us: The United States 
Through Foreign Eyes Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1959)7 see particularly "From France," pp. 57-71.
^Ardagh, New French Revolution, p. 455.
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Although French culture today includes variations of 
"negative" technologically-associated characteristics, much 
of the fundamental nature of French civilization remains un­
changed. Thus a traditional political and social policy 
has been and is that of"g r a n d e u r a matter of spiritual, 
cultural and aristic prestige rather than material benefits. 
Politically this "grandeur" is the subjective determination 
of the national interest at any one period of time and even 
extends to Europe as a whole, i.e., European grandeur is 
the "Europe of States." It is a characteristic applied to 
phenomenon when no other explanation suffices.
Another longstanding characteristic is that like
most European countries, France has a long history of self-
conscious awareness of national differences,^ particularly
between the French people and "others." Studies have shown
that the essential "differences" between the French and
other nationalities are along racial and political lines.
In references to the United States and the U.S.S.R., for
example, it is believed that Russians are less dissimilar
2
to "Frenchness" than Americans. The United States has 
long been distrusted by the French for a perceived political 
immaturity, in part because our leadership— or lack thereof—
^DeVos, "National Character," lESS, p. 15.
^Library of Congress Document #8863, ADI Auxiliary 
Publication Project (Washington, D.C.:Photoduplication 
Service).
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increases the propsects for disorder, particularly nuclear
war.^ Too, the French view international "battles” as being
conducted by political, economic, and psychological means.
They emphasize the latter, while the United States prefers
2
military strength.
In contrast to the United States, but like her 
European neighbors, France continues to have an elaborate 
social grading scheme. Social distance is large, with 
status differences reflecting some variations in norms or 
codes of behavior.3 However, more so than her neighbors, 
the French social hierarchy is based on intelligence and 
adaptability, particularly the willingness to conform. At 
the top of this hierarchy are the intellectuals, a group 
which includes writers, artists, scientists, philosophers, 
religious thinkers, social theorists, political commentators, 
university teachers, lawyers, engineers, and journalists.
Ijohn T. Marcus, Neutralism and Nationalism in France; 
A Case Study (New York: Bookman Associations, 1958), p. 131.
^Aron in Aron and Heckscher. Diversity of Worlds,
p. 21.
^Duijker and Frijda, National Character. See also 
Flower, France Today.
^Bottomore, Elites and Society, p. 70.
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The role of this group is reflected in the fact that for 
several centuries intellectuals have formed nearly half the 
total number of individuals recorded in Petit Larousse.^ 
Although all intellectuals seem to nourish hopes of eventual 
membership in Richelieu’s French Academy, those accepted may 
be divided into two groups: those of the upper social class 
with strong right wing attitudes who have graduated from the 
Ecole Libre des Sciences politicques and the working middle 
class or peasantry whose leftwing attitudes came out of the 
Ecole Normale. The emphasis of this "class," however, is 
upon literary intelligence and style, to the point that 
Nourissier’s statement is valid. That is, the French have 
an "unconscious horror" of oversimple statesmen, preferring 
"enlightened despotism, brutality embellished by style,
Q
/an(^ literary intelligence as much as political." France,
then, is an exception to the rule that:
Philosophers are less numerous than the clergy, less 
intelligible than novelists, less exciting than po-. 
litical pamphleteers, less revered than scientists.^
Alain Girard (ed.). La réussite sociale: ses caractères, 
ses effets, ses lois en France (Paris: Press Universitaires de 
France, 1951), pp. 256-9.
2
Bottomore, Elites and Society, p. 76.
^François Nourissier, The French, tr. Adrienne Foulke 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), p. 102.
^G. J. Warnock, English Philosophers Since 1900 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 166.
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In contrast to the Intellectuals is the French peasant* 
a term that encompasses not only small farmers or those directly 
working the land, but artisans and bourgeois, those of the 
middle class consciousness.^ More so than the intellectuals, 
this "group"'is a characteristic rather than a statistical 
entity. Rightly or wrongly, the peasant is characterized 
as having a quick, clear, precise mind^ along with the prerev­
olutionary bourgeois conception of work and thrift. The 
French peasant is often suspicious of the outside world, al­
though he believes it operates along Descartes' rational pro­
cedures.3 He is highly individualistic, which often means 
not wanting governmenfinterferences" with agriculture. Yet 
Bonapartist tendencies are prevalent in the rural areas, usually 
as a democratic variation. Still, the "defense of the little 
peasant in French politics is traditionally as sacred as the 
defense of southern womanhood among Dixie congressmen."^
Other that the fundamental differences between 
intellectual and peasant, there are few major national and
See Ernest Labrousse, "The Evolution of Peasant Society 
in France from the Eighteenth Century to the Present" in Evelyn 
M. Acomb and Martin L. Brown Jr. (eds.), French Society and Culture 
Since the Old Regime. The Eleutherian and Mills Colloquium, 1964,of 
the Society for French Historical Studies and the Société D'Histoire 
Moderne (New York: Holt,Rinehart & Winston,Inc.,1966) pp.25,43-64
^Charles Seignobos, The Evolution of the French People,tr. 
Catherine A. Phillips (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1932), pp. 373-82
^Herbert, J. Spiro, "Comparative Politics: A Comprehensive 
Approach," APSR 56(Sept. 1962): 577-595; Andree Hoyles,"Social 
Structures" in Flowers, New France,, pp. 1-26,
^Gordon Wright,"Catholics and Peasantry in France", Polit­
ical Science Quarterly 68 (December 1953): 5^3
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regional differences between the "French P e o p l e . F r e n c h  
culture is essentially Parisian culture, not only because 
culture is something of small groups, but because Paris has 
long exercised predominant influence in this area. Paris 
has developed a form of urban psychology only with the recent 
past. Rather, families living in Paris continue formal ties 
with the countryside, not only by visits there, but by owner­
ship of second homes in the regions from which they origin­
ally came. When one speaks of French literature, what is 
really being discussed is the activity of the Paris literary 
groups.2 Still these small groups are not closed, for one of 
the main characteristics of French culture is the pluralist 
and open character of modern French society,3a factor existing 
regardless of political instability. That is, even with five 
Republics, two Empires and three provisional governments, the 
French social climate is remarkably stable.
Thus France, both politically and socially, is more an 
ideal, " a purely cerebral creation, which rests less and less 
on concrete realities:"^ France is not a race nor territory.
For an opposing viewpoint see Alex N. Dragnich and 
Jorgen Rasmussen, Ma.1 or European Governments, 4th. Ed. (Home­
wood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 197%), p p . 157-59
2see Sapir, "Culture," American Journal of Sociology.
^Brinton, French, p. 209
4jacques de Launay, DeGaulle and His France: A Psycho-
Political and Historical Portrait of Charles deGaulle. tr. 
Dorothy Albertyn (New York: The Julian Press, Inc., 1968), p.34
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but rather an "Increasing consciousness."^ To be French,
2
therefore, is to have a French mind and a French heart.
French civilization is something that can be taught and
learned, but never completely by "outsiders," at least not
enough to be a total Frenchperson.3 Thus Frenchness is a
"given," a nonmystical, nonracial, "positive" doctrine of
nationality by history.^ A Frenchman is not someone who
merely possess a French passport and speaks the language of
Descartes. Rather a Frenchman is one who knows "who broke
the Soissons vase, what happened to Buridan’s donkey, why
Parmentier gave his name to a hash, why Charles Martel saved
Christendom."5 How a Frenchman knows such things, of course,
is a matter of socialization, begun in the primary stages by
the family and the educational system.
Le foyer et l'honnête homme:
The French Home and School
Each French generation is socialized out of common 
experience and against a common memory of what Durkheim calls
iQerard, France. pp. vlli-ix.
2d . W. Brogan, French Personalities and Problems. (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), p. 60.
^Mead in Mead and Metraux, Study of Culture at a Distance,
p. 19
^Brogan, French Personalities, p. 59.
5sanche DeGramont, The French: Portrait of a People,
(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1968), p. 11.
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a "collective consciousness."^ Past traditions, the family
2
and religion, each reinforcing the other as the conscience, 
provide the rules and standards of behavior that are necessary 
to preserve social solidarity. According to many, the most 
crucial phase of this "conscience" occurs at a relatively 
early age, childhood.  ^ For in any given culture, character- 
structure is shaped not only by "innate predispositions" 
but direct and specific formal and informal influences in
h
the growth processes. The primary influence in most in­
stances is, of course, the family. And importantly, it is 
the authority relationships of the family that provide the 
predominant means to study many aspects of our discipline.
All institutions have patterns of authority, subordination 
and superordination, among actors. Thus families, just as 
all other formal and informal relationships, have political 
characteristics. Any individual's experience with any 
authority, whatever the context, conditions both attitudes
Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology, 
tr. John A. Spaulding and George Simpson. (Glenco, 111.:
Free Press, 1951), p. 584.
2pye, Political Development, p. 105.
^H. Hyman, Political Socialization (Glencoe:The 
Free Press, 1959); David Easton and R. D... Hess, "The Child's 
Political World," Midwest Journal of Political Science, V 
(August 1962-3):229-46.
4
Here again, individuals may deviate from this 
pattern. However, our interest is in the pattern itself.
See Kardiner, "Basic Personality Structure" in Linton, 
Science of Man, p. 475.
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and behavior in the national and international political
systems.^ This family authority pattern is evident in
collective adult phenomena such as folklore, political
behavior, institutional practices, religious idea systems,
rituals, and mass media, along with psychological analyses
of the essentials of the child-rearing system or even personal
2
assessment of individuals as individuals. When studies 
have been made of the French family, it has been concluded 
that the core of most family relationships is a peculiarly 
French middleclass concept, le foyer.
In both their original and subsequent research, anthro­
pological studies by Mead and Metraux have sought to explain 
le foyer as an essential ingredient to understanding French 
national culture and its self-image. Within this central 
concept they have discerned several "themes," each of which 
expands the initial view that le foyer is a husband, wife 
and children "living together in a fixed place and forming a 
closed circle."
First, there exists the conception of le foyer as a 
model for closed circle relationships. This "closed circle"
Harry Eckstein, "Proposal for a 'workshop* on the 
social bases of stable rule," (mimeo) in Schonfeld, Youth 
and Authority in France, p. 10.
^Mead and Moraux, Study of Culture at a Distance; 
Benedict, Chrysanthemum and Sword; or Gorer, National Character,
^Mead in Mead and Metraux, Themes in French Culture, 
pp. 2-3. The themes are modified somewhat herein.
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Is a sense of boundary to protect Individuals within from 
outside intruders, including "adopted" individuals. Circles 
(cercle)then are self-contained and private, even to the 
point that an individual's health is not considered a proper 
topic of public conversation. This "privateness" is sealed 
by special blood relationships, the family, or outside le 
foyer by especially strong interests. Non-circle members 
are excluded on even the most informal level. Within these 
reciprocal personal relationships, each member responds to 
the other in a way which simultaneously includes the substance 
of the next action and response. More than merely a stranger, 
outsiders are 1'étranger, one with whom there are no common 
bonds and about whose intentions there is no certainty. The 
concept is pervaded by this "basic" orientation, which is 
informative when it is recognized that le foyer is also a 
concept that could be incorporated on the national or inter­
national scale.^ The traditional family is viewed as being
a series of foyer circles encompassing past, present, and 
future. The past is continually incorporated into the present 
to provide models for the future. So too would be le foyer
nationale. In either instance, le foyer is a key to French
social stability.
Second, as previously noted, le foyer relationships 
originate an exclusive dyadic form which ultimately extends to
^Mead in Mead and Mitraux, Study of Culture at a Distance,
p. 52.
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all areas of French society. These dyadic relationships 
begin with a married couple and their children, with 
"pairing" as adult-child, male-female, and younger-older 
relationships. These relationships are as unequal partners 
with distinct roles that "favor" the older members of 
society above peers or those younger.^ Still these reci­
procal personal relationships in their compartmentalization 
between pairs of individuals, provide "strength, richness 
and significance" in the family.^
Third, danger to members of le foyer are handled by 
externalization and distantiation. Children are taught that 
violence or aggression merely leads to more of the same, al­
though some contrast exists in the Parisian expression, "as 
stupid as peace." Internal conflicts are "satisfied" by 
verbal battles, just as the chauvinistic passion is cleansed 
by a verbal antimilitarism. The traditional exceptions to 
this "rule" are during industrial strikes and baccalaureate 
week. The former is considered a valid exercise in fun, 
profit, or politics, while clashes with the police in the 
latter instance are a matter of student folklore. In 
addition, there are every fifteen years, "sudden" collapses 
in the "will to work" among a majority of the population.3
^Lane, Political Ideology, p. 268; Edward R. Tannenbaum, 
The New France (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 196I), p.27.
^"Interview with a French Couple:Dyadic Relations in the 
Foyer" in Mead and Metraux, Study of Culture at a Distance, pp.
182-8. 3jean B. Blondel, "Challenges to Democracy in Britain
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Fourth, the character and training of le foyer are 
in essence determined by the parents and have remained ex­
ceedingly stable through the generations.^ Individual de­
velopment is seen as a lifelong process, with "maturity" 
or adulthood possible after a long apprenticeship, often 
culminating only after the death of the parents. Through­
out this apprenticeship and later life, the individual 
learns that all activities inherently present two potentials 
or qualities. The most sought, of course, is bonheur or 
"welfare, felicity, Ênçü good f o r t u n e . B u t  there is also 
malheur, the failure that results when the individual does 
not use skill or personal control over his body and its 
emotions. In the end, as Voltaire noted, everything is 
done the individual, who must be satisfied with cultivating 
his own garden, for no supernatural, natural justice exists. 
All that can be understood, then, and hopefully controlled.
and France," in E. A. Goerner (ed.). Democracy in Crisis:New 
Challenges to Constitutional Democracy in the Atlantic Area 
(Notre Dame:University of Notre Dame Press, 1971)> PP* 1-17 at 
1. The "collapses" have occurred in 1909, 1920, 1936, 1953, 
and 1968.
^Mead in Mead and Metraux, Themes in French Culture, p. 27
3see Saul K. Padover with collaboration of Francois 
Goguel, Louis Rosenstock-Franck and Eric Well, French In­
stitutions: Values and Politics (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 195%), pp. 11-12.
^The latter must not be excessive and can be controlled 
by substituting verbalization for action.
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are human behavior and the physical objects around us. Such 
role expectations are revealed in French children's stories, 
where the children learn that self-discipline and rational 
planning are the only ways to achieve personal satisfactions.^ 
Rewards and deprivations in life may be equally undeserved, 
but the world can not be changed merely to satisfy human wishes. 
Therefore if one can not have what he wants, it is necessary 
to make the best of what is available by prudence and fore­
sight. Consequently, French parents admonish their children 
"Sols Sage!" in contrast to the American "Be Good!" Child- 
rearing in the French home, then, stresses intellectuality, 
including distinctions in relationships, ideas and expression. 
Besides these aspects, parents also begin the teaching of 
language. If it is true that language is the most direct ex­
pression of national character, French is unique in its content 
and style of delivery. The language lends itself to abstrac­
tion and is delivered or pronounced distinctly in a word order 
sentence structure that has a rigid fixity. This language 
art is reinforced by the educational system.
The French educational system reinforces the abstract 
nature of its language by emphasizing theoretical and encyclo­
paedic training.2 In addition, the learning process reinforces 
the very regular rules of le foyer with its emphasis on honesty 
and nonviolence and particularly the dominance-submission or
^Tannenbaum, New France, pp. 24-26. For example, McClel­
land's content analysis reveals marked differences in children's
tales, depending on the cultural translation.
2Aron, As Others See Us.
78
authority-laden,authority pattern. The latter term best 
describes French behavioral control, without Ideological con­
trol, exercised by superordinates upon subordinates.^ It Is 
a syndrome found throughout French society, but usually 
associated with the educational system. In the system of 
superordinates, the teacher directs student response thoroughly 
Not only are Instructions given as to the general curriculum, 
such as reading materials and homework, but more detailed In­
structions require student compliance. This Includes the type! 
of paper to use In doing homework, what kind of writing In­
strument to use, the general format of the writing upon the 
page and so forth.2
The entire learning process, then. In both Informal 
"familial" and formal "educational" processes. Is rigged to 
give a sense of dominance. But there Is also an emphasis on 
discrimination. For example, national geography studies are 
clued on the French hexagon shape, which Is seen as a balance 
and harmony.3 This "natural" concept of balance consequently
^Schonfeld, Youth and Authority In France, p. 72 f. 3.
2
Ibid., p. 15. Schonfeld divides this directiveness In­
to Instrumental coverage, comportmental coverage and Ideological 
coverage. This writer disagrees that Ideological coverage Is 
successful. It would appear that since some students also 
experience a chahut syndrome. I.e., rebel against the authority­
laden syndrome, the overall result of the curriculum and 
Ideological coverages Is that the students accept the former 
but eventually reject portions of the latter. See also p. 3^.
3see Joseph T. Carroll, The French; How They Live and 
Work (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, I969).
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leads to the educational Ideal which sees specialization, 
here again, technological specialization in particular, as 
a cardinal sin. Science and its technology is viewed only 
as a means. What is done with these means is a philosophic 
problem linked to happiness and justice. Thus lies at 
least one explanation for the heavy French educational re­
liance on philosophical studies. This emphasis is successful 
through an educational system so rigidly state-controlled 
that until very recently all students studied the same thing 
at the same time. Teaching, then, is deductive, rhetorical, 
formal, and preoccupied with literary style and expression 
through the emphasis on the classics, literature and logic. 
Necessarily the teacher seldom has real personal contact 
with pupils. Rather, the more important task is to train 
intellects, men of literature rather than politics.^ This
results in a "severe and savage system" of written exams,
2
from even the youngest age. For example, many an eleven 
year old preparing to enter the lycée has faced this test
question ;
Comment on the philosophical significance of the 
Gide passage where he described as a boy how his 
favorite marble rolled into a crack in the wall, 
whereupon he grew one fingernail to huge length 
to get it out, but by then lost interest in the 
marble so bit off the nail again.^
^See Ardagh, New French Revolution, p. 310. 
^Padover et French Institutions, pp. 10-15. 
^Ardagh, New French Revolution, pp. 310-316.
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Or there are the baccalaureate questions, a portion of
one question asked:
Does the "hd^e st man" of the seventeenth century 
such as he is defined by LaRochefoucald, Pascal, 
and deMere possess qualities compatible with the 
needs of contemporary society?
Such examples indicate philosophy’s role in education, 
as also evident in the fact that secondary school students 
devote an entire complementary year to the study of phil­
osophy. If the student is a science major a more limited
emphasis is required, but one still including the study of
2
logic, epistemology and ethics.
Still, there is actually little attempted ideological 
coverage in the educational system. Rather, teachers try 
objectively to communicate a critical bend of mind, an 
individualistic outlook in a humanistic education. One 
means to do this is the exercise "explication de texte." 
Students not only read, analyze and critique a given 
philosophical passage, but then are assigned a contemporary 
essay topic to employ the philosophic style, reasoning and 
expressions being studied. The' process results in pupils 
being exposed to such diverse Ideological beliefs that 
their own belief systems scatter all along the ideological 
spectrum.3 It would be rather difficult to -consider the
^Ibid.
g ^
^Mead in Mead and Metraux, Themes in French Culture, p. l6l. 
^Schonfeld, Youth and Authority in France, p. 17.
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Influence of such philosophers as De Tocqueville, Rousseau, 
Voltaire, and Peguy as being anything other than contra­
dictory.
However, it is also true that until 1900 classical 
education in France did reflect political and social sit­
uations with a sharp division between primary and secondary 
education. At that time "the people," that is, those in 
primary education, first began to acquire the free inquiry 
and free consciences created by the bourgeoise secondary 
education.^ Even before the educational reforms of 1968, 
students each week had a minimum of five hours of science, 
nine hours of math, thirteen to seventeen hours of physics, 
biology or higher math and at least nine hours of philosophy,
considerably more than the "equivalent" American student en- 
2
joyed. Still, even with philosophical diversity and the 
rigid classical emphasis, the French educational ideal re­
mains "I'honnete homme." That is, what is sought is the for­
mation of an intellectually complete man, not the specialized 
creature American society emphasizes and not even an indi­
vidual who is a "useful member of s o c i e t y . Still, the
^Henri Wallon, "The Philosophy of Education and 
Theory in France," in Martin Farber (ed.). Philosophic 
Thought in France and the United States: Essays Repre­
senting Major Trends in Contemporary American Philosophy 
(Albany, New York: State University of New York, 1950), 
pp. 320-335.
2
Ardagh, New French Revolution, p. 313; Schonfeld, 
Youth and Authority in France, p. 73.
^Luethy, France Against Herself, pp. 57-61.
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French see an essential difference between the complete 
man and the "learned idiot," a mindless man who knows, 
but does not understand. In striving for the ideal man, 
the heir to Greece and Rome, French education lays all 
importance on the unit of the individual with all his 
peculiarities, not the "unit" of society. Social or­
ganization is but a necessary evil, a means, with man 
the center of all things. Even the state is an adversary 
to be kept in bounds and any talk of social conscience 
is merely a rhetorical flower of speech. The French 
ideal is the golden mean, or correct measure, here again 
a balance or harmony of those extremes that come with the 
individualistic inclination. These values or ideals are 
inculcated by le foyer and subsequent formal education. 
Also shaped at this time is:
A person’s consciousness of himself as a citizen 
of a particular national society. . . ^his con­
sciousness is shaped also by a ^  understanding of 
what that society is. Sense of self and sense 
of nationality are intertwined. Western man 
has had a sense of history as having a beginning, 
an end, and a purpose. The idea of national 
mission and purpose emerged out of that view of 
history. Every society has its own version of how 
it came to be, where it is going, and what its 
dominant values are and should be.^
Erwin Hargrove, Professional Roles in Society and 
Government: The English Case. Sage Professional Paper, 
Comparative Politics Series, Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert 
Gurr (eds.) (Beverly Hills, California: 1972), p. 14.
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The Ought Over the Is: French History and Philosophy
It would be difficult then to ignore the effect of 
historical consciousness on a culture and its products. Even 
Mark Twain warned that to understand a Frenchman it is neces­
sary first to consult a French history book, an old one. 
Historical consciousness, however, presents a contrast be­
tween belief and reality, a prime example of the previously 
noted statement that what is is not as important as what is 
believed to be. That is, myth or legend is a most indes­
tructible creation and one not necessarily based on truth. 
Thus although the French have experienced many forms of 
government, they basically believe in an overall French 
stability. In other words, France has a fundamental unity, 
"is united," yet she is also diverse and multiple— two 
fundamental yet contradictory beliefs. Further, the French 
have the illusion of control over their political decision­
making bodies. Yet parliamentary deputies are treated as 
"influence peddlers" rather than lawmakers.^ Still another 
illusion concerns Joan of Arc, who is often cited as a means 
to understand French national feeling. More than anything 
else, this nonFrenchwoman typifies the reality that French 
national unity is not necessarily an objective fact, but
p
rather an act of faith. Schonfeld furthers the list of
^Tannenbaum, New France, pp. 6-7. 
^Guerard, France, p. xvii.
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myths and contrasts:
The French (are a people who systematically refuse 
to cooperate with one another, and yet, during 
WWII, they had one of the most effective resis­
tance organizations of any nation under German 
control.
In many respects WWII was not as much a war against
fascism as a French civil war, with de Gaulle fighting the
Vichy more than the Germans. Here is one more instance of
defeat being claimed a victory. Another contrast is that
France, still a nation of small shopkeepers, invented the
department store. A double myth is that the French fight
for disinterested causes and that enemies of France are
2
enemies of Christian civilization. Needless to say,
France as a reality is not coextensive with French govern-
■3
ment. This all inevitably results in French history and 
its theories being a melange  ^ a mixture or jumble, which 
seems to validate Voltaire’s warning that history is merely 
the tricks the living play on the dead. Thus it is possible 
to pick or choose from any number of classifications used 
to explain French history and its politics, including:
1). traditionalist, bourgeois and industrial orders
2). the traditions of authority, liberty, and equality
3). the "geological faults" of the Great Revolution 
and the Industrial Revolution
4). the forces of order and the forces of movement
^Schonfeld, Youth and Authority in France, pp. 8-9.
2 2 
DeGramont, The French, p. 65. Guerard, France, p. xii.
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or 5). the representative and administrative traditions.^
These "classifications" are not necessarily contradictory. 
Regardless, French history usually is regarded by Frenchmen 
as extraordinary, whether they disapprove or approve any
particulars. Thus French history "forms a French nature
2
which transcends French division."
It has been said that the monarchy made France and 
the Church made the monarchy. Thus Nourissier sees France 
as "the embodiement of Christianity, Monarchy by Divine 
Right, Liberty, [an^ the Rights of Man."^ It is true that 
the principles and traditions of France are monarchical, 
while the sovereign is demos.^ Thus some republicans are 
more royalist than Kings. This essential cleavage of royalism 
versus republicanism remains. Each has a distinct class 
consciousness, church, and even peasant origin. Conversely,, 
however, royalism is dead, with few denying they are re-
c
publican.^ This is true particularly relative to the lay
^See Spiro, "Comparative Politics," APSR, pp. 588-9*
2
See James Friguglietti and Emmet Kennedy (eds.). The 
Shaping of Modern France; Writings on French History Since 1715 
(London: Collier-MacMillan Ltd., 1969).
3 4
■^Nourissier, The French, pp. 7-101-110. Guerard,France,pxii
5see Nathan Constantin Leites, On the Game of Politics 
in France (Stanford, California:Stanford University Press, 1959) 
and his The Rules of the Game in Paris (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1966).
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and religious forces that have divided France since 1789•
Each "force" has its own politics, philosophy, and social 
and cultural differences, even to the point that some consider 
them two distinct nations.^ This "fact" is basically an 
intellectual cleavage caused by the Revolution and divides 
France into 1) conservative, traditionalist. Catholic, 
nationalistic and 2)individualistic, democratic, anti­
clerical pacifists.2 France is, however, by majority 
Roman Catholic, at least nominally.
The French Revolution and the Napoleonic period 
have always exercised profound influence upon the continuity 
of French historical development,^ with issues affecting
5
politics as much a part of the past as the present. This 
is true of the entire political, economic, social, and 
cultural life of the whole western world. The French Revo­
lution was not only an event, but an idea coming out of the 
classical philosophical writings of the physiocrats and 
bound to a series of societal changes. It has become even 
more, a religion complete with a dogma of liberté et egalitieV^
^Brown, "France," in Christoph, Comparative Politics,
p. 131.
2
Charlotte Touzalin Muret, French Royalist Doctrines 
Since the Revolution (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, n.p.),p.217■
^Nourissier, The French, pp. 116-7.^Acomb and Brown, 
French Society, p.12.
^Ellen D. Ellis, "French Politics and World Affairs," 
Current History 28 (May 1955): 257-263.
^The latter has become more than part of a religion. A 
legal fiction that gross Inequities of income, opportunity and 
way of life do not exist results. See Ardagh, New French Revo­
lution, p. 232.
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In worship form, this ’’religion" is an adaptation of Catholic 
ceremonial, with civic fetes, saints, heroes, and martyrs of 
liberty.^
After the French Revolution, the most Influential 
historical presence Is Napoleon 1. He exemplifies the 
French love of revolutionaries, a fact easily apparent In 
French wax museums, which are devoted primarily to revo­
lutionary figures rather than stable figures. Why this may 
be so, particularly ^  re Napoleon, was explained by Max 
Lerner:
My own feeling Is that the great man does his work 
in the frame of Impersonal forces, but there are a 
number of these forces operating, often at cross 
purposes, and the question of which will prevail 
depends on the character of the men who serve as 
their carriers and express them.2
Over 200,000 books have been written on Napoleon alone. A
French Public Opinion Institute poll questioned Frenchmen on
Napoleon’s 200th birthday. Of 100 Individuals queried, thirty-
five thought Napoleon was the greatest Frenchman ever, while
Louis XIV had a mere five points and Joan of Arc and
Charlemagne had three each. General de Gaulle was alive at
that time and not Included In the survey. Napoleon’s
popularity Is believed to be based on his efforts to advance
^Carl L. Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth 
Century Philosophers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 
p. 155 (orlg. 1932).
p
Max Lerner, "Napoleon’s Mistake: He Used Sword," 
Norman Transcript (Oklahoma) (August 21, 1969).
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the glory and grandeur of Prance.^
The Revolution, Napoleon, and subsequent events, 
all part of the French historical consciousness, also 
demonstrate the fact that France has periodically entered 
what could best be described as high pressure situations 
for centralized authoritarian leadership. Korten notes 
that such situations occur when the following factors are 
present: high drive state, national status drive, sense of 
crisis, definite goal structure, low level of technical 
skill, stress from externally imposed threats, and moti­
vations from increased level of expectations, including 
changes in values.
The greater the stress, and the less the clarity 
and general agreement on goals and path, the 
greater the compulsion among the group members to 
give power to a central person who in essence 
promise^ to remove the ambiguity and reduce the 
stress.
The crux of the matter is that the usual French form of 
government is what Schonfeld calls the "assumed-coverage" 
type. In this situation, citizens follow detailed, al­
though not necessarily formal, rules— without explicit 
leadership directions. When the governmental unit is 
perceived to act ineffectively, the relationships change 
to the authority-laden regime. Thus the French scene.
David C. Korten, "Situational Determinants of Leader­
ship Structure," Journal of Conflict Revolution 7 (September 
1962):222-235. Also Hook, The Hero in History, pp. 152-7.
^Schonfeld, Youth and Authority in France, pp. 66-72.
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whether in the home, education, or politics, is often one 
of authority versus reason. This interpretation conforms 
to the conception which argues that within each French 
person there are two different and usually diametrically 
opposed attitudes toward authority. For example:
1). Dell in 1920 wrote that the French have a 
"natural dislike for authority."^
2). Hoffman in 1963 spoke of the French need for,
2
yet fear of, authority.
3). In 1964 Crozier discussed the French desire to 
avoid face-to-face dependency relationships.
4). And in 1968 Macridis noted the political
culture dualism between the "search for authority" and the
4
deep distrust of it.
Still these traditional cleavages constitute an essential 
role in the functioning of the French political system, 
orienting not only such things as individual behavior, but 
political roles as well.
^R. Dell, My Second Country, France (New York: John 
Lane, 1920).
^Stanley Hoffmann, at In Search of France 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963)•
3
He also makes note of this attitude in his latest 
work. See Brian Crozier, De Gaulle.
h
Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, Comparative 
Politics: Notes and Readings, 3rd ed. (New York: Dorsey, 
1968); Schonfeld, Youth and “Authority in France.
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Granting that the political system reflects not 
only a nation's life but the moving force to achieve 
change, evaluation must consider not only what a parti­
cular society is, but "what it strives to become."^
The cultural phenomena of ideology, the underlying presup-
2
positions of a society's world view, and historical con­
sciousness are important, but regardless of terminology, 
at the root of it all is the basic definition of the nature 
of man. This ideological commitment of a nation-state, 
along with its bellicosity, self-control, stability, and 
physical capability shape the structure of international 
politics.^ These aspects are found in an ideology, which 
function within the constants of a French tradition or what 
Jacques Havet terms the "French genius."^ This pseudo­
concept is applicable to either a single individual or a more 
complex society. It includes "the cumulative weight of 
past experience" interacting with current stimuli.^
^Heckscher in Aron and Heckscher, Diversity of 
Worlds, p. 123"
^Mullins, "Concept of Ideology," APSR. p. 500.
^Blondell, "Challenges," in Goerner, Democracy, 
p. 10. Persistent beliefs or set of beliefs about a topic 
or related set of topics may be termed a philosophy or 
ideology.
^Waltz, "The Relation of States to Their World,"
p. 6.
^Jacques Havet, "French Philosophical Tradition 
Between the Two Wars," in Farber, Philosophic Thought, p. 5.
^Rosenau, International Politics, p. 153.
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Theoretically, a knowledge of this French ideology and the 
cumulative impact of French historical experience would 
lead to an ability to predict forms or trends of behavior.
The historical consciousness of French ideology has 
been typified as politically revolutionary while socially 
conservative.^ Traditionally this has included the revo­
lutionary slogans of equality in a hierarchy laced with 
opportunity for individual advancement. The fundamental 
idea to understand French or any philosophy or ideology 
is what the "good society" should be. This would neces­
sarily include some consideration of such theoretical con­
cepts as the nature of reality, the world view, theology 
and religion or metaphysics, and how propositions are 
connected— logic. The nature of knowledge and the principle 
for obtaining it or epistomology, and the differences be­
tween right and wrong or ethics ultimately determine whether 
the distinctions between French cultural philosophy or 
ideology are rationalist-empiricist, idealist-materialist, 
or monist-pluralist.
Between World War I and 1929, de Gaulle’s career 
formative period, three major philosophical themes, dissimilar 
though not necessarily contradictory, were prevalent in
^Luethy, France Against Herself, pp. 30-40.
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France: liberalism with Alain, traditionalism with Maurras, 
and the Socialism of Marx. These all contained elements of the 
traditional, and were followed after World War II with 
the existentialism of Sartre. The latter replaced to some 
extent the following of the philosophical materialism of the 
Vienna circle, commonly called logical positivism. This 
was largely a division of an anti-technical and nationalistic 
character which is quite consistent with the traditional 
French culture. Frenchmen have long embraced a combination 
of the Thomist tradition linked to Cartesian philosophy to 
oppose the development of material civilization so typical 
of the United States. In American thinking, thought is 
technical and every situation is looked to as a problem 
just waiting to be solved. The French look upon this as 
an "error" in logic, an essential difference between a 
craftsman civilization and industrial barbarism.^
Brinton sees French philosophy as including modern 
neopositivism with symbolic logic, a linguistic philosophy, 
but also existentialism and neoromanticism. ^  This roman­
ticism is an attitude toward life in combination with 
rationalism. For example, the French deal more with romantic
^George Duhamel, Scenes de la vie future cited in 
Aron, As Others See U s , p . 65.
2
See Brinton, The French, passim*
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politics than means. Or as Siegfried states:
Principles and ideals are the very heart and soul 
of our politics, but their eventual application 
often remains a matter of quasi-indifference.^
The emphasis then is upon fundamental principles as a means
to salvation.2
Philosophically, Thomism also exists, with its
rejection of idealism and a logicism of distinction which
establishes hierarchies. Thus many French philosophers
are classifiers, not unlike Aristotle.^
French logical and moral philosophy comes from the
teachings of Thomas, Descartes, Plato and Kant. To their
critics, disciples of these philosophers have developed
their minds only to conformity, while becoming theoretically
undisciplined and uncreative. On the positive side, however,
such individuals are schooled to think imaginatively and
verbalize with great clarity, although along predetermined
lines. That is, although not consistent by adherring to
one theory, the French are usually logical. This means a
combination of humanism and naturalism, universalism and
encyclopaedism. French thinking, then, sees:
^Siegfried, France, p. 25.
^Muret, French Royalist Doctrines, p. I69.
^Jacques Maritain, for example. See Henry Dumery, 
"Catholic Philosophy in France," in Farber, Philosophical 
Thought, pp. 219-248.
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. . .every problem is a situation, and situations 
admit not of solution but of clear perception, a 
gradual inurement, possibly a transformation effected 
by man-above all the great master of man and things, 
time.^
The French analyze a situation to note that each possible 
decision clashes with insurmountable obstacles and then 
wait until time or events remove the obstacles to the 
solution. The emphasis is upon principles. Events are 
first explained by elaborating the universal laws, gen­
eralizing about the nature of man and society and perhaps 
the facts or statement of particulars may be slighted al­
together. In other words. Popper’s initial conditions are 
2
ignored.
This rationalism, abstraction and codification in 
all fields of French social life may be traced to Descartes, 
Montesquieu, and Voltaire. It results in an incompatability 
of thought and action, the advocacy of principle before 
practice, and ultimately in uncompromising postures. Per­
sonal behavior, then, is somewhere between logicality and 
impulsiveness, between idealism and realism, with an ethic 
of enlightened self-interest, i.e., Kantian. This is the 
"Man of Thought"^ trained by Descartes to seek the rational 
meaning of the universe.
^Aron, As Others See Us, p. 62.
^Lane, Political Identity, p. 349.
^Madariaga, Englishmen, Frenchmen, Spaniards, p. 30.
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Descartes Is more than a French philosopher. For 
many Frenchmen, his writings signify the beginning of all 
philosophy and not merely a division between ancient and 
modern philosophy.^ Still, since the seventeenth century, 
the French have recognized themselves as Cartesian to the 
point that all French thinkers embrace aspects of this 
thought. That is, most thinkers distrust all knowledge 
not capable of mathematical formulation. Even human re­
lations are explainable according to laws of mechanical 
causation. Too, most French ideologies embrace the Catholic 
ideal of unique truth, that which is absolutely determinable 
at any moment. In his writings, Descartes sought to "extend 
and vindicate" knowledge derived from science and mathe­
matics, that is, mathematics is considered the ideal para­
digm of knowledge. Thus Cartesianism, although ultimately 
based on the mathematical sciences of nature and the mechan­
ical principles governing the universe, also includes the 
values and doctrines attributed to Christianity. This 
seeming paradox is rationalized by recognizing two separate 
realms: the spiritual, subjected to theology and much in­
fluenced by the teachings of St. Thomas, and the realm of 
matter and extension subjected to mathematical laws.
This "division" is dated 1637 with the publication 
of Discourse on the Method. See The Philosophical Works of 
Descartes, tr. Elizabeth Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (N.P.: 
Peter Smith Publishers, 1931).
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The French philosophy is thus bicentric, based on 
two separate theses. First, there is a sound philosophy 
which cultivates methodical doubt, that is, the prelude to 
philosophical inquiry is doubt. There is then a psycho­
metaphysical tradition, the cogito. The only thing one can 
not doubt is his doubting, expressed by Descartes as "I 
think, therefore, I am."^ The universal or primary truth 
is experience or immediate awareness, subjective critical 
reflection wherein the experience of thought is in thinking.^ 
Therefore one must not only "have a good mind" but apply it 
well, in other words have and use common sense.3
Disciples of this, thought investigate limited areas 
rather than attempting to explain everything. Thus Descartes 
is existential, with a stress on consciousness, but is not 
an existentialist. The essence of mind is to think, to explore 
with logical tools a world which is made up of precise entities, 
orderly arranged. The representation in our mind forms an 
"objective" reality, which in turn reveals a "formal reality." 
The latter is the idea of the Infinite and perfect Being, 
for the perfection of God (the First Cause) brings with it His
Rene Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly 
Conducting the Reason and Seeking for Truth in the Sciences 
in Works, pp. 95-100.
2gee Rene LeSene, "La Philosophie de I'esplrit" in 
Farber, Philosophic Thought, pp. 103-120.
^Descartes, Discourse, Part I in Works, pp. 81-7.
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truth-system of Eternal verities.^ Man then attains God by 
supernatural revelation and by "natural light" or reason.
To know this, man can then dominate nature without alien­
ating himself from it. This is very consistent with that 
which Thomas set out to do when he rationalized Greek pagan
philosophy with aspects of Catholicism, revelation and faith.
2
Soul and body is an original indivisibility. The human 
personality is joined to that universality whose origin is 
in God and of which the world is the realization. This 
nature of man is within the Platonic tradition and is 
acceptable to both St. Thomas and Descartes.
Cartesian philosophy is a secularized version of 
Reformist thought presented as a paradigm of philosophical 
rationalism and incorporating two elements of French culture, 
the humanism of the Greco-Latin era and Christian thought. 
This is evident in the Cartesian method, which begins with 
the admonition that one commence with simple rather than 
complex notions. The method is of classic symmetrical 
syllogisms where that which is disagreed with is discarded, 
not necessarily because it is intrinsically wrong, but seems
^See his Fourth Meditation in Works, pp. 171-9. 
^Passions of the Soul in Works, pp. 331-^27.
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wrongly reasoned. Only those beliefs which are derived 
deductively from Intuitively evident principles should 
be accepted as reliable. These two basic divsions may 
be examined in greater detail as follows:
1). Nothing is true unless it is clearly known 
to be so.
2). Every difficulty should be divided into as 
many parts as necessary to resolve it.
3). Deal with problems in their order of difficulty, 
beginning with the simplest and easiest to the most complex.
4). Make exhaustive general reviews to ensure that 
nothing is left out.
This philosophical rationalism, rather than an
empiricist one, develops the belief that there are self-
evident and nontautological truths from which can be deduced
substantial conclusions about the way things have been, are,
and will be. But always the following dictum is present:
/Th^ power of judging well and of distinguishing 
the true from the false . . .is naturally equal in 
all men. . . The diversity of our opinions arises 
from the fact that we conduct our thoughts along 
different paths and do not consider the same things.^
The man of Cartesian thought, therefore, finds his center of
gravity in the intellect. In fact, thinking is his natural
1
So men do not have differing amounts of reason. See 
Descartes, Discourse, Part 1 in Works, pp. 81-7.
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reaction to life, to the point where theorizing "prethinks" 
abstract future problems. In this process, definition and 
classification permits not only "knowing" but "foreseeing."
All is judged by intellectual standards which then can not, 
must not, be sacrificed by such tactics as compromise. To 
do so would mean sacrificing order. One result of this 
type of thought is a complicated French system of written 
laws whose end is foreseeing all possible cases within a 
general network of principles, the Civil Code and le droit.
The French mind is one tending toward universalism, 
with the egocentric attitude that their case is the case of 
the human race. Humanism provides a basis for individualism, 
or vice versa, in that all men have something in common—  
reason.1 Individualism, then, is a cardinal virtue of French 
philosophy and is evident throughout French society. To 
some this means France's image includes the reign of the self, 
the quest for privilege, deceit, imposture, trickery, "I do 
as I like," to the point of cynicism. This individualism 
is learned and has at its base the notion that each should 
act or be according to his own taste. However, this applies 
only to those who have been assimilated in the proper, cultural
^Henri Wallon, "The Philosophy of Education in France," 
in Farber, Philosophic Thought, p. 325.
^Leites, Rules of the Game, passim.
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norms of the French society. This individualism is a human 
value and to the French is both universal and comprehensible. 
Therefore the emphasis is on striving for precision and 
clarity in the belief that any complex and personally stated 
idea may be communicated or known exactly if it can be re­
lated logically to the traditional and what is commonly known. 
Since logic is assigning things and ideas to their proper 
categories, so personal happiness is behavior appropriate to 
each particular compartment of life; otherwise frustration 
and maladjustment result. However, this attitude often re­
sults in leaving few things unsaid in a spirit of frankness 
and honesty that is assumed to be bad manners in other cultures. 
Candor in politics has prevented some tacit agreements to be 
arrived at silently elsewhere. However, nonpolitical relations 
in France have a clearness and definiteness lacking in other 
cultures.1 DeTocqueville viewed this individualism as:
. . .a mature and calm feeling, which disposes each 
member of the community to sever himself from the 
mass of his fellow creatures: and to draw apart 
with his family and friends: so that, after he has 
thus formed a little circle of his own, he willingly 
leaves society at large to itself. . .individualism 
is of democratic origin, and it threatens to spread 
in the same ratio as the equality of conditions.2
^Tannenbaum, New France, passim.
^Alexis DeTocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. J. 
P. Mayer, Vol. Ill (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1969), Bk. 
2, Ch. 2. Note the similarity to our previous discussion of 
le foyer and a closed circle arrangement.
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The emphasis is on logic and precision with issues affecting
politics viewed as much a part of the revolutionary past as
the present. Thus individualism carries over to the foreign
policy area, for what is a French "domestic" concern is
universal, therefore also a part of foreign policy. This
individualism is reflected in French politics then as:
. . .large and sweeping practical maxims, from 
which, as ultimate premises, men reason downwards 
to particular applications, and this they call 
being logical and consistent. . ., measure 
ought to be adopted because it is the consequence 
of the principle on which the form of government 
is founded; of the principle of legitimacy, or the 
principle of sovereignty of the people.^
As an adult "individualist," a person is free to
make choices and improvise in ways that will be understood
by other persons with the same background of home training
and education. Thus it is to some anthropologists and
philosophers that French values and ideas are universal ones.
Yet to reiterate, only people born into a French family and
reared in France can communicate with others from similar
backgrounds at all levels of experience. As Ernest Renan
notes, there must be "a common possession of a rich legacy
of memories."2 Still there are enough alternative forms
Ijohn Stuart Mill, A System of Logic (London: Longmans, 
Green and Company, 1936), p. 618.
^Ernest Renan quoted in DeGramont, The French, 
p. 65. See also Tannenbaum, New France.
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of behavior to accommodate all tastes and temperaments.
This individualism is both a weakness and a "grandeur."
Within it, the French have an acute sense of right and 
devotion to what they consider logical. However, this re­
sults in internal discords, particularly in its extremes.
An example may be seen in French social manners. Anonymity 
is revealed in the unusual fear of informal relations among 
subordinates and superiors, and the desire to preserve pri­
vacy, which presents difficulties in allocating responsibility 
in the French system.^ Office workers, government employees, 
and teachers, among others,refuse to give their names in 
social intercourse. This notion of "discretion" is a pillar 
of French manners and tends to discourage name exchanging or 
familiarity. It further encourages a characteristic of 
French political, economic, and social life known as le système, 
se débrouiller, or popularly, le Système D , which is trans­
lated best as a uniquely Gallic caginess. This "technique" 
serves to circumvent the bureaucratic system in order to 
give human proportion to inhuman official procedures. It 
is necessitated by the "vicious circle of impersonal auth­
oritarianism pervading all official life. Thus system D
^See Brogan, French Personalities, passim. 
^Ardagh, New French Revolution, pp. 441-3.
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is a method for cutting corners, a way of getting through
red tape by working the angles, with such "benefits" as
not paying taxes.^ This anonymity also effects political
buck-passing, which is more culturally complex, incorporating
the French concept of an authority which is absolute, monarchic,
2
and here again, anonymous. In all, the result is the French 
tendency to enter into some enterprise and then deliberately 
scuttle it. Or there is "the lifting of the mortgage" and 
"waiting," to proceed by stages for fear that premature 
announcment of a solution may be fatal to success. But 
then there is the French belief that decisions are "valid" 
only if conceived in the heat of a decision. The passage 
of time will provide an automatic solution or that ingenuity 
will find a solution if only enough time is available. 
Equivocation is thus a means of making possible temporary 
alliances, and action is to be taken only when catastrophe 
appears. The immediate future alone is taken into account. 
These ways of behaving at the domestic level are extended to 
foreign affairs. For example, France accepted and then re­
jected the European Defense Community. She rejected the 
Paris Agreements of 1954 but had accepted detailed blueprints
^This is in contrast to the English method of "muddling 
through."
^Ardagh, New French Revolution, p. 443.
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for them earlier in the London Agreement.^ Aptly, the
French are often called "girouette" or weather vane, often
2
changing camps and those they support. Yet even when there 
have been campaigns to end these "tactics," those In the
•3
campaign refuse to give their names.
The French emphasis on Individuality may also be 
seen In that until the late 1940's, there were few organi­
zations of any klnd-rellglous, economic, or social— that 
the French joined.^ "Joining" was, and even Is, not necessary 
for personal happiness or "le bonheur." Personal happiness 
Is achieved by a delicate balance of skill, foresight and 
the exercise of enlightened control. Such happiness can 
come only with maturity and the human dignity and privacy 
an adult alone can possess. Hence the validity of Mead's 
comment that French childhood Is a long apprenticeship to 
adulthood.
This central characteristics of French Individualism 
Is reflected also In French life by the struggle of the In­
dividual against the state, a struggle so Important that 
there Is a separate entity established for administrative
1
Leltes, Politics In France, p. 2.
2
DeGramont, The French, pp. 105-6.
^Washington Post (January 20th,197-^), p. G-2.
4Tannenbaum, New France, p. 5.
^Mead In Mead and Metraux, Themes In French Culture.
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justice. The state then is an important concept to note,
for at the root of subsequent international maladjustments
is the development in children of the idea of the homeland
and of the relations with other countries.^ Even in the
most individualistic French Anarchist can be found the old
2
nationalist tradition. However, this is an attachment to 
a nation-state, not to a language.^ In this, the French have 
been greatly influenced by Bodin in regard to his ideas of 
peace and order as the end of the state, and also to Grotius. 
Contemporarily, Maurras has exercised influence with his 
theory of integral nationalism, which he states as "the 
exclusive pursuit of national policies, the absolute main­
tenance of national integrity and the steady increase of
national power, for a nation declines when it loses military 
4might." This nationalism, the Jesuits recognized, "combined 
the new recognition of political facts with ancient ideals 
of unity, and the older conception of law as an eternal 
verity."^ States then are juristicly equal persons, but unequal
Jean Piaget and Anne Marie Weil, "The Development in 
Children of the Idea of the Homeland and of Relations with Other 
Countries, International Social Science Bulletin, 3(1951):561.
^P^uy, Situations (Paris: Galliard, 1940).
^DeGramont, The French, p. 196.
^Colette Capitan-Peter, Charles Maurras et l ’idéologie 
d'action française (Paris: Edition du Seuil, 1972).
5j. N. Figgis, Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 196o)7 p. 2l6.
io6
in power. Thus the state is an adversary to be kept in 
bounds.^ Appeals to a Frenchman's nationalistic pride find 
responsive audiences, whereas an appeal from a particular 
regime usually does not. Here is the reoccurring indication 
of the fact that although Frenchmen disagree on the details
of their political or social system, they do not disagree on
2
its "essentials.” This reinforces the fact that French in­
dividual character is based exclusively on the awareness of
o
a common civilization.^ This belief is a conservative one,
as Montesquieu recognized:
The problem for individuals and for nations is not 
to create themselves as they would wish to be (an 
impossible task!) but to keep themselves as the 
centuries have predestined them.
Throughout, therefore, the French view of politics is as a
theater, a show at which they are satisfied to be passive
spectators.^
The French state is expected to assume a moral role 
with the Civil Code providing a behavioral model for those 
good citizens who obey that state.^ Equality before the
^Luethy, France Against Herself, p. 57.
^Maurice Duverger, The French Political System, tr.
Barbara and Robert North (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1958), p. 5 .
^Luethy, France Against Herself, p. 3.
^Leon de Montesquieu, Les Raisons du nationalisme, pp.
15-6 in Muret, French Royalist Doctrines, p. 221.
^Nourissier, The French, p. 107. ^DeGramont.The French,p.204.
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state apparatus exists. Freedom Is the state's ability to
regulate and adjust conflicting interests. Civil liberties
permit the opposing of those in power, but are of relatively
recent innovation, originating from the nineteenth century.^
Still, the rights of the individual are secure through a
2
"perfection of personality" within the culture. Liberty is 
seen as participation in collective decisions, but there is 
always distrust of power and a "natural" tendency to defy 
authority. It is possible to have the state without justice, 
but not justice without the state. There is a need to combine 
autonomy with cooperation. Groups, even the elite, can not 
be unified or such would mean an end to freedom. Yet there 
can be too much disunity, which could even lead to the end of
o
the state, so there must be an Intermediate point.^ This 
need for order has long occupied French philosophical thought. 
Richelieu, for example, sought to restore order by theorizing 
that authority is boundless, with disobedience being a sin.
His state, of course, would be the prince, for "to multiply 
the number of pilots, is to ruin the possibility of a safe 
voyage."^ Even the Church must be controlled, although royal
^Duverger, French Political System, p. l46.
^Aron in Aron and Heckscher, Diversity of Worlds, p. 86,
^Robert Aron, Social Structure and the Ruling Class 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950), p. 143.
^See Armand Jean du Plessig, Political Testament: The 
Significant Chapters and Supporting Selections, tr. Henry B. 
Hill (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961).
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authority would have no counter-balance either in political 
assemblies or corporations or municipal privilege.
Throughout, the French have retained faith in the 
permanence of sovereign states (with Paris as the center of 
the Solar System), in the durability of national interests 
as order in the world over supranational interests, and in 
the concept of the national soul, an evanescent ideal.^
But this French nation maintains an emphasis on values of 
stability, harmony, permanence, resistance to the machine age, 
and a focus on moderation and equilibrium within a national 
ideal of order. This order is provided in part by a strong 
French government, headed preferably by aged leaders, but 
one which claims to be based on the sovereignty of the 
people.2 Throughout the system, however, there are various 
expressions for the French taste for individuality with its 
preferences for "fine distinctions, a distrust of power and 
a will to preserve existing social i n s t i t u t i o n s . S t i l l  
with the distrust of human nature and an innate defiance 
and cynicism on the personal level, there exists an un­
believable tolerance on the philosophical level.
These are the cultural values which form part of the 
milieu relevant to the individual French decision-makers in
^Snyder, New Nationalism, p. 76.
^Raymond Aron, "Raymond Aron Weighs Up the World," 
Realities (No. 198 May 1967): 27-9, 90.
^Aron and Heckscher, Diversity of Worlds, p. 124.
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their development of images vital to their roles. When 
these factors are combined with specific situations and include 
an analysis of the individual's personality, it is possible 
to come close to behavior prediction at most, behavior 
tendencies at the very least. We now turn to Charles de 
Gaulle as an individual to see if he has experienced these 
cultural values and distinctive acculturation processes.
CHAPTER III 
DE GAULLE : THE IDIOSYNCRATIC VARIABLE 
Introduction
Political ideas— like the consumption of cigarettes 
and hard liquor— do not suddenly begin with one's eighteenth 
birthday. Richard G. Niemi
Many American political scientists consider political 
leadership behavior a natural result of political environment, 
or what some term "environmental antecedents of behavior."
S t H 1, regardless of how political behavior is analyzed, its 
core is the individual. Barber expresses this writer's view­
point most succinctly in saying:
. . .to the grand theorists of social movements and 
the engineers of systems and structures— some of 
whom see human choice as determined by forces beyond 
the control of human beings— 1 can only express puz­
zlement. Shuffle the system as you will, there is 
still at its center the person, and it is his init­
iatives and responses that steer the ship.l
Political and other successes, then, depend to a considerable
extent on the quirks and idiosyncracies of one very human
individual,' for the principal actors determine a system more
than they are determined by it.^ Such an opinion does not
preclude the influence of other variables.3 Thus, in its
^Barber, Presidential Character, p. vii.
2See Raymond Aron, Peace and War, Chapter 1, 
^See Leites, Rules of the Game, p. 3*
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widest scope, foreign policy is affected or influenced by 
no less than five "variable clusters:" the societal or non­
governmental aspects discussed in Chapter 2 above, the 
systemic or international system, the governmental or in­
stitutions, the role variables, and the idiosyncratic or indi­
vidual.^ This idiosyncratic cluster includes the political 
leader’s experiences, values, personality and style (consid­
ered in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 herein) in what DeRivera calls 
a "psychological approach" to foreign affairs analysis, i.e.,
the consideration by political scientists of the individual’s
2
perceptions, values and interpersonal relationships. What 
foreign policies will be advocated, what commitments will be 
made, what priorities will be drawn between domestic and 
foreign affairs, and related aspects of international 
political relations really depend on that idiosyncratic 
variable, the Chief Executive, whether in the United States 
or France.
Although social,systemic, governmental, or even role 
variables rarely change radically, every change in political 
leadership will result in some alteration in decision-making.
See Rosenau, Foreign Policy. Also found in Greenstein’s 
modification of Smith’s psychological analysis of single political 
actors where he discusses the social and political system, the 
socio-political environment that shaped a personality, the in­
dividual’s personality structures and finally the immediate 
environmental antecedents of a decision. M. Brewster Smith,
"A Map for the Analysis of Personality and Politics," Journal 
of Social Issues, 24 (July 1968): 15-28.
2see Holsti, Crisis, pp. 51, 70-1; DeRivera, Foreign
Policy.
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Variations result from the fact that the individual person­
ality, values, and life experiences of an incoming leader 
will not be identical to those of his predecessor.^ Un­
fortunately, the behavior and personality of the political 
leader "tends to be all too often obscured— if not factored 
out" in most American social scientist analyses.^ Yet re­
gardless of how it is defined, politics, domestic or inter­
national, hinges on the interrelation of environmental situ­
ations and psychological predispositions of the decision-maker 
and the resultant human behavior.^ The fact is that an actor's
psychological characteristics are mediating factors between
4
the decisional stimulus and its political response. That
is, every time an event occurs:
. . .it is a stimulus that may be legitimately 
perceived in several different ways. The per­
ception that actually occurs is the one that re­
quires the least reorganization of the person's 
other ideas. Without any distortion of the stimulus 
there may be perceptual error.
Thus the political decision-maker's perception links the
See David J. Rosen, "Leadership Change and Foreign 
Policy," paper presented at the 1974 Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association (Chicago, Ill.iAugust 
29-September 2, 1974); DeRivera, Foreign Policy, pp. l65,l8l-2.
^Edinger, "Biography," Journal of Politics, p. 437.
3creenstein, Personality and Politics, pp. 6-7;James C.
Davies, "Where From and Where To?*' in Knutson, Handbook, pp. 1-
27; Human Nature in Politics (New York: Wiley, I963).
Vreenstein, Personality and Politics, p. 11.
G
DeRivera, Foreign Policy, p. 22.
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external environment and policy decisions. That per­
ception, whether it is correct or not, is the individual's
"real" world.^ Differences in personality may result in
2
diverging definitions of the decisional situation. Any 
behavior, therefore, is the result of culture and personality 
factors interacting in a particular situation. One further 
dimension should be added. The political decision-maker's 
behavior and decisions are influenced also by his personal 
life experiences. Much political activity, then, is explan- 
able only after personal characteristics are considered, 
for the experiences of a man's life will help account for 
many of the peculiarities of his thought.
Still, as we noted in Chapter 1 above, political 
science analyses of individual political leaders are a recent 
innovation. Political psychology did not receive any great 
impetus until 1956 with the Georges' study of Woodrow Wilson 
and Colonel House.^ Since then similar studies have followed 
the George example, but not in any great depth or volume. 
Still, Lasswell and others have recognized the need to apply 
pyschological concepts in the study of politicians, whether
^John Spanier, Games Nations Play: Analyzing Inter­
national Politics (New York: Praeger Pubs., 1972),pT 33.
^Holsti, Crisis, pp. 50-70.
^Greenstein, "Personality on Politics," APSR, p. 629. 
4George and George, Woodrow Wilson.
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researching an individual’s political socialization and 
recruitment into political decision-making roles or studying 
the decision-maker's personal characteristics and its re­
lationship to subsequent political decisions.^ What is 
needed is an emphasis on "psychobiography." Such a study 
includes personality, those behavioral regularities which 
prevail regardless of diverse stimuli' and which are inferred 
rather than directly observed. Specifically, this psycho­
logical approach is at the extreme micro level in its con­
sideration of the perceptions, cognitions, expectations, and
2
motivations of people. In relative terms, political science 
is more at the macro-level. Importantly, in foreign re­
lations studies, personality analyses aid in determining:
. . .whether the incumbent of a position which he 
perceives as promising potential or actual leader­
ship makes a choice primarily in terms of future 
internal or external sanctions and whether he 
sees immediate or future gratification or depri­
vation resulting from one alternative action or 
another.
Besides the psychological emphasis of such attempts, 
however, the "psychobiography" is biographical. Edinger 
notes that the task of political scientists should be:
See A. Gottfried, Boss Cermack of Chicago (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1962); A. A. Rogow, James 
Forrestal: A Study of Personality, Politics, and Policy 
(New York: Macmillan, 1963).
p
N. Kiell, Psychological Studies of Famous Americans 
(New York: Twayne, 1964); Betty Glad, ^Contributions of Psycho- 
biography" in Knutson, Handbook, pp. 296-321.
^Edinger, "Biography," Journal of Politics, p. 670.
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. . .to write political biographies of dead, as well 
as living Individuals, which will Increase our under­
standing of their actions both as aspirants to and , 
as Incumbents of positions of political leadership.
Biographies attempt to recreate either the entire life 
cycle or some "significant portion of It, In order to de­
scribe and explain the contribution and responses" of the
2
Individual to his environment. Thus a psychobiography 
Identifies salient personality and situational variables 
that permit the relating of childhood learning and experiences 
to adult political behavior. There are several problems evident 
In such studies. First, political scientists usually do not 
consider the complex personal characteristics that motivate a 
political decision-maker’s behavior until or unless that be­
havior Is "deviant" from the observer’s perceived norms or 
values. Rogow expresses this clearly:
While most political leaders neither require nor 
merit a psychobiography, the form Is particularly 
appropriate when we are dealing with odd or deviant 
political careers.
Even when the behavior Is deemed "deviant," the usual ten­
dency Is to render an explanatory analysis grounded In external 
or situational variables. Only when the situational
^Ibld.. p. 674.
^Palge, Readings, p. 197■
^A. A. Rogow, "Review of V. Wolfensteln, The Revolutlonary 
Personality," The American Political Science Review 62 (1968):
605.
^See Glad In Knutson, Handbook, pp. 296-321.
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explanation is found to be patently false will psychological
explanations finally be employed or attempted by most
political scientists. Thus the tendency is to assume that
personality theory is specifically a method or tool for the
study of the pathological. Further, there is the correlate
assumption that political leaders, indeed "politicos" in
general, nurture a love of "pure power as an end that motivates
their adult behavior.^ Wolfenstein verbalises this belief:
"Leaders crave, relish, and have confidence in their own power 
2
and authority." Political scientists particularly view this 
power-seeking as a monistic drive, a "first" and only cause 
for political role-seeking. Consequently, there is the ten­
dency, when psychological data ^  used, to "overpsychologize" 
political phenomena in such a way that wider application of 
psychobiographical and similar studies is thwarted, and thus 
graduate emphasis and the growth of expertise in this field. 
What is needed are balanced studies of individual leaders.
This seems to be possible only when several methodological or 
theoretical directions are employed in one study, hence the 
emphasis herein on considering cultural restrictions (Chapter 
2), the individual motivations and personality (Chapter 3), 
theory (Chapter 4) and style (Chapter 5). The generalized or
^See Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The 
Politics of Leadership (New York: Wiley, I960).
2
E. Victor Wolfenstein, Personality and Politics 
(Belmont: Dickinson Publishing Co., I96O), p. 331
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eclectic approach results in what may be termed a "skimming" 
or superficial effect, but it does preclude the more deadly 
quicksand effect of in depth, overextended monistic analyses. 
For example, an extreme in the "pure" biography category 
emphasizes such "politically relevant" facts about George 
Washington as his undistinguished ancestry; his trading and 
relationships with slaves, indentured servants, and squatters; 
his false teeth; and his lack of children, possibly due to 
an earlier attack of mumps.^ A contemporary example of psycho­
logical emphasis is found in Robert U. Akeret's photoanalysis
1
of Richard Nixon. The theme of this study is that the former
President’s face is not symmetrical, thus indicating the
duplicity of Nixon’s inner emotional state. In other words,
there has always been the "old" and the "new" Nixon, which
is revealed in what might be called the "Mona Lisa smile
syndrome." An even more extreme example is found in portions
of Launay’s study of de Gaulle, who is "explained" as follows:
Like the majority of those in blood group 0, he is 
predisposed to inflammations and troubles of the 
circulation, but this never shows. . .A hyper- 
trophia of the hypophysic gland caused the giantism 
which disturbed his bodily development. On the 
mental plane, aggravated by this giantism, a
^Robert U. Akeret, Photoanalysis, ed. Thomas Humble 
(New York: Peter H. Wyden, Inc., 1973).
2
W. E. Woodward, George Washington: The Image and 
the Man (New York: Boni and Liverwright. 1926).
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hypertrophie of the ego has been noted, a pro- 
digous egocentricity and tendencies to exhi­
bitionism and mythomania, to spitefulness and 
revenge.
Granted all of this information may be true and potentially
relevant politically, but the studies by their narrow-gauge
approaches do not validate anything other than the thesis
that these approaches are used, with the data garnered to
the theoretical direction.
In general, "biographies" have been in-depth and at-
length attempts to describe the "whole man." However, as
Edinger warns, this must be sacrificed in favor of the less
complete analysis oriented toward understanding that "part"
termed political behavior, and even more specifically,
2
foreign policy behavior. Thus it is not the purpose here 
to "fall" into any one of the fifty categories for biography 
or fifty definitional types of personality. Rather, the 
developmental study research results on de Gaulle are pre- 
sented. Only those biographical characteristics which are 
most useful in conjunction with other information will be 
presented, in order to see patterns of behavior. Knowledge
1
Launay, De Gaulle and his France, pp. 25-7•
2
Edinger, "Biography," Journal of Politics, p. 6?6.
^See Allport, Personality and Lasswell’s writings.
^The actual developmental study is too lengthy to be 
considered here. Major events in de Gaulle's life are noted 
in the attached Appendix I.
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of the latter could result In predicting "climates and 
modes," but not necessarily day-to-day behavior of a po­
litical tenure.^ Future predictions can be made on the
basis of the relatively stable personality types into
2
which adults fall. More pertinent in de Gaulle's 
case is that the decision-maker's basic values form an 
environmental framework for a particular policy. As 
previously indicated, the study's basic theme is to in­
dicate the validity of eclectic-methodological political 
leadership studies as a base for future predictive behavior 
analyses. In toto, all:
. . .social scientists must understand the outlook 
of the man he studies, see things as they see them, 
before he can profitably employ the apparatus and 
objectivity of science.
Unfortunately, when the political leader, in this
4
case that "politician of catastrophe" de Gaulle, is dead, 
"his dreams and fantasies, his Oedipus complex and identity 
crisis" must be inferred to an even greater extent. Even 
when alive, political incumbents are "a notoriously secretive 
lot, and any inkblots. . .inadvertently left behind are
^The phrase is Barber's. See his Presidential Character.
2
Jeanne Knutson, The Human Basis of the Polity: A 
Psychological Study of Political Man (Chicago: Aldine, 1972), 
p. 15.
•3 4
^Redfield, Community, p. 81. Luethy, France Against Herself, 
^Rogow, "Review," APSR, p. 605.
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usually wiped clean by their loyal posterity." In de Gaulle’s 
case, most "Inkblots" were destroyed before the Ink dried, 
for once a speech or press conference presentation was per­
fected and memorized, all previous drafts were summarily 
destroyed. De Gaulle’s written works do provide an ample 
source If It Is accepted that the written word Includes a 
level of consciousness not evident In the spoken word. I.e., 
the subconscious In however shallow a form ^  Included In 
an Individual’s productive writings. Even speeches Indicate 
an Individual’s tacit assumptions about reality, his Ideological 
eyeglasses so to speak.
Other methods helpful In discovering the Idiosyn­
cratic aspects of an Individual’s political behavior Include:
1) direct or Indirect observation, such as Theodore White’s
2
U. S. Presidential election studies or In the form of 
visual tapes. However, It must be remembered that de Gaulle’s 
public appearances were extremely well-staged; 2) personal 
Interviews, Increasingly rare as the pressures of political 
office Increase and with de Gaulle, sacrificed for the 
greater value of personal privacy; 3) content analysis of 
writings. Including public speeches, provide the most readily 
available but Indirect measure of motivations toward power;
^Ibld., pp. 605-6.
^Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 
(New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1973).
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4) biographies or hagiographies, numerous and useful as long
as constant comparisons are made; and 5) case studies, the
culmination, hopefully, of using all the methods.
Fortunately,there is no lack of documentation of
the behavior of most contemporary political leaders, including
de Gaulle. The abundant record includes, potentially:
. . .oral epics, songs, plays, poems, paitings, 
diaries, letters, memoirs, speeches, state papers, 
autobiographies, biographies, photographs, films, 
sound recordings, historical accounts, journalistic 
observations, and contemporary public appearances.^
Such documentation is generally self-explanatory, except for 
minor problems magnified in de Gaulle's case. There is a 
natural distortion for writers of autobiographical works 
to attempt to place themselves in a good light. De Gaulle 
did this in part of his writings "between" political tenures. 
Distortion also occurs when time has passed between the be­
havior and the writing of it, so that what is "recalled" is 
"logical" in light of habits and future developments rather 
than actual facts. Often alternatives to an action or decision 
are forgotten, particularly when a past event, a foreign policy 
for example, cost money and lives. Events then had to occur, 
whereas less costly decisions, when successful, are viewed as 
resulting from personal abilities.^ DeGaulle's Memoirs, 
therefore, must be scrutinized against the autobiographical 
writings of others, particularly his international decision-
Ipaige, Readings, p. 194
^See DeRivera, Foreign Policy, pp. 6-7
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making peers such as Winston Churchill.^
Biographical sources present even greater problems.
The Hoffmanns succinctly state the situation:
]Be Gaulle’â biographers do not give much detail, 
they do not indicate their sources, they copy one 
another often without acknowledging it, and some­
times contradict each other.
Then there is the diversity of "approaches to de Gaulle." 
Helms in her doctoral study discerned at least seven. There 
are the standard biographical studies such as la Gorce, Werth, 
Hatch and Clark; descriptions of the content of de Gaulle's 
policies by Kulski, Aron, and Grosser; doctrinal studies that 
are multi-factoral by Mann and Johnson; historical analyses 
written by Langer, Funk, and DePorte; ideological studies 
focusing on one idea as did Macridis and Duverger; methodo­
logical exercises that explore the manner of policy imple­
mentation attempted by Callaui, Thomson, Gorday, and Revel;
and the polemical stuides of Schoenbrum, Grinnel-Milne,
4
la couture, Aron, and Pabre-Luce.
Thus an objective view of WWII would have to include 
the writings of de Gaulle, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin. 
See Dwight Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday, 
1963); Arthur Bryant, Triumph in the West (Garden City, N.Y.:
1959) and his To Turn the Tide (New York; Doubleday, 1957).
^Stanley Hoffmann and Inge Hoffmann, "The Will to 
Grandeur: de Gaulle as Political Artist," Daedalus (Summer
1968): 829-867 at 879.
^Helms, "De Gaulle's Foreign Policy," p. 8. 
h
See the attached bibliography for full citations.
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With such an abundance of materials, it is necessary 
to remember Barber's dictum that although there may be 
errors of fact in a study, the emphasis is on the reports 
of de Gaulle's words and/or actions rather than the in­
dividual opinions of his biographers.^ For example, it 
is not necessary to know whether it was de Gaulle's mother 
or father who, when questioned about the four de Gaulle 
sons said, "yes, but they are republican (not royalis^,,."
The content and consistency of the statement is what is 
important. Or there is the question of whether Henri de 
Gaulle was teaching in Lille when his son Charles was born, 
or if Jeanne de Gaulle had followed a traditional pattern
and returned to her parents' home for the event. What 3^
2
important Is de Gaulle's ties with northern France.
Still, regardless of the source consulted or the 
methods employed, such personal leadership qualities as
3
"wide sensitivity, active energy, . .aDoofness of manner" 
or good judgment are not and can not be analyzed precisely. 
All-in-all then, when analyzing individual political leaders.
^See Barber, Presidential Character, pp. v-vii.
2
For some of the most interesting biographical dis­
crepancies, see Georges Cattaui, Charles de Gaulle: 1'homme 
et son destin. (Paris: Universitaires, 1956) and J. R. 
Tournoux, Pg^taln and De Gaulle (Paris: Plon, 1964).
^Dankwart A. Rustow, "Ataturk as Founder of a State," 
Daedulus (Summer 1968); 794.
h
See also DeRivera, Foreign Policy.
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we must take Edinger’s advice to employ "conceptual models 
and quantitative analysis in conjunction with a frank but 
disciplined use of empathy and other forms of imaginative 
speculation."^
There remains but one other deficiency, a problem 
evident in any biography but more pointed in psycho­
biographies. That is:
. . .knowledge about the early childhood influences 
in the lives of political leaders is invariably 
fragmentary. Even less is known or knowable about 
the reasons that leaders became such while their 
brothers, sisters, parents, and children usually 
are individuals of no great distinction. We can 
trace back from the broad, fast running river of 
the leader’s public career to the headwaters of 
his childhood, but we cannot yet explain why mgst 
such headwaters do not become such big rivers.
Yet childhood is a crucial time for political socialization. 
Although the chief learning in every early childhood con­
sists of satisfying innate drives for the primary gratifi­
cations of hunger, thirst, etc., there are also secondary 
drives of fear and anger and biological derivatives of 
maturation. It is during this time that the individual 
child is made aware he is loved, has rules, develops his
own personality, and establishes Important parental relation-
4
ships. The latter may be based on one parent exploitation
^Edinger, Schumacher, pp. 1-8 at 4. Emphasis supplied.
2
Davies, "Where From and Where To?" in Knutson, Hand­
book, pp. 24-5.
o
Gorer, National Character, p. 77»
^Interview with David Barber, "What’s the Big Idea,"PBS- 
TV(Ralelgh,N.C.), recorded October-November,1972, televised Aug­
ust 29, 1973; also see S. Freud and W. C. Bullitt, Thomas Wood­
row Wilson:A Psychological Study (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,1967).
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or focus on siblings and other significant persons.^ Rules 
and judgments of right and wrong and other major value orien­
tations, then, are developed by the time an individual is
2
six or seven years of age. Whether or not we agree that 
the crucial time is early childhood  ^ or a lifelong process
il
of identity crises, it is evident that:
. . .the significant aspects of an individual's per­
sonality and values tend to remain relatively stable 
throughout adult life, and experiences, by their 
very nature, tend to be cumulative over time and 
will undergo only incremental change.
Thus early life habits not only influence all subsequent 
learning,^ but childhood learning relates to the adult political 
life. Too, the early environment is considered crucial inso­
far as it is easier to change habits, values, etc. at this
7
early stage than later in adulthood.
^A. Adler, Understanding Human Nature (New York: 
Fawcett World Library, 19^9)* (Orig. 1927).
?
Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child, tr. 
Marjorie Gabain (New York: Free Press, Macmillan, 19&5).
H. Hyman, Political Socialization (New York: 
Free Press, 1959); Fred I. Greenstein, "The Benevolent 
Leader: Children's Images of Political Authority," The 
American Political Science Review 54 (I960):934-43•
il
Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society, 2d ed. rev, 
(New York: W. W. Norton, I963).
^Rosen, "Leadership Change," p. 5 .
^Gorer, National Character, p.77.
^See B. Bloom, Stability and Change in Human 
Characteristics (New York: Wiley, 1965).
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The guiding question for political leadership 
studies is not whether leaders have personalities 
different from followers but rather the effects of 
whatever personalities they do have. . . Cu]he 
whole life cycle from birth and childhood through 
old age and death, should be of potential interest 
in political leadership studies.
It is important then to understand de Gaulle's early identi­
fication with politics and political leaders, how his value




these values on his behavior. For, as Piaget notes.
patriotism does not come naturally to a child,
To reiterate, this chapter has a two-fold purpose.
The primary theme is to discover what aspects of de Gaulle's 
personality and motives resulted in his quest for power and 
subsequent political behavior. That is, could his unconscious 
motives be explained by the "ambition theory" that he was a 
compensatory power-seeker or was his political role-seeking 
a conscious pursuit of personal self-interest or even the 
nebulous goal of the collective good?^ Secondly, did de Gaulle 
exemplify his culture as discussed in Chapter 2 above?
^Paige, Readings, p. 71.
^Ibid., p. 197.
See Otto Klineberg and Wallace E. Lambert, Inter­
national Commission for a History of the Scientific and 
Cultural Development of Mankind (UNESCO : 1962).
il
George and George, Woodrow Wilson; Also see any 
study by Lasswell.
^Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 87.
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As previously noted, personal political motivations 
have been subjected to many explanatory hypotheses. We be­
lieve that the psychological method holds the greatest por­
tent for both individual and comparative political leadership 
studies. Knutson writes:
It is possible for political scientists also to 
deal with the total personality as a meaningful 
way of integrating the disparate findings which 
past research has gathered and in pointing the 
way to the type of questions whose answers we
should seek in the future.
One theory of total personality is that of Abraham Maslow.
His is a generalized approach based on four basic human 
drives: physiological, security or safety, affection and 
belongingness, and self/social esteem, ordered in a hier­
archy and "topped" by Self-Actualization. Although some 
psychologists advocate dividing the hierarchy into only two 
areas, security-searching and self-actualization, Maslow's 
theory does permit an analysis of changing patterns of moti­
vation most appropriate in both individual and comparative
political leadership studies. As a psychological theory, 
Maslow*s concepts are more applicable for political science 
since it is not as in depth as Freudian analysis nor as 
lengthy as the more complicated psychoanalytic procedures.
The idea of priority or hierarchy, although not new, does
2
appear to explain those patterns of political behavior that
^Knutson, Human Basis, p. 103.
2
For political Implications of this hierarchy, see 
Davies in Knutson, Handbook, Chapters 1-2 and Knutson, Human 
Basis.
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have often been categorized as irrational. Erikson*3 theory 
of "epigenesis" is similar, although his eight successive 
stages of development from infancy to maturity are more com­
plicated.^ He.does agree with Maslow, however, that if 
full development does not occur at any given stage, the in­
dividual does not proceed normally.
In some respects Maslow's "theory" is also similar 
to Barber's Presidential Character dichotomies. Indeed it 
would be valid to use Barber's thesis exclusively. Instead, 
both will be utilized. That is, de Gaulle's motivational 
values will be studied within the narrower framework of 
Maslow's generalized theory in this chapter, while Barber's 
more well-known and well-criticized formula will be used in 
discussing de Gaulle's political style in Chapter 5-
In applying a psychological framework, the difficulty 
of separating personality, philosophy, and political style 
is more evident since no mutually exclusive realm really 
exists that is not affected by a value, habit, philosophical 
orientation, or such. For academic purposes, however, an 
attempt at divorcing the variables is being made.
De Gaulle au Maslow 
Abraham Maslow's theory is a "holistic" view of the
The stages are basic trust, autonomy, initiative, 
industry, identity, intimacy, generativity, and ego integrity. 
See Erikson, Childhood and Society, pp. 247-268.
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humanistic school of psychology.^ This "Third Force" 
school of thought contrasts with the other two subdisciplines 
of psychology, Freudianism and Watsonian radical behavioralism, 
in contending that no behavior— social, political, or otherwise- 
can be divorced from the total personality. In other words, 
individual traits, attitudes and behaviors must be studied in 
relation to the total personality. What must be understood 
is the organizing principle of each personality. Thus human­
istic psychology owes a debt to: 1) Plato in his admonition 
that prepolitical dispositions shape political institutions;
2) Socrates* belief that in order to improve human and social 
values it is necessary to first advance the state of our 
knowledge and particularly our knowledge of persons and 3) 
seventeenth century philosophers like Bacon who advocated a
unitary science which would be a "synthetic whole in the
o
service of man." Thus, as Lane writes:
Plato, Freud and the Jesuits agree that whatever 
is learned early has a special importance to the 
adult; it is more likely to endure; it is more 
likely to be central to his philosophy.
A complete bibliography of his writings may be found 
in A. H. Maslow: A Memorial Volume, Compiled by Bertha Maslow 
(Belmont, Calif. .-Brooks Cole, 1972), pp. 115-133.
2
Maslow, Memorial, p. 63» Notes dated October 7, 1969.
O
Ibid. , pp. 6-7. However, Maslow "left out" the emphasis 
on religion and used the term humanistic rather than pansophia.
4
Lane, Political Ideology, p. 251.
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This humanistic psychology is "a world view or life 
philosophy. . .a way of living; a system of ethics and values, 
of politics and economics, of education and religion; a 
philosophy of science."^ It is thus positive, as may be 
seen even in its basic methodology. That is, unlike many
2
other theorists who have influenced political scientists,
■3
Maslow emphasizes psychologically healthy individuals. The 
study of the crippled, immature, and unhealthy can result 
only in a weak psychology and philosophy. Thus psychoanalysis 
presents a picture of man in a "lopsided, distorted puffing 
up of his weaknesses and shortcomings /while purportingV to 
describe him f u l l y . S t i l l ,  Maslow considered himself
G
Freudian, but not exclusviely Freudian. He refutes much of
Freudian theory as being too reductionistic about higher
human values:
The deepest and most real motivations are seen to 
be dangerous and nasty while the highest human values 
and virtues are essentially fake, being not what 
they seem to be but being camouflaged versions of 
the deep, dark and dirty. (Social scientists carry 
this along, fo3 total cultural determinism is still 
the official orthodox doctrine for many or most of
^Maslow, Memorial, p. 60.
2
Such as T. W. Adorno e^ The Authoritarian Per­
sonality (New York: Harper, 1950).
^See Maslow's Motivation and Personality (New York: 
Harper & Row, 195^)> p p . 199-203.
^Maslow, Memorial, p. 71. Notes dated August 16, 1965.
^Ibid., p. 73. Letter dated 72-3; November 23, I960.
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the social scientists and anthropologists. This 
doctrine not only denies intrinsic and higher 
motivations but comes perilously close sometimes 
to denying human nature itself.
All that is necessary to prove that all people are basically 
decent is to discover the motives for their "superficial 
behavior - nasty, mean, or vicious as it may be." It is 
Maslow's view that individuals who "fully utilize and ex­
ploit, their talents, capacities, and capabilities |ar^ 
fulfilling themselves to a much greater extent than most 
individuals."^ They are those with "B-cognition" or "Being," 
the psychic economy of plenty or the Self-Actualizer in con­
trast to those of the "D" or "Deficiency realm." This 
Self-Actualizing individual is one who has:
. . .developed or (1^ developing to the full stature 
of which jlie i^ capable. . . This is to say that 
[he feel^ safe and unanxious, accepted, loved and 
loving, respect-worthy and respected, and that he 
has worked out his ^philosophical, religious or 
axiologlcal bearings.
Such a concept is not novel. Goldstein's "self- 
actualization," Fromm's "productive character," Whltehorn's 
"mature personality" and the "self-affirmation" of the
^Ibid., p. 23. Emphasis supplied Reported by Denis 
O'Donovan.
^Ibid., p. 95» Notes dated June, 1937.
^Gordon Mercer, "Psychological Dimensions of Executive 
Leadership," Paper presented at the Southern Political Science 
Convention (November 1-4, 1973), p. 15.
4
Maslow, Motivation and Personality, pp. 200-1.
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existentialists are essentially of the same warp. Even 
Freud alluded to mature self-realization, but did not 
consider it in depth.^ In all these variations, but par­
ticularly in Maslow's interpretation, the human being is
2
believed to be motivated by basic needs which are not 
only genetic or instinctual in origin, but evident through­
out the species and apparently unchanging. The Self- 
Actualizing individual is one in whom inborn basic emotional 
needs have been satisfied. These basic needs, or "need
q
areas," are hierarchical in nature. When a "need" is
absent, there is:
. . .illness, its presence prevents illness, its 
restoration cures illness. . .it is preferred by 
the deprived person over other satisfactions and 
it is found to be inactive, at a low ebb, gr 
functionally absent in the healthy person.
These hierarchical "need areas" include the self-oriented
physiological concerns and security or safety; the transition
to other-directed motives in affection and belongingness,
and those solely concerned with the environment and the self
in relation to that environment, the higher plane of self
See Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, "Psychiatric Aspects of 
Anxiety" in M. R. Stein, A. J. Vidich and D. M. White (eds.). 
Identity and Anxiety (New York: The Free Press, I960), pp.
Ï29T I T C  --------
2
Davies in Knutson, Handbook; Knutson, Human Basis and 
Lane, Political Thinking.
^Abraham Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," 
Psychological Review 50 (19^3):370-396 at 370.
^Maslow, Psychology of Being, p. 22.
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and social esteem. Self-actualization is the "being level" 
above the "need levels." In each instance, the basic need 
is that perceived by the individual, in this instance Charles 
de Gaulle, and not by an outside observer. In most instances, 
the lowest need level must be fulfilled before higher needs 
emerge to become the prime motivational force. Or to put it 
another way, deprivation in one category so conditions an 
individual that he will continue to pursue the "need" until 
minimally satisfied. And, of course, which of these need 
areas has been satisfied or unsatisfied, even severely de­
prived, will affect the attention, behavior and performance 
of a person.^ Psychic needs therefore can determine decision­
making, particularly in ambiguous situations that are complex,
2
new, or contradictory. Indeed, if severe deprivation of a
need has occurred during childhood, a syndrome will develop
to motivate the individual's behavior the rest of his life, 
even after many years of satisfying the basic need. The
further importance of the theory of need and being levels
may be seen in Eckstein's contention that a system's stability
and even longevity may be equated with the congruence of the
3authority patterns of the government and society. These
Maslow, "Human Motivation," Psychological Review, 
pp. 370-5.
2
See Greenstein, Personality and Politics.
^See Harry Eckstein, A Theory of Stable Democracy 
(Princeton: Center of International Studies, 1961) or his 
"Authority Patterns: A Structural Basis for Political In­





patterns, however, appear to result from the "more elemental
congruence of values, philosophy and need requirements as
the basis of political stability."^ Thus a governmental
and economic system will be stabler to the extent that Its
philosophy and political actions are based on the personality
2needs of Its citizens. A change In man's motivational level 
may be the basic cause of many political and cultural differ­
ences between developing and developed nations.
Physiological
The first of the basic "need areas" Is. physiological,
and like the next three areas Is specific and dellmltable.
Food, shelter and clothing or more specifically, hunger, thirst,
sleep, warmth, sex, etc., are basic requirements upon which
physical health depends. If these needs are unfulfilled, the
suffering Individual will be apathetic and uninvolved in
anything, particularly political behavior, until this vital
"self" motive is satisfied. Maslow writes:
For the man who is extremely and dangerously hungry, 
no other interests exist but food, he thinks about 
food, he emotes only about food, he perceives only 
food, and he wants only food. . .Such a man can 
fairly be said to live by bread alone.
^Knutson, Human Basis, p. 274.
^Ibid.. p. 276.
^Maslow, Motivation and Personality, pp. 82-3.
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Unfortunately a past United States foreign policy often has 
sought to "build democracy" in areas of the world where a 
majority of the population is concerned more with basic 
human survival. We have thus neglected the repercussions 
of this very basic need. Once fed, etc., however, the effect 
of deprivation does not automatically disappear. Extreme 
lack of food bordering on starvation during the early years 
of life often later results in adult food hoarding and similar 
habits. The important thing to remember here is that the de­
privation of the basic need must be perceived as such by the 
individual concerned, and not through the perceptions of 
over-fed, over-clothed, over-warm, and basically over-indulged 
Americans, for example. Deprivations in this basic area, 
then, are more typical in the so-called developing coutnries 
or in unusual situations such as the Jewish concentration 
camps during World War II. However, any deprivation of what­
ever duration or depth has the potential of coloring the in­
dividual’s response to the luxury of adulthood.
In de Gaulle’s case, there exists no indication that 
he was ever severely deprvied in physiological terms. He 
often did characterize his background as "poor." However, 
this was generally in contrast to the European class structure 
in general and the bourgeoise in particular. In this context 
de Gaulle says:
Bourgeois? That, I have never been. The bourgeois 
is wealth, either the consciousness of having it, 
or the wish to acquire it. My family and I have
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always been poor. . .I have never felt myself 
bound ^o the interests or aspirations of that 
class.
The de Gaulle family outlook, concerns, and resources were 
not typical of the French bourgeoise. Thus de Gaulle was 
never a strong part of a French class in its hierarchy to 
the exclusion of other classes, and could more readily iden­
tify himself with the "whole" of France. True, his father, 
Henri de Gaulle, was a poorly paid Lillian and Parisian Pro­
fessor. He had even given up a military career, since 
officer status required social expenditures that a twenty- 
two year old in charge of a fatherless family could not afford. 
He also postponed marriage until the age of thirty-eight, 
primarily because of financial problems. Later, with five 
children to support, he taught at more than one school simul­
taneously. However, the home atmosphere Charles de Gaulle
experienced was not as much severely deprived as it was one
2
of planned frugality, which resulted in austerity as a 
means to such ends as having three homes— one in Lille, one 
in Paris, and a summer place in the Dordogne. This meant 
that when it was fashionable to live in a first floor apart­
ment, the de Gaulles resided in a fifth-floor flat. There 
is even evidence that money to provide more physiological
^Lacouture, De Gaulle, p. 4. Emphasis supplied. 
^Clark, The Man Who is France, p. 22.
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comforts was held in "quiet contempt."^ Frugality, then,
was more a family habit and tradition than any dire
necessity. For example, Jean de Gaulle left his family
841,000 French pounds in the early part of the nineteenth
century. The de Gaulles still have some unknown portion of
2
their daily livelihood from that inheritance.
De Gaulle then did not perceive himself as being 
physiologically deprived during his childhood, although he 
did acquire an adult passion for the taste of a particular 
French pastry called madelines. Still, as a married adult, 
his wife’s menus were primarily hardy stomach-filling fare 
such as cabbage, hardly an indication of compensatory food 
indulgences. Further, neither de Gaulle wanted to change 
the "rustic" nature of their home at Colombey-les-deux-eglises 
It is evident that the basic physiological need was satisfied 
in de Gaulle’s case. And when satisfied, the next higher 
need, safety or security, emerges to dominate the organism 
and provide a continuing process organized in a hierarchy 
of relative prepotency.
Pierre Galante, The General (New York: Random House, 
1968), p. 47; Brian Crozier, De Gaulle (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1973), p. 17.
2
Alden Hatch, The De Gaulle Nobody Knows: An Intimate 
Biography of Charles de Gaulle (New York: Hawthorne Books,
I960), p. 19.
^See Maslow, Motivation and Personality, pp. 8O-IO6 .
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An individual becomes motivated by an awareness of the world, 
which the physiologically deprived does not even perceive, 
when and only when the primary need area is satisfied.
Security or Safety
This awareness away from the self is seen in child­
hood motivations resulting from a lack of safety or security.
Whatever words we use, there is character dif­
ference between the man who feels safe and the one 
who lives his life out as if he were a spy in enemy 
territory.
That is, an "inner panic" results from the basic perception 
that the world is chaotic. The individual thus attempts to 
overcome this feeling by seeking order in its simplest but 
most permanent form. There is suspicion of anything foreign 
or "different," often manifested in conservativism in its
purest sense. Such an individual would be the typical ex-
2
ample of one who over-conforms and is "other-directed."
The measure of generalized psychic deprivation of the 
safety/security syndrome is to be found in a psychological test,
•3
the Security-Insecurity Inventory. In reality, the test also 
determines various aspects of all the need areas. There are
^Ibid.. p. 114.
2
See Fromm, Escape from Freedom.
Q
Abraham Maslow, The Security-Insecurity Inventory 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952).
139
fourteen factors in the insecurity syndrome,^ three of 
which are causal to the other eleven. Although political 
leaders would probably never be induced to take this test 
knowingly, the "questions" are often answered in other con­
texts. It is possible, then, to arrive at a determination
2
of insecurity indirectly with these three basic factors:
1) There is a perceived feeling of being unloved or 
rejected, with parental treatment either without affection or 
cold, even to the point of being hated or despised. In con­
trast, a secure feeling would be of being liked, loved, 
accepted, and generally warmly treated.
2) The insecure has a feeling of isolation, alone- 
ness, ostracism, or of being left out. Here again, in con­
trast, the secure individual feels at home, with a sense of 
belonging— whether in the family, group, or the world at large.
3) The insecure has a constant feeling of anxiety, of 
being threatened with danger. The secure's feelings are
Davies ("Where Prom and Where to?" in Knutson, Handbook, 
p. 7) contends that security is an instrumental need in that 
it is acquired in the pursuit of the other need areas. Thus he 
recommends the addition of "knowledge and power" here. Others 
have also critiqued Maslow's theory for not incorporating "cogni­
tive understanding" as a higher need. However, Maslow always 
emphasized his use of "need areas" over the singular "need" so 
that knowledge, power, or "cognitive understanding," however 
each is defined, could be added to the appropriate step in the 
hierarchy. His usual reply was also that "young" theories are 
rarely "fullblown." Moreover, he began his concepts as a case 
study of his own graduate school professors, who were "explain­
able by this particular hierarchy. He did "add" the social-self 
differentiation in the "esteem" need area at a later date.
370-96.
PMaslow,"Human Motivation," Psychological Review, pp.
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unanxious, in a safe-secure aura with only rare occasions 
of perceived threat and danger.
As an adult, the deprive.d individual will be moti­
vated primarily for search for security in what is perceived 
to be an insecure or unsafe world. Richard Nixon epitomizes 
such an insecure individual.^
Maslow doubtlessly intended the security/safety need
area to be. a personallyperceived or self-orientation. Taken
in that light, Charles de Gaulle was not severely deprived
in this area either. His early childhood and adolescence
were during French periods of relative social and political
stability, on both the domestic and international scene. His
family and relatives formed the closed circle, le foyer, when
that institution was at its zenith. In fact, throughout his
career, de Gaulle was not one to bother with the "great world"
2
as the French call "society." There is no indication at all 
that de Gaulle suffered any insecure periods as far as his 
being was concerned. However, after analyzing his writings 
and speeches and the biographies and hagiographies centered 
on him, Maslow's original safety/security need area requires 
elaboration.
De Gaulle, indeed most if not all of his family, were 
insecure at a time when France as a nation was secure, re­
latively. Yet their insecurity was not for any "individual
^See Bruce Mazlish, In Search of Nixon: A Psychological 
Inquiry (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1972).
I4l
self," but for the French nation in a socio-political sense.^
During Henri de Gaulle’s early childhood and adolescence
French culture had been in what might be called a severe
security/safety deprivation period, marked by such chaotic
events as the unfinished tru^e of ralliement, the long period
(1789 to 1875) of revolutions and counter-revolutions, the
Dreyfus case, anti-clericalism, and the rise of Socialism.
The de Gaulle family as a whole perceived France as being
subjected to insecure forces and their personal and political
behavior reflected this perception. This perception is so
persistent and of such strength that it must be considered as
a primary motivation in de Gaulle’s adult political behavior.
Thus, contrary to Maslow’s original hierarchy, the resultant
ostracism, isolation, rejection, and anxieties the de Gaulles
perceived were relative to the public self, the cerebral
France. These perceptions were inculcated in Charles de Gaulle,
whose socialization occurred during a period that Hoffmann
2
characterizes as a stalemate society. French nationalism 
was dormant, not to be revived until the period of World War I.
Possibility the insecurity was even in an economic 
sense. De Gaulle personally did not care for this "discipline" 
and seemed to deliberately ignore it, although he majored in 
astronomy and mathematics and was not unaware of the forces 
of economics. However, only one of his writings was economic­
ally oriented and not very well at that.
2
Hoffmann, In Search of France, pp. 3-4.
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All these factors of past national humiliation distressed 
the de Gaulles. Their beliefs ran against the then-current 
dogmas and would label them as nontypical Frenchmen. Lacouture 
goes further and writes that de Gaulle's uniqueness, his 
historical isolation, solitude and basic beliefs result in 
his lack of value as a sociological specimen or representative 
Frenchman.^
The de Gaulle "solid" foyer, reinforced by Roman
Catholic teachings, accentuated the uniqueness of Charles
de Gaulle. His formal schooling was initially in his father's
school. This too was reinforcement of the impressions of
political insecurity acquired in his socialization process.
The familial sources or origins of this syndrome that divides
personal and public self reveal the depth to which the dichotomy
exceeds the more familiar "public good" motivations we see in
Franklin D. Roosevelt or John F. Kennedy.
Charles Andre Joseph Marie de Gaulle was born November 22,
1890 in the heart of the Jansenist quarter in Lille, a northern
French province near Belgium, into a family of scholastic
traditions. The de Gaulles included educators, lawyers, state
2
functionaries, military bourgeoise and historians. This 
tradition was not a silent one, but rather persistently alluded 
to in the family circle.
^Lacouture, De Gaulle, p. 2; Hoffmann and Hoffmann, 
"The Will to Grandeur," Daedulus, p. 832.
2
Lacouture, De Gaulle, p. 67.
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De Gaulle’s grandmother, Josephlne-Anne-Narie Maillot, 
in contrast to the more "typical'* Frenchwomen of her day was 
a writer of innumerable novels and biographies. The latter 
were primarily glorifications of such revolutionary figures 
as Proudhon, Jules Valles, and Daniel O'Connell, the libera­
tor of Ireland. Interestingly, her theme in the O'Connell 
book is the validity of bloodless revolution, paralleled in 
Charles'political career.^ Werth notes that her writings
2
reveal ascertain scocialist and revolutionary romanticism," 
although Crozier views her works as essentially high moral 
exercises of piety. In either case, France, revolution, unity, 
and other aspects of de Gaulle's concepts and values growing 
out of psychological insecurity fixation for France are 
evident in these earlier ancestoral efforts.
De Gaulle's uncle by the same name, Charles, was a 
poet and writer. His emphasis was the Celts, with a theme 
of worldwide union for all celts. The earlier Charles added 
a further dimension to the family traditions in an oft-quoted 
passage:
When, in a camp surprised, at night, by an enemy 
attack, when each one fights alone, one does not ask 
his rank of whoever raises the flag and takes the 
initiative, of rallying the men. 3
^Crozier, De Gaulle, p. 18. She also wrote of Chateau­
briand, at least one travel book on thenorth of France and edited 
a journal. Correspondence des Familles. Werth, Alexander. DeGaulle: 
A Political Biography (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1966), p . 6^ 4.
^Werth, De Gaulle, pp. 64-5; Crozier De Gaulle, p. 18.
3cattaui, Charles De Gaulle, p. 16; Grlnnel-Milne,
Triumph of Integrity, p. 30; Hoffmann and Hoffmann, "The Will 
to Grandeur," Daedulus, p. 831
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Nephew Charles not only wrote on the same theme, but acted 
upon it during his London years.
The family's literary tradition is also found in 
Grandfather Julien-Phillippe De Gaulle, who wrote a history 
of Paris, edited a history of St. Louis, and traced the 
family geneology which de Gaulle learned at an early age.l 
Yet another noted de Gaulle was a Great-Grandfather, Jean- 
Baptiste-Phillippe, who held a Director of Transport and Posts 
position in the Grand Armée under Napoleon.^ As a whole, 
then, the de Gaulle family had a tradition of service to the 
state in public-oriented vocations or written themes ref]eCt-> 
ing such, regardless of their endeavors elsewhere. They 
were often characterized as "impoverished nobles," or noblesse 
de robe et d'Ipee. although Charles de Gaulle never used such 
nomenclature himself.3
As for the immediate foyer, de Gaulle's parents were 
not only cousins, but both from established norther Catholic 
conservative lines, although the de Gaulle family had strong 
Parisien tles.^ Relatively little is known of de Gaulle's
^See the literary license resulting from this family 
geneology in Cattaui, Charles de Gaulle.
2
Or merely Director of Promotions according to 
Thompson, Pledge to Destiny, p. l6
3see Paul-Marie de la Gorce, De Gaulle entre deux mondes, 
(Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1964); Adrian Crawley,
De Gaulle : A Biography (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co.,
Inc., 1969), p. 14.
^Crozier, De Gaulle, p. 17.
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military service as a volunteer. This ended In his being 
wounded and medaled In the I87O Pranco-Prusslan War at the 
selge of Le Gourget. a Paris battleground.1 Here again, 
the war and battle were so typical of Erbfelndschaft, the 
"hereditary enmity of the French and German people"2 and 
the subsequent era of French revanche.3 The event Is Im­
portant In Its destruction of the dominating fascination
of the Napoleonic legend with Its Illusions about the essence 
a
of German. All of this was recognized by de Gaulle In his 
1938 study of the French Army. Indeed, the three chapters of 
history taking place during his childhood were entitled 
Vers la revanche, a recognition of the Influence It had on his 
gereratlon. This "revenge" was more than mere rhetoric. It 
Included an extensive search for security, defined Inevitably 
as safety from Germany.^ There was the fear that any future 
war would again be on French soil, a major factor In French 
foreign policy.^ Yet the Church’s view was that such struggles 
were essentially materialistic. All of this merely reiterated
^Hatch, Biography of Charles De Gaulle, p. 20.
2see Frank Hoy Willis (ed.), France, Germany and the 
New Europe: 1945-1967 (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1958), p. vll.
^Hatch, Biography of Charles de Gaulle, p. 36.
^See Hans Kohn, The French Mind: Making of the Modern
(New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1955)» pT 40.
5simon Serfaty, France, De Gaulle and Europe: The Policy
of the Fourth and Fifth Republics Toward the Continent (Baltimore; 
John . Hopkins Press, I968) Originally a PhD Dissertation.
^See Padover, French Institutions, pp. 82ff.
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the de Gaulle theme of the various humiliations of the French 
State and the need for safety and security. Henri de Gaulle 
Inculcated these "facts" in his children, who when they were 
young were taken often to the scene of French humiliation, the 
Parisian battlefields. But Charles* father also showed his 
children the symbols of French glory and repeated his own 
fascination with the history of France so evident in the 
Parisian environs.
After giving up thoughts of a military career, and
a brief sojourn with the Paris police department which ended
with a clash over principles, Henri de Gaulle turned to the
teaching profession. He was diversified, holding the Doctor
of Letters, Science and Law at a Church school first in
Lille and then Paris. His opinions of the state l y c ^  system
and his unbending principles as a fervent Roman Catholic
precluded secular employment. In Paris at both a Jesuit
2
College and a school in Rue des Postes, Henri taught philos­
ophy, mathematics, history,literature, Latin and Greek. He 
became lay headmaster or prefet after only a year. He re­
mained at the church "high school" until its 1907 liquidation, 
under the Combes Law of 1905, in the midst of a wave of anti­
clericalism which expelled the Jesuits from France. When this
^Tournoux, Petain and De Gaulle, p. 1.
2
Clark, The Man Who is France, p. 21.
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occurred, he established his own private school. École or
Pension Fontanes, a "crammer's" school for baccalaureate
preparation.^ Charles, however, was sent to Antoine,
Belgium with the exiled Jesuits.
Charles de Gaulle characterized his father as a
"thoughtful, cultivated, traditional man. Imbued with a
2
feeling for the dignity of Prance." He was both royalist
and antl-republlcan, but not In a sectarian manner. That
Is, Henri de Gaulle did not have the Intense hatred, whether
antl-republlcan, antl-Semltlc, or xenophobia, so character­
's
Istlc of the French Right. A stern moralist with an In­
flexible code, he had an "old-time" sense of honor reflected 
In the Greek elegies he wrote. His deep even mystical love 
for France, her history, and her classical literature pro­
vided him with the background to understand ongoing events 
on the French scene. But the lessons of the past and the 
events of the present were essentially a continuation of 
the French search for national security, prestige and con-
li
tlnulty. To Henri and his family, this French nation 
exemplified:
^Lacouture, De Gaulle, p. 9*
2
De Gaulle, Memoirs, p. 3.
^Hoffmann and Hoffmann, "The Will to Grandeur," 
Daedulus, p. 832.
^Serfaty, De Gaulle and Europe, p. 13.
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. . .the highest temporal good, . . .a cultural 
partnership of the living and the dead, the virtues 
of the soldier as both the defender of the nation 
and the carrier of the Christian faith.
Henri de Gaulle had a unique ability to employ mime
in teaching in order to make the past come alive for his 
2
students. One of his students was Charles, whose character 
and values were shaped by a parent who was also the teacher, 
on both a formal and informal basis. Henri's favorite 
teaching example was Ignatius Loyola, the soldier-priest, 
along with the Greek ideal of a sovereign personality.
Charles assimilated the latter without modification, but 
his personal ideal would come to be a balance between the 
citizen-soldier and the cabinet-minister colonel.
"Entertainment" for the de Gaulle family invariably 
was educational sojourns, such as rare attendance at 
Parisian plays. These included classical presentations of 
French literature such as Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme, Rostand's 
L'Aiglon, a romantic drama of the last days of Napoleon's 
sons, or Cyrano de Bergerac. Even the traditional de Gaulle 
walks were educational reinforcements, always noting histor­
ical landmarks or visiting museums. Throughout, Henri
^Hoffmann and Hoffmann, "The Will to Grandeur," 
Daeddlus, p. 832.
2
De Gaulle would do Just as well with his political 
"stagecraft."
^Tournoux, Petain and de Gaulle, p. 5.
^Hatch, Biography of Charles de Gaulle, p. 23.
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de Gaulle Inculcated In his son the contrast of the ideal 
of a grave and faithful Christian Prance, the unworthiness 
of her citizens who so often fell short of it, and the sub­
sequent insecurity created by the existence of such a 
dichotomy. His was a cult of integrity, of Prance, but in­
cluding religious devotion, philosophic abstractions and 
literary articulateness: all for the security of Order 
through God and King.^ These emphases on throne, altar, 
sword and Holy Water were actively pursued in public service,
discipline, and submission to causes, but not classes. Thus
2
Henri de Gaulle valued Justice above class solidarity. 
Understandably, he came to defend Dreyfus at a time when his 
"class" did not, for the de Gaulles were "extreme moderates," 
condemning excesses. Theirs was a tradition of examining 
issues on its own merits, independently, rather than on any 
preconceived opinions or ideologies. In other words, there 
were open belief systems that would take into account higher 
values such as Justice and the state. This objectivity 
may be seen in Charles de Gaulle's first book, which was 
written during the frustrations of his German captivity. Yet 
even after considering the cultural and familial values, in-
O
eluding ravanche, the book's constant theme is "moderation."
^See Tournoux, Petain and de Gaulle, p. 3; Edelman, 
"Vision," Part I, p. 64.
^Ibid., p. 39n.
^Charles de Gaulle, La Discorde Chez 1'Ennemi (Paris: 
Berger-Levrault, 1924).
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Generally, however, the de'Gaulle family perceived the
French State to be in chaos. Order, unity, etc. had to be
reinstated in order to restore her place or grandeur among
other nations. The epitome of such beliefs are found in
the repercussions of "The Dreyfus Affair."
In France as early as 1886 the Roman Catholic Church,
the military, and the aristocracy led an anti-Semitic campaign
that would become more than a case of whether a Jewish Army
Officer had indeed sold French secrets to the Germans. The
"real" question was the Republic versus the Church, the nature
of modern French society, the role of the Army in that society
and that Republic, and the objectivity of basic principles of
justice or the national interest against the rights of the
individual.^ It is natural then that the de Gaulles were not
as much concerned with whether Dreyfus was guilty or innocent
as the effects of a national scandal which spotlighted many
normally latent French conflicts and in which both "sides"
2
behaved lamentably. Perhaps they thought Dreyfus innocent. 
There is even comment that Henri, de Gaulle's vocalizing of 
such an opinion had more to do with his giving up a military 
career than financial problems. Still the dominant distaste
^See Kohn, Modern French Mind, pp. 70-1; Crawley, 
De Gaulle, p. 20.
^Charles de Gaulle, France and Her Army, tr. F. L. 
Dash (London: Hutchinson & Co., n.p.), p . 82.
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for the affair was its effect on the country In general, 
in other words, the French nation-state in general and the 
military in particular. The constant strife with its in­
trigues, confessions, forgeries, retractions, mutual slander, 
duels and suicides lasted through de Gaulle's early adoles­
cence.^ The case and its wounds were reopened and the sentence 
eventually annulled when de Gaulle was fifteen years of age, 
so the controversy was a long one. The end result was a de­
moralization of shame and defeat for the French Army and a 
tarnishing of its prestige, which resulted in a depopular­
ization of military careers. There was not only a rise in 
anti-militarism with a reduction in Army manpower (Army Law 
of 1905), but a general pacifism in the country. De Gaulle, 
in reviewing the Dreyfus matter writes: "the illusions of 
pacifism and the newly awakened distrust of the military mind
(resulted in the army (Beginning to lose strength and co- 
2
hesion." The de Gaulles viewed the Army as the essence of 
France. The military provided a means to fulfill Prance's 
place in the world and her "historical destiny" in such 
national purposes as the defense of French territory and the 
colonial expansion of French interests. In contrast, the
^Ibid., also Clark, The Man Who is France, p. 27.
2
De Gaulle, France and Her Army, p. 82.
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Dreyfus Affair epitomized the de Gaulle perceptions of a 
cataclysmic world and the decline of the French state. For 
more than personal security, the de Gaulles feared for 
"their France."
The fact that such beliefs motivated Charles de 
Gaulle is readily apparent in his writings, whether Une 
mauvaise rencontre, a playlet written at age fourteen, or 
the posthumous publication of Memoirs of Hope.^ Even more 
relevant support is found in de Gaulle's political behavior 
during his political tenure. His "idea of France" is 
evident in all of his London British Broadcasting Company 
broadcasts :
At this hour all Frenchmen know that the ordinary 
forms of power have disappeared. In the confusion 
of French souls and the liquefaction of a govern­
ment fallen under the servitude of the enemy. I, 
General de Gaulle, a French soldier and chief, I 
assume to speak in the name of France.
In the name of Prance I formally declare the following:
Every Frenchman who is bearing arms has a sacred duty 
to continue the resistance. . .To relinquish even the 
smallest sliver of French land to the enemy would be 
a crime against the Nation. . .and now I speak above 
all for French North Africa; for an intact North 
Africa. . .every man possessing a shred of honor 
must refuse to carry out the conditions imposed 
by the enemy.
2
Soldiers of Prance, wherever you may be, arise.
See Tournoux, Petain et de Gaulle (Paris: Plon,
1964), pp. 28-37 for the playlet in French; Charles de Gaulle, 
Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1970.
2
Quoted in Hatch, Biography of Charles de Gaulle, 
p. 104; Clark, The Man Who is France, pp. 128-9. Emphasis 
supplied.
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To reiterate, the deprivation of perceived safety 
or security did not motivate the "de Gaulle self" in any 
personal quest for order, but rather for France. De Gaulle 
did not experience the psychological loss of a parent or 
the physical loss of siblings that fed Nixon's search for 
security and order, for example. Indeed, de Gaulle seems 
to have rarely sought anything, but rather has, in the French 
tradition, let time and events determine the pace of activity. 
He merely took advantage of surfacing events when the time 
was "right."
Affection and Belongingness
Although the distinction of personal self and public 
self would indicate a transition from self-concern to concern 
for others in the environment, Maslow views the transition 
as actually beginning with the "need area" of affection and 
belongingness. He defines "love" nonsexually, as being 
deeply understood and accepted.^ The lack of love or emotional
coldness is often the most common cause of maladjustments in
2
society. Such a deficiency may be partial, that is, the 
rejection cf the child by one parent, or even harsh parental 
discipline in general. Several American Presidential studies 
have explored the results of a child's perceived lack of
See S. DeGrazia, The Political Community, A Study of 
Anomie(Chicago : Unviersity of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 107 for 
a discussion of how the lack of this basic need results in anomie.
2
Maslow, Motivation and Personality, p. 89.
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love on subsequent political behavior. The Georges, for 
example, explore the dual motivations of love and self­
esteem relative to President Woodrow Wilson. They find 
that he had a:
. . .core feeling of inadequacy, of a fundamental 
worthlessness which must ever be disproved, that 
the unappeasable quality of his need for affection, 
power and achievement, and the compulsive quality 
of his striving for perfection, may be traced to 
the lack of affection shown him as a child .
Wilson’s primary interest in political power and its leader­
ship was essentially because it provided a means to compen­
sate for his damaged self-esteem and perceived lack of love.
The urgent inner need constantly to struggle against 
these mischievous self-depreciating legacies from 
his early years crippled his capacity to react 
objectively to matters at hand. . . (His was a 
necessitjQ to prove to himself that he was* after 
all, an adequate and virtuous human being.
Wilson would emotionally commit himself to specific measures
whose fate became, to him, a test of his personal worth. All
of this could be applied equally as well to Richard Nixon,
with more disastrous conclusions. A less extreme example is
Lyndon B. Johnson, a man driven for political power by a
love through performance which replaced an inability to re-
■3
late to people on the one-to-one level. In contrast, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt had an overpowering mother and a very
N.C. ).
^George and George, Woodrow Wilson, p. 8.
^Ibid., pp. 114-6.
^Doris Kearns, ’’What's the Big Idea?” PBS-TV(Raleigh,
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old father. His political motivations and traits developed 
in reaction to these factors, rather than permitting an un­
healthy situation to exist.^ Wilson, however, sought political 
power as a value in itself, as a means to find "approval, re­
spect and . . .a virtuous feeling," in other words, love,
2
affection and self-esteem. Even with the acquisition of 
power, however, Wilson was never satisfied. His childhood 
deprivations even affected his political style or role behavior. 
He preferred to hear only favorable information communicated 
in the Presidential decision-making process, even when from 
his closest advisers.
Further, deprivations of affection and belongingness 
can result in hostility, prejudice and autism. As Adler 
comments: "the stronger the feelings of personal inferiority, 
the greater the likelihood that a person will hold negative 
attitudes toward others. Thus those individuals with "unful­
filled need for affection will tend, because of their anxieties 
and hostilities, to be authoritarian and undemocratic."
In contrast, it is difficult to find examples of 
perceived severe deprivation of love in de Gaulle’s pre­
adult life or even to infer such from his adult behavior. 
Although, as previously noted, Henri de Gaulle was a "stern
^Maslow considered Roosevelt a prime example of the
Self-Actualizer. 
2George and George, Woodrow Wilson, p. 320.
^Knutson, Human Basis, pp. 39-^0. Here again, Nixon.
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moralist" and his wife one who hid her inner emotions, what 
little is known of de Gaulle's childhood is indicative of a 
protective le foyer functioning at its best. The few 
occasions "love" is mentioned, the inference is that the 
de Gaulle family life was a normal one. Tournoux writes 
that :
Henri de Gaulle was an extremely devoted father, 
proud of all {Tive ofl his children, and he 
admired Charles's exceptional gifts. And further, 
Charles is the most affectionate of the de Gaulle 
children.
The Hoffmanns go so far as to note that de Gaulle "must have 
experienced, at home, . . .the opulence of affection," al­
though as a child he had "no special privileges," for all
2
the children were treated equally. The Hoffmanns consider
Q
this a "deprivation" for such a "remarkable boy." Such an 
opinion, also expressed in the hagiographies, does not con­
sider the consequences of singling out one child of five for 
"special" attention. Although the other four children were 
not carbon copies of Charles, it appears that each in his 
own field of endeavor was more than "average."^
^Tournoux, Petain and De Gaulle, p. 15.
^Hoffmann and Hoffmann, "The Will to Grandeur," 
Daedalus, pp. 834-5. Emphasis supplied.
o
None of his biographers seems to dispute that Charles 
was very precocious, "wise beyond his years," according to 
his father.
The eldest brother was even considered the family 
intellectual. Little is known of the only sister.
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Until his adolescence, de Gaulle appears to have
been a typical boy, more interested in martial games^ and
adventure stories than studying, although he did some verse
writing, including his playlet. A practical Joker, de Gaulle's
aggressive temper often required "physical chastisement" from 
2
his father. This, however, appears well within the so-called 
"typical" experiences of a growing boy, with no Indication 
that the family relationships were sufficiently unusual as to 
result in compensatory motivational behavior. Indeed, de Gaulle's 
twenty year devotion to his retarded daughter is indicative of 
a capacity to love that could only come from one who had ex­
perienced affection and belongingness. Unfortunately, be­
cause he rarely broke the customs of le foyer and its shelter 
of privacy, plus the unique style of his particular person­
ality, de Gaulle's biographers continually reiterate the un­
contested, undocumented, and largely unanalyzed statement that 
he had been reared in an ice house, or at least had fallen Into 
one during adolescence.^ Yet, as we have noted, in de Gaulle's 
few references to his youth, the awareness of his family-world
^Crozier, De Gaulle, p. 23; Galante, The General, p. 47.
^Philippe BarrA, Charles de Gaulle (Parist Plon 
Cartier, 1941), pp. 22, 30t Tournoux. PetaTn and De Gaulle, 
pp. 24-5; Crozier, De Gaulle» p. 22
^The phrase is found somewhere in most of what has been 
written on the childhood period. See Crawley, De Gaulle, Chapter 
1; Tournoux, Petain and de Gaulle, p.7; Hoffmann and Hoffmann, 
"The Will to Grandeur. DaediiusTo. 834.
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Is one that was safe and secure for "his self," but chaotic
for the "self" of Prance. In a more tenuous way, the need
area of affection and belongingness could be dichotomized
the same way. For example, the love of France the de Gaulle
family had is reflected in the portrayal of Henri de Gaulle
by one of his former students, Marcel Prévost:
It is France you love at this school. In speaking 
to you of France, I know I am repeating myself.
You can all testify, all of you: in the ten years 
I have addressed you here, I have never done so 
without speaking of France.
Charles de Gaulle's religious and nationalistic love of
France was strong, if not deeper, as indicated in his oft-
quoted "certain idea of Prance:"
The emotional side of me tends to imagine France, 
like the princess in the fairy stories or the 
Madonna in the frescoes, as dedicated to an ex­
alted and exceptional destiny.
"Prance" was de Gaulle’s marotte or obsession. With a motto 
of "grandeur," from an early age he totally identified his 
destiny with the preservation and promotion of that abstrac­
tion, "France." For he believed that as long as there is 
France, there is no need for anything more.
As noted previously, the dichotomy of self and State 
is so strong a part of the individual makeup of the de Gaulle 
family that it must be considered as something other than a 
motivation to duty in the "public interest," a concept which
^See Marcel Prévost, Le Scorpion (Paris: n.p.). 
2
De Gaulle, Memoirs, p. 3.
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too often does not adequately express the "non-people" 
orientation of de Gaulle’s "Prance." More detail on this 
Idealization and Idolization of France will be considered 
In Chapters 4 and 5, since It Is a major element In both 
de Gaulle's political philosophy and style. In the present 
context, however, France "needs" to belong, to be respected 
not only by her citizens (nationalism), but other nation­
states as well. Henri de Gaulle taught his children the 
history of France's shame and defeat and the need for 
patriotism, faith and religion.^ Charles de Gaulle In turn 
sought a means to help recapture the grandeur of France and 
her honor. For a time he thought that the means to do this 
was to be an African missionary. As a practicing Roman
Catholic, he accepted the teachings of the Church with complete 
2
faith. However, his eventual choice of a military career
was based In part on the deep sense of duty and the military
?
orientation cultivated early by his family. He saw a greater 
role In regaining French grandeur or esteem with the Army.
As a soldier he could also, as In French colonial days, "carry
^Crozier, De Gaulle, p. 21.
^Ibld., p. 45; Hatch, Biography of de Gaulle, p. 266.
^Tournoux, Petain and de Gaulle, p. 4l. After years 
of recreating French battles, wherein he always played the 
role of France, de Gaulle chose the military career when he 
was about seventeen.
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the faith" while defending the nation. In all then, de Gaulle 
had an apocalyptic vision of international politics as crisis- 
oriented. But he believed he would play an undefined role in 
that vision. Such a role would be for the entire French State 
rather than for the Church which represented merely a part of 
that State.
Esteem
Esteem, the fourth "need area" has less clarity. In 
Maslow’s analysis, the lack of esteem may either spur activity 
toward seeking prestigous roles or be a barrier to activity 
by producing a shyness that inhibits role-seeking. Although 
characterized by others as personally shy, it appears that 
de Gaulle's reticence was more the result of the influence 
of le foyer and the particular behavioral and political 
style he adopted so early. If indeed he was shy,^ it did 
not permanently inhibit political role-seeking. Further, any 
shyness could be explained in the Cartesian thought-pattern 
that advocates waiting for the right moment to permit events 
to do the "acting." De Gaulle was a "waiter." He was forty- 
nine years old before he emerged as a French leader. His 
brief political tenure over, he was to wait another twelve 
and a half years before returning to political leadership. 
Further, once in political office, he sought to awaken the
^Grinnel-Milne, Triumph of Integrity, p. 39
I6l
French political consciousness, not an easy thing to do.
Such a national consensus In France has often been directed 
against political parties and the Institutions of the govern­
ment. And historically, the "director" has been an Individual 
whose sole role seemed to be restoring Prance’s rank or 
grandeur, her esteem, rather than functioning as a specific 
problem-solver.  ^ De Gaulle’s political style was definitely 
not tinged with any "shyness."
Maslow divided this "need area" of esteem Into the 
need to ^  a worthy Individual— to have strength, freedom, and
Independence— and the need to be recognized as a worthy In-
2
dividual In the esteem of others. There are vital differences 
between the two. Self-esteem entails confidence, competence, 
mastery, adequacy, achievement. Independence and freedom while 
soclal-esteem results In prestige, recognition, acceptance, 
attention, status, reputation and appreciation. For many 
researchers, this general "need area" constitutes the prime 
motivating force In the pursuit of power. Power compensates 
for previous deprivations. It "is expected to overcome low 
estimates of the self, by changing either the traits of the
■3
self or the environment in which it functions." This pursuit
^Serfaty, De Gaulle and Europe, p. 91 quoting 
Pougeyrollas, Politique, pp. 178-89.
2
Maslow, Motivation and Personality, p. 90. 
•^Lasswell, Power and Personality, p. 39*
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of power Is viewed by Lasswell e;b as a compensatory
personality goal that Is not entirely healthy. I.e., the
neurotic seeking naked power. Yet the pursuit of power
can come from those with high self-esteem, particularly
by those Individuals who can survive the rigors of political
candidacy and consequent office and whose leadership Is a
commitment to a high moral cause. Barber states this view:
A political role Is based on deeper motives. It 
Is not likely to be taken by two kinds of people: 
those who have such high self-esteem that they can 
manage relatively easily the threats and strains 
Involved In this change; and those who have such 
low self-esteem that they are ready to do this 
extraordinary thing to raise It.
De Gaulle was the Individual of high self-esteem.
However, his obsession with "French destiny" led him to
sacrifice his personal career In the military for the
2
eventual grandeur of France, rather than to seek political 
power as a compensatory action per Lasswelllan precepts. 
Further, the seeking of "naked power" for the sake of 
domination Is rare In certain cultural Instances. For 
example, although his Inner conflicts would make It appear 
that pure power would be sought by President Wilson, these 
conflicts were tempered by the external environment of his 
family, their values, and the larger cultural context. These
^J. David Barber, The Lawmakers (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1965), pp. 223-4.
2
Thompson, Pledge to Destiny, pp. 256-7.
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factors moderated Wilson's original motivations. In de Gaulle’s 
case, much the same is true. The French have a anti-dictatorial 
tradition, found essentially in their concept of liberty.
Liberty is seen as a means or civil right for the citizenry to 
oppose those in power.^ "Naked power" is anathema to the 
French, who have a "natural" tendency to defy what they dis­
trust, authority and power. Too, France does not have the 
authoritarian tradition evident in a country like Germany, for 
example. And if we assume the acquisition of "naked power" 
is fairly consistent with dictatorships, then neither Wilson 
nor de Gaulle could be so categorized.
In de Gaulle's case, no examples of severe deprivation 
of either self or social esteem exist, unless the dichotomy 
of the French public versus the personal self is continued.
This, however, would only complicate Maslow's own self/social 
divisions in this particular "need area." The established 
fact of the existence of the dichotomy is more important than 
reiterating its application to each "need area." Too, the 
"public self" will be analyzed further in subsequent chapters. 
Although this writer believes de Gaulle experienced no severe 
esteem deprivation, this is not true with the Hoffmanns.
^See.Duverger, French Political System, pp. 8-9.
2
Note again, the previous discussion of authority-laden 
versus authoritarianism.
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Their conclusion is that the entire de Gaulle family was 
"frustrated" both socially and politically by the domestic 
and international political conditions.^ The Hoffmanns 
contend that these frustrations, combined with familial
2
values, resulted in de Gaulle choosing a military career.
In other words, his motivation was to shape the future, yet 
renew France's destiny as it had been in the past. But be­
cause his political beliefs were not monarchical as were his 
family's de Gaulle chose to identify himself in his goal of 
the restoration of French grandeur with the French State, 
that is, an entity above every and all ideologies.
It seems, however, that in the main de Gaulle was 
an individual high in both security and self-esteem for the 
self. Maslow writes that such a leader will be motivated 
only in fields or areas that interest him and then only 
for the sake of the task to be accomplished, the advance­
ment of the field in which he is interested, or for the good 
of society in general. His acitons would not be merely 
subterfuges for Internal frustrations. That is, de Gaulle 
viewed political power as merely a means to further objective
^This idea originated with Emanul de la Vigeria 
D'Astier in his Sept Fois, Sept Jours (Paris: de Minuit, 
1947).
^Hoffmann and Hoffmann, "The Will to Grandeur," 
Daedùlus, pp. 835-6.
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goals, often viewed as a "public duty" but not as an end.
Still, active political participation can reflect a need 
for self-esteem while lack of social esteem impedes socio­
political participation.^ Overall, an individual deficient 
in esteem will tend to be intolerant of others, while ex­
hibiting a concern for power and status. Such individuals 
are susceptible to closed belief systems, for dogmatism aids
in their understanding the external environment and in seeking
2
security in power. Unfortunately, de Gaulle's political 
style often left him open to such criticisms, although the 
evidence to support such a view is meager. Generally, he 
does not fit unequivocally into any of Maslow's "deprived-to- 
motivate" categorizations. Since it is impossible to "prove" 
unquestionably the depth of the "public-self of Prance syndrome" 
on de Gaulle's "personal self," other than that evident in his 
conscious political philosophy and style, we must conclude 
that de Gaulle more readily fits Maslow's Self-Actualizing 
individual.
When severe deprivation during the formative years 
has occurred in any of the "need areas," the individual who 
survives is one crippled by an inability to assess reality
^Studies are actually Inconclusive at this stage and 
support either self or social esteem.
2
See Milton Rokeach, The Open*and Closed Mind: Inves­
tigations into the Nature of Belief Systems and Personality 
Systems (New York; Basic Books, I960).
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accurately.^ A different quality of leadership character­
izes such an individual. And although there is little 
specific data, it has been suggested by Morganthau and 
Thompson that the quality of leadership affects the overall 
power position of nation-states. Relative to political 
style, the leader who has emerged from a deprived childhood 
tends to make decisions without all relevant information, a 
potentially fatal factor resulting from defective or un­
healthy interpersonal relationships with others, including 
political advisors. That is, political advisors are expected 
to function primarily "toward" the political leader’s per­
sonality needs. When that leader once makes a decision, it 
is rarely changed. Indeed when the situation, requires de­
cisional certainty, inaction often results. When action
does result, it often lacks flexibility, as conformists lack
2
independence or freedom and thus function inflexibly. When 
the psychically deprived become politically active, it is 
often with the aim of forcing social and political change in
■5
an effort to create greater stability. Yet their political
^Knutson, Human Basis, pp. 4l-6.
^Ibid., pp. 64-7. In contrast, de Gaulle’s policies 
were often so flexible that opposite interpretations were 
given to the same outlining speech.
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belief systems are "short-term, egoistic, concrete."
Their sickness is a character sickness; they have 
a sick philosophy of life, which is to say a false, 
incorrect one. It is understandable that they should 
have formed such a philosophy when we understand 
their jungle childhood. But their jungle philosophy 
doesn't change even when they grow up and come out 
of the jungle. It resists new facts. It is sick 
because it reacts to,an outgrown past, rather than 
to the real present.
De Gaulle's personal and political philosophy and his unique
political style just do not validate his characterization as
such an individual, although in unscientific personal re-
2
flections it would appear that Maslow did just that.
Self-Actualization
Rather than a motivational force buffeted by depri­
vations, Self-Actualization constitutes a "being level," a 
process of growth rather than a "need level." In contrast 
to the previous discussion of deficiency-related areas, 
Self-Actualization occurs when the individual's basic needs 
are met. It is a process wherein the human personality
"unfolds" to its fullest extent, is mentally healthy or
o
more "fully human." As such, Self-Actualization can not 
be specifically defined or delimited, although it appears
Abraham Maslow, "Power Relationships and Patterns of 
Personal Development," in A. Kornhauser (ed.). Problems of 
Power in American Democracy (Detroit: Wayne State University,
1957), p . 130. A jungle philosophy is valid in jungle-like 
worlds, however.
2
See his letters in Maslow, Memorial.
^Maslow, Motivation and Personality, p. I83.
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more often In those over the age of sixty. De Gaulle's 
personal growth is most evident after he reached the age 
of fifty and during his second political tenure, although 
not necessarily the last two years of that tenure.
This growth process is indicated by self-actualization 
needs or " me t an ee ds n eb u l o us  concepts perceived by the 
individual. These include: meaningfulness, self-sufficiency, 
effortlessness, playfulness, richness, simplicity, order. 
Justice, completion, necessity, perfection, individuality, 
aliveness, beauty, goodness, and at the pinacle - truth.^
A majority of these "metaneeds" are evident in de Gaulle's 
written philosophy. However, this is a normative judgment 
since the use of a Personal Orientation Inventory is im­
possible now and would be improbable for political reasons 
for the living. Thus it is again necessary to infer intui­
tively how well Maslow's Self-Actualizing individual fits 
de Gaulle.
Maslow expresses this "being" as "what a man can
2
be, he must be:"
One's only rival is one's own potentialities. One's 
only failure is failing to live up to one's own 
possibilities.
Maslow, Psychology of Being; Prank G. Goble, The 
Third Force: The Psychology of Abraham Maslow (New York:
Grossman Pub., 1970;, p. 46.
2
Maslow, Motivation and Personality, p. 91.
■3
Maslow, Memorial, p. 99. Notes dated February 23, 1970.
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Capacities clamor to be used, and cease their clamor 
only when they are used sufficently. That is to 
say, capacities-,are needs and therefore are intrinsic 
values as well.
Maslow's basic theme seems to be that the Self-Actualizing
individual exhibits opposing characteristics to those of
the psychically deprived group. The most radical difference
is in their individual Weltanschauung as related to individual
personality needs. This is an old idea, as Fichte notes:
The kind of philosophy a man chooses depends upon 
the kind of man he is. For a philosophic system 
is not piece of dead furniture one can acquire and 
discard at will. It is animated with the spirit 
of the man who possesses it.
Or, from the psychological camp. Allport writes:
The political nature of a man is indistinguishable 
from his personality as a whole, and . . .his 
personality as a whole is not the sum total of his 
specific reactions, but rather a congruent system 
of attitudes, each element of which is intelligible 
only in the light of the total pattern. A man’s 
political opinions reflect-the characteristic modes 
of his adjustment to life.
In contrast to the ’’deprived," the Self-Actualizer 
has an open personality system that does not impede "success­
ful social functioning,"^ in part because personality does not
^Maslow, Psychology of Being, p. 144.
2
Quoted in Stein, Identity and Anxiety, p. 542.
^Gordon W. Allport, "The Composition of Political 
Attitudes," The American Journal of Sociology 35 (1930):238.
^Knutson, Human Basis, p. 8?.
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hinder basic assessments of either the external environment- 
reality or an individual's own personality. Rather there is 
a superior perception of reality, eventuating "in a superior 
ability to reason, to perceive the truth, to come to con­
clusions, to be logical and to be cognitively efficient."^ 
This superior ability, by whatever terminology is applied, 
was recognized by de Gaulle:
Great men of war have always been conscious of the 
importance of instinct. Was not what Alexander 
called his "hope," Caesar his "luck," and Napoleon 
his "star" simply the fact that they knew they had 
a particular gift of making contact with realities 
sufficiently closely to dominate them?
L % e is seen clearly, objectively, and with little emotion­
ality to cloud this perception. For example, during the 
emotional period of his "exile" in London, while he labored 
to rebuild the fighting French as the Fres French, an un­
knowing subordinate ran up under the Tricolor a Cross of 
Lorraine flag, de Gaulle's personal symbol. De Gaulle's 
unemotional and logical response was an order to remove the 
banner. It was not a French flag. Objectivity is also 
evident throughout his writings on war and its activities.
^Maslow, Motivation and Personality, p. 205.
2
Charles de Gaulle, The Edge of the Sword, tr. 
Gerard Hopkins (New York: Criterion Books, Inc., I960), 
p. 22; Le Fil de 1 'Epee, p. l8l.
^Grinnel-Milne, Triumph of Integrity, p. 121.
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His first words in Edge of the Sword quote Faust: "In the 
beginning was the Word? No! In the beginning was the Act."  ^
Military and political action are not necessarily based on 
a philosophy of words. War is action, the aftermath brings 
objectivity.
In political terms, de Gaulle's objective perception
was "realism." This is evident in his view that the Algerians
were fighters for independence, not part of a world-wide
2
Communist conspiracy as the French Generals warned. Ho Chi 
Minh, in turn, was another nationalist, although the U.S. 
Pentagon followed their French brothers in viewing him as 
little more than another link in that "Red" conspiracy. In 
fact, de Gaulle incorporated Communists in his military and 
political actions, beginning with a role in the French Resis­
tance— as they were not "pure separatists." His behavior in 
most instances was uncolored by emotionality. However, this 
does not mean he was not sensitive, for in the early days 
of his London years some emotionality showed through his
■3
self-control, but his realistic perceptions were not 
affected by this.
De Gaulle's philosophy and pragmatic political 
style indicated that the realities of power were clearly
^De Gaulle, Edge of the Sword, p. 15; Le Fil de 
I ' E p ^ , p. l6l.
^Werth, De Gaulle,p. 55.
^See Colonel Passy (A. E. V. Dewavrin), Souvenirs, 
I (Paris: Raoul Solar, 19^7)•
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and objectively faced. In decision-making, this translates 
into a strong sense of what is right and wrong, with little 
room, if any, for compromise.^ What de Gaulle considered 
"right," particularly in major issues as h£ determined them 
to be, was not a matter for either debate or compromise, even 
if such an attitude resulted in inaction or unpopularity.
This element of his personality is evident throughout his 
public career. It may be seen in his military opinions on 
the use of a motorized army, his role as leader of the Rally 
of the French People in the 1950’s and all of his foreign 
policy. This sense of right and wrong was reinforced by a 
strong personal ethos, a set of principles he termed "honor 
and honesty." Such qualities enhance the decision-maker’s 
ability to foresee or predict future events. De Gaulle is 
noted for his prescience, less a totally objective fact since 
his predictions were made after a crisis had begun in most 
instances and then were based on what his own political be­
havior would be. Of course, this behavior was grounded on 
a basically unchanging philosophy and was predictable. It 
is only necessary to compare the philosophy of The Edge of 
the Sword to his actions during WWII to understand how 
Grinnel-Milne could write: "His most objectionable quality 
is being almost invariably right." Yet de Gaulle's pre­
dictive power is not always evident in international events
^Crawley, De Gaulle, p. 18.
^Grinnel-Milne, Triumph of Integrity, p. 317.
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per se, although he did accurately foresee certain major 
events such as the United States and Russian entry into 
WWII. This ability to predict circumstances correctly 
should not be construed as an inability to listen to others. 
That is precluded by the reality that the Self-Actualizer 
has an internalized conscience, but one moulded by empathy.
As an individual, de Gaulle was humane, indefensive, and 
cosmopolitan. Such a person may be either a liberal or 
conservative, although normally oriented toward the present 
and future. De Gaulle has been characterized as either, 
both, and neither.
Self-Actualizers, then, are tolerant and accept not 
only themselves but others. De Gaulle's Memoirs and his 
actions during his political tenures reveal a willingness 
to adapt and take others' aspirations into consideration.^ 
Although during WWII de Gaulle had a "running battle" with 
Churchill, Roosevelt and others, his Memoirs usually absolves 
those with whom he had fought so long and hard, a good in­
dication of his tolerance and forgiveness but not necessarily 
of Roosevelt's.
The Self-Actualizer has an identification with mankind 
in general, believing that man is good. De Gaulle did not 
divide humanity into good and bad, but rather included all
^Hoffmann and Hoffmann, "The Will to Grandeur,"
Daeddlus, p. 851.
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in the interests of Prance. However, "people" or "man" in
de Gaulle's interpretation meant essentially the people of
northern France^ or any person who accepted French culture,
2
an ethnic view. He had a "very Christian sense of man's 
frailty,"^ noting often that the French are "somewhat weak 
and fickle," but liking them no less for it. Although 
tolerant of others and the natural world, in other words 
identifying with mankind, de Gaulle was intolerant of dis­
honesty, cheating, inefficiency, and the like. As Thompson 
notes, there was "the arrogance of his scorn for the compro­
mises and docilities of his fellows."^ D ’Astier goes further 
by saying for de Gaulle: "I don't like men, I like what
c
elevates them." However, in general de Gaulle viewed man 
as not necessarily approved of, but essentially good.
Maslow sees the Self-Actualizer as basically free 
from anxiety or hostility, although the latter may exist.
With de Gaulle it existed. His sense of "order" was obtain­
able only through battle, whether in war or politics. But
^See de la Groce, De Gaulle.
2
Crozier, De Gaulle, pp. 54-5.
^Hoffmann and Hoffmann, The Will to Grandeur," 
Daedftlus, p. 854.
^Thompson, Pledge to Destiny, p. 256.
^D'Astier, Sept fois, pp. 60-l.
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it was a state of low and well-managed anxiety, one that 
permitted a creative interest in his environment. Thus 
although de Gaulle always had to have a quarrel, believing 
that to be great one must sustain a great quarrel,^ a 
"governor" existed in the fact that he was also a French 
classicist, desiring balance and efficiency attainable 
only with individual self-control. "Greatness," he told
2
Malraux, "is a road that leads toward something unknown."
De Gaulle was also philosophcally oriented, both 
practically and theoretically, as are most Self-Actualizers.
Prom early childhood, as early as age five according to 
some, de Gaulle's formal and informal education was a classical 
French one, which means philosophical orientation. In addition, 
he appears to have continued this interest through his life. 
Whether in his writings, speeches, military or political 
actions, there are ample evidences of this philosophical 
orientation. Chapter 4 following explores the content of 
this philosophy, which draws upon Bergson, Chateaubriand, 
Saint-Simon, P^uy, Epictetus, Barres, LaRochefoucauld,
Bismark on war and politics, Sartre, Malraux, Descartes,
^De Gaulle, Edge of the Sword, p. 15. The idea is 
originally from Hamlet.
^Malraux, Felled Oaks, p. 29.
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Mauriac, Nietzsche, Montaigne's Essays, Pascal, Maurras-
but not as a reactionary. Corneille, de Vigny, Froissant,
St. Augustine, Goethe, Socrates, Plato, and Kant - to name
a few.^ This Is scarcely typical of, for example, Lyndon
Johnson or Richard Nixon.
De Gaulle was skilled in Greek and contributed
philosophically oriented verse and prose to literary reviews
2
while still a teenager. As an adult, he frequented French 
and Polish salons. Including that of Daniel Halevy, a friend 
of P^guy. He acknowledged the Importance of philosophers In 
writing that :
. . .In the realm of the mind, men like Bourtroux or 
Bergson gave new life to the spiritual side of 
French thought, while Pëguy and Barras appealed 
to the precocious maturity of a young generation 
who sensed the presence of the Gleaner, In liter­
ature the Influence of a Barres, reviving In the 
elite an awareness of the Imperishable Inheritance 
by uncovering the links that attach It to Its 
ancestors, are at once effects and causes of [the 
recovery from French pacificism and the demorali­
zation of the military7 3
As one who was philosophically oriented, de Gaulle 
advocated waiting for the right moment and then acting 
decisively. This Is his basic concept of time, which ever
See Crozier, De Gaulle,pp. 21, 442; Tournoux, Tragedle, 
pp. 231-2; Lacouture, De Gaulle, pp. 11, 43; Hatch, Biography 
of Charles de Gaulle, pp. 23-4, 266; Clark, The Man Who Is 
France, pp. 24-5; Crawley, De Gaulle, pp. 17-8; Edelman, "Vision," 
Part II; Gaston Bonheur, Charles de Gaulle (Paris: Gallimard,
1958), p. 32; and others.
Clark, The Man Who Is France, p. 31.
^Crozier, De Gaulle, p. 33; Robert Aron, An Explanation 
of Charles de Gaulle (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. ix-xl.
De Gaulle, France and Her Army, p. 87.
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cycles from heights to depressions in periods, epochs or 
returns, similar to the theories of Nietzsche and Peguy.
Thus slow orderly change, rather than sudden usually 
militarily-inspired changes, are preferred. Although the 
Army was considered a major factor in a nation, de Gaulle 
recognized that the French Army had been against Dreyfus, 
for Vichy, and for Algerian integration. Such a force could 
scarcely be turned to for objective or realistic policies. 
Yet although his bitterest quarrels were with the military, 
he still preferred to be called mon General above all other 
titles. However, after the military returned him to power, 
de Gaulle was the one to effectively "tame" it. Indirectly, 
then, his actions or policies toward the major vehicle of 
sudden change, the military, are good indications of his 
advocacy of slow change.The end result may still be revo­
lutionary, but a bloodless one.^ Slow change, of course, 
requires the patience to await the proper moment, which de 
Gaulle had. He was unknown by most Frenchmen until he was 
forty-nine, and then gave up his political role after only 
a brief tenure, not to return to formal power positions for 
twelve years.
Maslow' further states that Self-Actualizers are 
more cosmopolitan or "international people," rather than
^Note de Gaulle’s grandmother’s quotation on p. 143
above.
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typifying a purely "national character."^ Although de Gaulle’s
roots were In the North of Prance, he did travel extensively
2
whenever possible. He has been said to be an "untypical" 
Frenchman. In fact ^  said so In stating that he was "with­
out precedent." A more "typical" French leader would Include:
. . .the ruthless, sarcastic ’Jacobin’ Clemenceau; 
the humourless CplcJ, hard-working, drearily 
legalistic Polncard'; Doume^gue, the average politician 
with his false bonhomie; Petaln, the traditional 
general, suddenly called upon to play the Father 
Figure (In the midst of his secondary occupation, 
"sklrt-chaslng.'G
Still, de Gaulle Is "typical" with respect to his seventeenth
century classical educational emphasis and many of the
cultural values he held. Including the Cartesian thinking he
epitomized. However, what Maslow seems to mean here Is that
the Self-Actualizer does not fall to national pressures to
conform when non-humanlstlc or antl-democratlc values are
Involved, but rather Is Independent when basic principles
are the Issue. Yet there ^  conventionality where less
Important things like dress or food are concerned. De Gaulle’s
nonconformist Ideas in the military effectively restricted
his promotions and slowed his career, yet he never changed
his preferences. Conventional on how he dressed and the
food he ate, he refused to cultivate "the taste, attitudes and
^Maslow, Motivation and Personality, pp. 213-4. 
2
Lacouture, De Gaulle, p. 23.
^Werth, De Gaulle, p. 56.
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features that could flatter" crowds.^
De Gaulle, as Self-Actualizers are wont to do,
recognized the difference between means and ends in a
basically democratic value structure. That is, if one
accepts that his values or attitudes were not ideologically
authoritarian, it must be assumed that they were democratic.
His insistence upon wanting to deal with the people directly
in the referendum, universal suffrage, granting women the
right to vote, etc. are indications of a democratic value
structure. In this, and other political behavior, de Gaulle
was more mission-centered and less ego-centered, although he
admitted to being an egoist.for France. His was a sense of
2duty or obligation that had to be accomplished. This 
mission-centered orientation is evident in de Gaulle’s Edge 
of the Sword where he constantly notes that leaders identify
•5
themselves with high ideas. So a cause is necessary, a form 
that is likened to a missionary, in this case of, to, and 
for France. De Gaulle then is "destiny’s instrument" seeking 
to preserve a cultural entity, the French nation. The French­
man is a national animal, linked to a homeland, the product
^Charles de Gaulle, Unity:War Memoirs :19^2-44, tr.
Richard Howard (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1959)» 
p. 311.
2
Maslow, Motivation and Personality, p. 205. For more 
political application of this theory,i.e.,that the democratic' 
character is one developing from,a "combination of emotional 
maturity, of self-confident strength that permits both respect 
and healthy control and discipline, of warm or cool affection, and 
of training in democratic techniques and philosophy" see Lasswell, 
Power and Personality;Maslow,"Power Relationships" in Kornhauser, 
American Democracy, pp. 105-8. De Gaulle, Edge of Sword, pp. 87-8,
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of a collective temperament and a traditional culture, according
to de Gaulle. Within this context, he says:
A call to honor from the depths of history, as well 
as the instinct of the nation itself, had led me to 
bear responsibility for the treasure in default of 
heirs: to assume French sovereignty. It was I who 
held the legitimacy. It was in its name that I could 
call the nation to war and to unity, impose order, 
law and justice, demand from the world respect for the 
rights of France.
In decision-making terms, the Self-Actualizing in­
dividual has psycholgical strength in spontaneity, unhampered 
2
by convention. He is a task-oriented problem-solver open 
to new ideas and new information. De Gaulle, although con­
sidered a traditionalist, opened France to industrialization 
and modernization. However, he sought to control this evolu­
tion so that it would not result in the disadvantages he saw 
in the experiences of the United States. But he moved from 
being a French Empire man of the old-time imperialistic 
school to a decolonizer and leacjler, or at least friend, of 
the "Third World" nations. In his nonconformity, de Gaulle 
dedicated himself to a mission and was willing to discipline 
himself to work hard to accomplish his goal, in order "not 
to disappoint oneself" according to Malraux.^
^De Gaulle, War Memoirs (Unity), p. 665.
2
Maslow, Motivation and Personality, pp. 208-9.
^Werth, De Gaulle, pp. 57-8.
^See Andr/ Malraux, Antimemoirs (New York: Holt,
Rinehart & Winston, I968), p. 130 or his Felled Oaks: Conver­
sation with de Gaulle (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1972)
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But there Is objective detachment from a problem. However, 
this can be, and with de Gaulle was, interpreted by others 
as coldness or aloofness.^ Yet humility is more character­
istic. In other words, creativity including flexibility,
spontaneity, and courageous action is typical of de Gaulle's
2
Self-Actualization. De Gaulle's flexibility is evident in 
his ability to change both his political orientation and his 
personality. Thus, although he has often been characterized 
as a bourgeoise and minor aristocrat, de Gaulle's political 
support at any given time came from both the bien-pensants 
of conservative Prance and the "revolutionists," but not
■3
the ideologists. He explains the paradox of his family's 
background and his adult political beliefs in a newspaper 
interview :
I was brought up, like most young men in my class, 
as an ultra-conservative. That was the atmosphere 
at St. Cyr. But, during the present war WW II ,
I have had evidence of treason among the same class. 
After I started the Free French movement, I soon 
discovered that the support I was getting from France 
came from the working class and peasantry. They were 
the ones risking their lives. This had a profound 
impression on me and made me alter my opinions.
view.
^Edelman, "Vision," Part 1.
2
See Crozier, De Gaulle, pp. 663-4 for an opposing
^Ibid., pp. 4-5.
^Richard Harrity and Ralph G. Martin, Man of Destiny: 
de Gaulle of France (New York: Duell, Sloan & Peace, I961), 
n.p.
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His Idealism, then, was not rigid in application. He 
viewed statesmanship as "doing what is possible in the 
right direction."^ Thus although he was a traditionalist, 
he acted more progressively than the radicals, in order to 
adapt the best of French traditions to what he considered 
the inevitability of change. "Enemies" were forgiven when 
their interests approximated those of "Prance." His personality 
changed too, or at least mellowed. Prom an aggressively hot- 
tempered youth, de Gaulle evolved sometime between WW II and
the institutionalization of the Fifth Republic into a man
2
of patience. He even gave up the chain-smoking which alone
often indicated his internal turmoil, or his wandering
trail during military maneuvers.
De Gaulle's courage and inventiveness may be seen
in his reaction to involuntary confinement as a Prisoner
of War during WW I. He attempted five escapes from five
different prisons, including being smuggled out of camp in
a horse-drawn supply wagon, swallowing vast amounts of
bicarbonate to turn a jaundice yellow for an easier escape
4
from the camp hospital and digging a tunnel. In each
^Hatch, Biography of Charles de Gaulle, p. 266.
^Crozier, De Gaulle, p. 686.
Thompson, Pledge to Destiny, pp. 40, 49j Grinnel- 
Milne, Triumph of Integrity,"pi 83» Clark, The Man Who is 
Prance, p. 105» Hatch, Biography of Charles de Gaulle, p. 216.
^Galante, The General, pp. 62-5.
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U.'
instance he made his own uniforms,^ but was easily recaptured
due to his unusual height. The Germans finally put their
2
"mulehead" into a camp for incorrigible prisoners. When 
it became evident that the escape attempts were fruitless, 
since the last camp included among other things, a moat, 
de Gaulle turned his energies to other ventures. He polished 
his German language skills and by researching German newspapers 
on that country's military actions, established the ground­
work for his 1924 book. La Discorde chez l'Ennemi. His 
spare time was spent lecturing his fellow prisoners on the 
war campaigns from facts he gleaned from the censored German 
papers. Here again his ability of prescience revealed it­
self when he was able to predict the German military defeat 
from such Incomplete information.
In their desire for personal privacy and detach­
ment from society, the Charles de Gaulles rarely enter­
tained^ outside their circle of family and friends. Yet 
this typical Self-Actualizing behavior means increased 
autonomy and improved interpersonal relations, although the 
circle of friends and;loved ones with whom feelings of 
intimacy are shared are small in number. In all his contacts
^Clark, The Man Who is France, p. 46. 
^Ibld., Port IX, Ingolstadt, Bavaria. 
^Crawley, De Gaulle, p. l4.
184
with Americans, those he considered friends were few, in­
cluding Envoy to the Free French Robert D. Murphy, U. S. 
Ambassador to France Charles E. Bohlen, and NATO/SHAPE 
Commander, General Lauris Norstead. But detachment from 
others is preferred so much, that often extreme measures 
are taken to insure privacy. De Gaulle went so far as to 
insist that there be no telephones in his immediate vicinity, 
even when he was France's Chief Executive. Virtually every 
weekend during his political tenure was spent "away" at 
Colombey and many weekdays were spent travelling throughout 
France or abroad.^ Such privacy meant that few realized how 
bad de Gaulle's cateracts were during the 1950's, for ex­
ample. Yet even with such self-imposed social restrictions, 
the Self-Actualizer sees the world as knowable, and manage­
able. He learns more than others about this world and life 
in general from both the formal and informal educational pro­
cesses. De Gaulle seems 'to have learned it rapidly, and 
then became bored with school. He passed first or near first 
from each school, regardless. He innovatively enhanced his 
abilities by using his knowledge of language as a vehicle to 
discipline his mind. He learned, and taught his siblings, 
to speak French backwards. With such discipline, he
^Hoffmann and Hoffmann, "The Will to Grandeur,"
Daedulus, p. 857*
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memorized lengthy passages and entire plays, such as a 
favorite, Cyrano de Bergerac.
Interestingly, Goble notes that the Self-Actualizing 
Individual tends to be too competent, therefore discouraging 
his own children.^ This could be partially true, as de Gaulle's 
only son has had a lack-luster military career In the Navy. 
However, much of this career was during de Gaulle's political 
tenure. It appears that the Father might be guilty of 
actually Impeding his son's career In an attempt to be ob­
jective and avoid nepotism. We do know that de Gaulle re­
fused to make permanent or promote his own temporary rank 
of General when he had the power to do so. However, there 
Is actually little data to verify If de Gaulle was a "good 
parent" as Maslow defines It.
De Gaulle's spirituality or religiousness Is better 
known. Although all Self-Actuallzers have this character­
istic, It Is not necessarily In a structured sense. Moral 
values are often self-determined, although de Gaulle's fall 
within the boundaries of French Catholicism. He had a vivid 
appreciativeness of life, with work and play virtually 
synonomous. As a "complete" or healthy Individual, de Gaulle 
had a unique sophisticated or philosophical humor. In contrast 
to the more hostlle-dlrected variety. Thus Lacouture quotes
^Goble, The Third Force, p. 23.
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hlm as commenting: "Reassure yourselves, I shall not fail
to die,"^ or there is Werth noting that a comment on a small
"independent socialist" party was "Oh yes, that party with
2
six members and seven tendencies." His wit, then, is of the 
dry variety so typical of Northern Prance, a humor without 
persiflage or irresponsibility.
A Summary
Although Maslow would no doubt disagree with the 
characterization of de Gaulle as a Self-Actualizer, and de 
Gaulle would never have submitted himself to the necessary 
psychological testing to effectively prove or disprove the 
contention, the data which we do have indicates this as a 
reasonable explanation for his motivations toward power.
To accept unequivocally many statements made about him pre­
cludes the applicability of a scientific inquiry. True, 
Roosevelt considered de Gaulle a potential dictator and 
noted that he and Joan of Arc were alike— they both heard 
voices! Even Churchill once characterized de Gaulle as the 
Frankenstein monster. A most recent study contends that
^Lacouture, De Gaulle; Werth, De Gaulle, p. 62.
^See Galante, The General, pp. 153» l64, 106, 208, 
and 209 for further examples of his wit. Also "The Court" 
in Le Canard Enchaîne and his own reflections in Memoirs of 
Hope.
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de Gaulle was inflexible, vindictive, and a magalomanic 
and that "as a writer, he wrote too little; as a soldier, 
he fought too little; and as a statesman, he came too late.
But these reports, professional or otherwise, do not make 
adequate note of the influence of cultural values, individual 
personality, philosophy and style on understanding a decision­
maker’s specific situational behavior. Unfortunately, what 
is more readily consumed is subjective analysis to the ex­
clusion of promoting understanding of leadership behavior.
The subjective orientation is exemplified by a recent Jack 
Anderson column. Thirty of the "most astute foreign affairs 
observers in Washington," including State Department, Pentagon, 
Congressional, Embassy, and academic representatives were 
polled and responded to a "worst leader" list. Their re­
sponses included such characterizations as "bush-league 
autocrat," "fanatic," "petty little dictator" and "madman."
The poll ratings not only included Idi Amin, Nguyen Van 
Thieu, Muammar Qudafi and Lon Nol but Mao Tse-Tung, Leonid 
Brezhnev and Isabel Peron. Granted some or all of the 
leaders cited may be guilty of "despotism, ineffectiveness,
O
irresponsibility, personal greed and personal instability."^
p. 4.
3
^Crozier, De Gaulle, p. 9«
2
Jack Anderson, News and Observer (March 18, 1975),
Ibid.
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But our individual perceptions and political values appear 
to be hindering a more objective assessment of these leaders 
to enable us to understand and even predict a climate of be­
havior. No qualifying comments were rendered or possibly 
asked for, although the question asked appears to be open- 
ended. Yet as McFarland notes: "Prom ancient times to 
modern, men have personified the social-structural forces 
that shaped their lives. T o  characterize decisional be­
havior as "mad" or "irrational" could be more a reaction to 
political style, without consideration of the cultural con­
text or whether the individual leader is consistent in re 
his particular philosophy and personality, or what the moti­
vations of that personality are. Regardless of the inaccess­
ibility of most political leaders, social scientists have 
one readily available source to draw upon, the written word, 
which can be value or content analyzed. De Gaulle's only 
pre-adult writing available to American-based researchers 
is Une Mauvaise Rencontre.
An Unfortunate Encounter is a playlet, written in 
Alexandrines, when de Gaulle was about fourteen. Originally 
the work of a popular songwriter, Gustave Nadaud, de Gaulle 
added his own innovations, including changing the major role
1
McFarland, Power and Leadership, p. 154.
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of the brigand to one Cesar-Charles. Briefly, the tale 
concerns a highwayman’s successful acquisition of a traveler’s 
wearing apparel, purse, and watch, all without bloodshed.
This brief study in human behavior has been considered a 
satire on cowards and a lesson in political philosophy and 
a "boring tale of grandeur, struggle, chaos and loss, lone­
liness. . .glory and fatalism."^ Fabre-Luce’s terse comment
is that cunning and panache attracted de Gaulle at an early 
2
age. Much has been made of this very short play. A value 
analysis of the written words and inferred actions does 
substantiate a preoccupation with force. Cesar-Charles 
repeatedly draws the traveler’s attention to his two pistols 
and the threat implied there, whereupon the item being 
discoursed upon is "voluntarily" relinquished. However, the 
other Hoffmann characterizations are more tenuous. Al­
though struggle, chaos, loneliness, etc. are evident, the 
inescapable conclusion for this researcher is that the 
play’s overwhelming emphasis is on style. The chaos of the 
world of a highwayman and the loss and loneliness of his 
experiences are merely part of his ruse. Along with flattery 
and the character faults of the traveler, pity and cowardice
^See Cattaui, Charles de Gaulle; Hoffmann and
Hoffmann, "The Will to Grandeur," DaedAlus, pp. 837-9
^See Alfred Pabre-L 
(Paris: Table Ronde, 1964).
2
uce, Le Couronnement du Prince
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at least, the brigand obtains his end, the acquisition of 
material goods laborlessly. There are interesting parallels 
between what the playlet says and infers and de Gaulle's 
adult writings and behavior. However, this early writing 
leaves more questions unanswered than it settles. All of 
de Gaulle's central values as an integral part of his per­
sonality are just not explicitly evident in this playlet.
Charles de Gaulle was motivated toward political 
power primarily on the basis of his personal philosophy and 
cultural values. He had a psychically healthy environment, 
both externally and internally, and sought to be all that 
he could be or do in whatever endeavor he pursued. There 
would not have been any great psychic damage then had he 
remained in the military or pursued a writing career, as 
his objective appraisal of reality would deny any other 
reaction. But besides the requirement of being a "healthy 
individual," cultural values must reinforce the mental being. 
For de Gaulle, most of these values came from his family or 
were reinforced there, although these are also evident in the 
French culture or national culture. But then values by 
definition are explicit or implicit conceptions distinctive 
of an individual or even characteristic of a group. Values 
influence the selection from available modes, means, and 
ends of action. The key words are "right," or "wrong," 
"better," or "worse." Either way, value orientations in­
fluence decisional behavior. Political decision-makers tend
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to rely heavily on their fundamental value orientations,
rather than empirical or factual criteria, when the decisional
time is short and/or limited.^ Sometimes single values are
good predictors of behavior, such as the value "salvation"
2
tends to be a good predictor of church attendance. De Gaulle's 
value of order, then, would explain his self-discipline. His 
major personal values, however, include self-respect, honor, 
integrity or truth, and fidelity. These were manifested in 
his personal characteristics, which in review included: 
erudition, a practical intelligence expressed particularly 
in political acumen but also a prodigious memory, which in­
cluded a phenomenal knowledge of history. Consequently, he 
had a prescience of the future which he expressed through a 
complete mastery of the French language. He was a linguist 
who used "correct terms" often mistranslated into other 
languages. He was also capable of using barracks language 
at will. From an early age he divided his personality into 
the self and Prance, with an absolute devotion to France.
Here was manifested his tenacity of purpose and the constancy
Richard C. Snyder and Glenn D. Paige, "The United 
States Decision to Resist Agression in Korea: The Application 
of an Analytical Scheme," Administrative Science Quarterly 
3 (1958): 341-8; Paige, Readings, pp. 168-70.
^See Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind.
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of his plans from youth. He was dedicated in the pursuit 
of his objectives with an invincible will. This required 
self-discipline and order, manifested in his choice of the 
military career where such were cardinal values and virtues.
His inflexibility in character, however, did not preclude a 
flexibility in means. For decisive political action he would 
be on one side or another, but never in the middle or in a 
compromise. Yet he believed there was a right moment for 
action and a wrong moment for action. This could mean dis­
obedience to "authority" when "false disciplines" existed.
He was a man of intuition and empiricism, isolated and 
impassive with little overt sentimentality. This, however, 
was within the cultural concept of French privacy and the 
relationships of the foyer. All these values are evident 
throughout the de Gaulle foyer. Politically, de Gaulle in 
many respects exemplified his culture. Using Glad's criteria 
we find :
1) De Gaulle performed "with wide acceptance in a 
high-status role to which he. . .had routine or easy access."^ 
His entry to France's highest political office was polit­
ically facile, although remaining in office was not necessarily 
2so. ■ Sondages and other studies reveal his wide acceptance 
among the French population. Some indication of acceptance 
of his political role-taking is indicated by virtue of being
^Glad in Knutson, Handbook, p. 309. 
^Sondages, See Vols. 19-31.-
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unopposed in the Free French movement, even after higher- 
ranking individuals joined the organization. Here again 
the existence of an equally strong Vichy organization is 
typical of the French culture.
2) De Gaulle obtained these politically prestigous 
roles without "great psychic costs." He does make several 
references to the loneliness required of his role, but this 
seems to have been accepted as a necessary means to his 
particular ends and again not atypical of the foyer's con­
cept of privacy or the emotional restraint of the de Gaulle 
family.
3) "His basic values are also manifest in key in­
stitutions which he has encountered in the socialization 
process."^ De Gaulle's socialization included the de Gaulle 
foyer, the Roman Catholic Church, Roman Catholic schools, 
and peer groups from the same. The "ideas, individuals, in­
terests, and institutions" he encountered were mutually re-
2
inforcing.
4) De Gaulle's values were, and yet were not, a 
basis of reward. His military career and eventual mode of 
exit from the political scene would indicate a denial rather 
than reward. However, de Gaulle did not perceive these
^Glad in Knutson, Handbook, p. 309-
2
See the term-concept in James MacGregor Burns and 
Jack W. Peltason, Government by the People, 6th ed (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall, Inc., 19^3)•
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events In this way, but rather believed that his hs^ic 
philosophy and its value structure were vindicated by the 
.nonoccupation of France by Allied Forces after WW II, his 
two political tenures, and the institutionalization of the 
Fifth Republic.
5) De Gaulle’s followers did not necessarily hold 
similar values, although his teachers and intimate colleagues 
did. However, this too is not unusual in the French culture.
De Gaulle’s London years and the beginning of his first 
political tenure are basically charismatic periods. His 
political difficulties began when that charisma was insti­
tutionalized. In the main, however, de Gaulle’s leadership 
in re foreign policy is typical of the French cultural mean.
His entry to politics, however, is atypical. Although 
politics was discussed in the de Gaulle foyer, it appears 
that a career in politics, like a missionary vocation, was 
only briefly considered. The intellectuals with whom the 
de Gaulles socialized were not active participants in the 
political process. This was not unusual in a France where 
the term ’’intellectual” normally excludes most in politics 
by simple definition. Although he held some political officials 
such as Clemenceau in high esteem, de Gaulle’s interests and 
actions were strictly military until approximately 1934 when 
he was forty-four. At that time he entered politics in­
directly or ”by the back door” when he actively sought to
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have the French National Assembly adopt his ideas on the 
reorganization of the Army.^ This, however, was begun only 
after a long series of rebuffs by the conservative military 
echelon and as a desperate attempt to see his plan imple­
mented. After enlisting journalistic allies, he secured
2
a "political sponsor" in Paul Reynaud. Since his pro­
posals were only partially implemented and with WW II 
approaching, de Gaulle continued his political activities. 
This included membership in some radical political organ­
izations, but only as a means to the ends he reiterated 
so often in his personal and political philosophy.
See his The Army of the Future (Philadelphia:^ 
Lippincott, 1941); Oeuvres. II, pp. 17-114 as Vers I'armee 
de Metier.
^See Hatch, Biography of Charles de Gaulle, pp. 69-70
CHAPTER IV
INTERNATIONAL IMAGES: DE GAULLE'S 
PERSONAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
Can a man disclaim speculation, can he disclaim 
theory, without disclaiming thought? Jeremy Bentham
Introduction
Jeanne Knutson writes that although "unartic­
ulated and fragmented in many cases, each person nevertheless 
possesses a coherent philosophy which covers such vital 
issues as the nature of man, of human relationships and of 
his environment."^ This personal philsophy, when expressed 
in the political concepts of an individual's political culture, 
constitutes a political philosophy. Political behavior with­
in the "cultural and situational bars which obstruct its
2
actualization" is determined by this political philosophy.
Prom the least involved citizen to national decision-makers, 
each has a complex of underlying assumptions and conceptual 
frameworks though which specific opinions and decisions on 
international politics are formulated. De Gaulle said much 
the same thing in writing that "the form in which men cast 
their speculations, no less than the ways in which they behave, 
is the result of the habits and thought and action which they
•3
find around them." The cultural and idiosyncratic variables
*1 p
Knutson, Human Basis, p. 103. Ibid., p. 104.
2
See de Gaulle, Prance and Her Army.
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that could be expressed in a personal or political philosophy 
have been noted In Chapters 2 and 3 above, although Inevitably 
various aspects of acculturation are left behind In the mat­
uration process. Still, even when an Individual attempts to 
rise above his background. In many respects he remains a 
"child of his age." Regardless, the decision-maker's beliefs 
and values evidenced In his personal and political philosophy 
may account for the greatest change or deviation In "national" 
foreign policy behavior.
Theory, or Image building. Is an Indlspenslble part 
of our Individual being. Without theory we do not have a 
means or pattern to recognize and then assimilate facts from 
the world around us.^ However, what theory Is or should en­
compass Is not so simply explained. McClelland discusses 
the diverse definitions or "feats" that political theory 
should perform. It Is speculative thought, an abstraction,
a guide to action, a framework for organizing facts, and a
2
set of statements of how things ought to be. It Is often 
confused with Ideology, a simplified or debased political 
theory. That Is, Ideology Is:
. . .an unconscious tendency underlying religious 
and scientific as well as political thought: the 
tendency at a given time to make facts amenable
^McClelland, Theory of the International System,
pp. 8-11.
2
Ibid., Chapter 1, passim.
^Kateb, Theory, p. 8.
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to Ideas and ideas to facts, in order to create 
a world image convincing enough to support the , 
collective and the individual sense of identity.
But even then, whether theory or ideology, there exists a 
basic standard of individual behavior and a theory or 
rationale for leadership.
Political theory is also a means used by a writer 
to inform and persuade the reader of his views. It is 
therefore "an elaborate and wide-ranging defense of a 
political (and moral) position, with a wide exposure of 
the writer's mind offered to public criticism." Tradition­
ally, theory has four essential characteristics, which are 
found in varying degrees and depth in de Gaulle's oral and 
written presentations. A political theory must;
1) Be moral in purpose. This "morality" is defined 
by the theorist, but basically includes an attempt to "per­
suade, convince, or convert others" to a political attitude 
or action. Throughout de Gaulle's writings, particularly Edge 
of the Sword, his dominant theme is "arms-and-power," in an 
attempt to persuade the French military and political
Erikson, Luther, p. 22. As Hargrove notes (Society 
and Government, p. 2Ôff), an individual's ideology develops out 
of the personal history of an individual. To understand the 
"mature world view," the relationships of six factors should 
be analyzed: parental politics, parental class status, identi­
fication with ethnic and religious groups, educational exper­
ience, young adult experience including working or studying a- 
broad, and the effect of the chosen occupational milieu upon 
individual values. In essence this is what all leadership studies 
seek to do, including this one.
^Kateb, Theory, p. 88.
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authorities to follow a "new path" of national defense and 
moral rejuvenation. His Memoirs are a unique defense of a 
philosophical vision of Prance more than a personal or iiuto- 
biographical explanation. The writer’s central values then 
form the motivations or rationale for writing, which ulti­
mately answer the question of what ends or purposes a govern­
ment should serve.^
2) Be inclusive in the writing. This intellectual 
method is expressed in an interest in the entire system of
politics and thus includes a discussion of organization,
2
powers, functions, and limitations. Here again, the term 
"inclusive" is relative. De Gaulle's cardinal interest was - 
a strong executive in a powerful French State. His interest 
and proposals for reforming the French political system are 
antecedent to his political tenure. However, his political 
position on this matter was inclusive in that virtually every 
conceivable aspect of man's existence somehow related to his 
concept of France and her role in international affairs. For 
example, de Gaulle considered the birth control pill a political 
issue. He rejected attempts to legislate governmental subsidies 
for or allocations of "the pill" with a caustic remark that the 
State did not pay for the people's movie or theater-going. 
Therefore, other forms of "entertainment" should not be sub­
sidized either. The truth of the matter is that de Gaulle
^Ibid. . p. 3. ^Ibid.
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considered a high birth rate and growth in population as 
one of the essential elements in a nation-state's power.^
To limit population growth, therefore, would be to preclude 
a country's international independence, which is possible 
only with "power.”
3) Be philosophical. That is, an intellectual pro­
cedure or method to get to the writer's end is employed.
Kateb writes that the assumption is :
. . .that politics is problematic, that its means 
are morally dubious and its ends morally preemptive, 
that the subjective of politics is supremely impor­
tant because politics involves men in a sizable or 
important portion of the totality of their moral 
relations.
"Philosophical" is used in this sense only as an intellectual 
method meaning the rigorous asking of questions that may seem 
"simple" and not necessarily finding all of the answers.
Unfortunately, de Gaulle's political policies are 
often confused with his philosophical ends, particularly 
since he himself often "mixed" the two realms deliberately. 
That is, from 1958 on de Gaulle found that public discussion 
of his articulated philosophic ends and particular political 
policy "means" resulted in restrictions on his political free­
dom of action. He then intentionally began to employ the
See Morganthau, the Sprouts, and other theorists 
for similar views that population or people constitutes an 
element in "power."
2
Kateb, Theory, p. 4.
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style discussed in the following chapter. Still, as Soustelle 
notes, de Gaulle is philosophical in his writings and political 
ends :
When his action is that of a soldier, he is strictly 
military, but only does so within the framework of 
his profession— outside, he is a philosopher of 
history who applies his philosophy to reality-a 
little lil^e a doctor who is at the same time an 
engineer.
4) Be general in applicability. The theory should 
then be applicable to other systems in other time-frames, al­
though the specificity may appear more applicable to a parti­
cular contemporary system. France was de Gaulle's primary 
concern and occupation. However, his concepts of the nation­
state in international relations are applicable universally.
5) Some theoretical works also include a systematic
presentation. That is, the presentation is orderly, with the
2
"construction and consistency of argument" clearly evident.
This fifth aspect of a theory is not always present nor is 
it even necessary in order to characterize a work as "philo­
sophical." De Gaulle's philosophic arguments are not systema- 
ticly presented in the form of classical tracts, unfortunately. 
In fact, this reader of philosophers disliked abstractions. 
Still the thread of his theory is evident in his writings and 
his everyday political decision-making.
Jacques Soustelle, Envers et contre tout (Paris 
Laffont, 1945-I95O). Vols. I and II, pp. 30-1 quoted in 
Launay, De Gaulle and His France, p. 83.
2
Kateb, Theory, p. 5.
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What were the main ideas in his thought that moti­
vated most of his political actions, whether in foreign or 
domestic policy? Behind the well-staged flamboyant speeches 
may be discerned the great issues and concepts of political 
theory. Many of these concepts are not only complex, but 
ambiguous and vague, particularly those in the field of 
European "integration." Too, words like "democracy" and 
"power" are not easily defined and may be subdivided end­
lessly.^ There are even those philosophers who argue that 
some concepts should remain "open." The intent here, however, 
is to analyze the main concepts and doctrines, or combinations 
of political concepts, which form de Gaulle’s philosophy. These 
concepts are evident not only in his formal writings but his 
speeches and even luncheon "toasts" as well. There is no 
intent to consider de Gaulle’s specific international or 
domestic policies as indicative of these principles,although 
for the sake of example some specific policies will be noted.
In fact, de Gaulle’s political responses or policies are 
frequently inconsistent. This led Crozier to view de Gaulle’s 
foreign policy as having false underlying premises, "its 
assumptions illusory, and its consequences divisive and even
^See Hopkins and Mansbach, International Politics, 
Chapter 1.
^William T. Blackstone, Political Philosophy; An Intro­
duction (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1973)» pu 4.
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disastrous for the West as a whole and for France in par­
ticular.”^ De Gaulle of ten did reorder the priorities of 
his pr inciples so that a similar political situation could 
evoke a different policy. Yet this does not preclude the
definite pattern of his foreign policy, for his principles
2
remained fairly consistent. The present concern is de Gaulle's 
intellectual ideas, which are primarily centered on inter­
national relations.
Chapter Format
The explicit and implicit philosophical concepts of 
de Gaulle's intellectual ideas include the nation-state and 
sovereignty, power, authority and liberty, freedom and order, 
the general welfare and the common good, and the forms of 
government. These will be incorporated in an essay exploring 
de Gaulle's metaphysics: the universe, what makes it go and 
what man's society incorporates; the nature of the individual: 
what is Man? good or bad, rational or irrational, ordinary (the 
masses) versus extraordinary (the Hero-Leader); and the model 
of a political system, including the powers a government must 
have 2^ d its delimitations within his theory of the Nation- 
State. In summary, the result of a primitive value analysis of
^Crozier, De Gaulle, p. 681.
^See Judith H. Young, "French Defense Policy,” and
Helms, ”De Gaulle,” p. 361.
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a random sample of de Gaulle's speeches and press conferences 
will be presented. Here selected political "value words" 
relative to international affairs are used to determine if 
de Gaulle's political principles were ordered in any priority 
and whether changes occurred in this priority over a period 
of time.
Charles de Gaulle in his France and Her Army said 
that every great leader of men had a philosophical background: 
"behind Alexander there is always Aristotle." Our concern 
now is what that "philosophical background" meant. De Gaulle's 
Aristotle, of course, was Malraux.
The Unlverse-Image
The beginning of a personal philosophy is to be 
found in an individual'» metaphysics, that is, ideas as to 
the science of being and fundamental causes and processes.
In layman's terms this means an individual's religious beliefs 
or theological views. Carlyle expresses this importance in 
saying that:
. . .a man's religion is the chief fact with re­
gard to him. . .the thing a man does practically 
believe (and this is often enough without asserting 
it even to himself, much less to others); . . . 
relations to this mysterious Universe, . . .duty 
and destiny there, that is in all cases the pri­
mary thing for him, and creatively determines all 
the rest.
Although de Gaulle's political style had religious
^Carlyle, On Heroes, pp. 2-3.
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overtones or even charismatic characteristics, he rarely
verbalized in public the extent of his religious convictions.
We have noted that the de Gaulle family were active practicing
French Roman Catholics. Charles de Gaulle attended parochical
schools and his writings indicate a retention of the Catholic
2
thought learned there. One of the few explicit statements
he made on the Church appears to be his answer to a question 
on his attitude toward priests. His reply, "I’m a Gallican, 
reveals only contradictions. For he may have meant he is a 
"Frenchman," since most are Roman Catholic at least nominally, 
or the hidden meaning could be a support of Gallicanism. This 
in essence is the belief that there should be an autonomous 
French national church. As one who incorporated so much of 
Peguy’s thought in his own philosophy, it is improbable that 
de Gaulle would ignore the philosopher's warning that the 
Church should not meddle in the affairs of the State. But 
unlike President Gerald Ford, who in his April, 1975 "State 
of the World" address frequently invoked the power of God and 
prayer, de Gaulle rarely mentioned any Supreme Being or the 
rituals of established religion. When a speech or press 
conference contained a possible religious reference, de Gaulle’s 
comment was brief, devoid of fervor, and usually qualified, 
such as:
^Hoffmann and Hoffmann, "The Will to Grandeur," 
Daedalus, p. 8?6.
2See the corporativism in his model of a political 
system or the Rally of the French People.
^Launay, De Gaulle and His France, p. 37.
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Now, by the grace of God, a better life is avail­
able to the French people provided they remain true 
to effort and to unity.1
Or -
. . .if only God lets me live and the people 
listen to me - I pledge myself to. .
The Spiritual or God is not invoked alone, for the secular 
is acknowledged in the "will of the people." It would appear 
that the Hoffmanns are correct. De Gaulle did not serve a 
harsh God, but a dualism of History and France.^ Still, 
de Gaulle's religious beliefs were strong. He attended 
Church regularly and supported it financially. But his 
beliefs are reflected in hidden form and must be implied 
throughout his personal and political philosoophy. At a 
time when religious beliefs were being challenged, he chose 
to incorporate in his thinking the philosophies of Bergson 
and others. These philosophies used "new" knowledge to re­
inforce or confirm the ancient theory that the univ.erse has 
a spiritual nature, the basic philosophy of the Roman Catholic 
Church.
"Inaugural Address of General Charles de Gaulle as 
President of the Republic and of the Community at the Elysee 
Palace on January 8, 1959»" in Major Addresses. Statements and 
Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle (New York; French 
Embassy, Press and Inforamtion Division). Emphasis supplied. 
Hereinafter cited by title and date only.
2
"Radio and Television Address on the Future of Algeria," 
September 16, 1959. Esphasis supplied.
^Hoffmann and Hoffmann, "The Will to Grandeur,"
Daedalus, p.855.
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In addition. De Gaulle’s metaphysics incorporates
the typical French cultural thought pattern of Descartes.
That is, in seeking a rational meaning of the Universe, a
dualism of body and Soul is assumed. Cartesian logic is
evident throughout De Gaulle’s speeches:
What will happen will happen because it must happen.
Whoever they are, wherever they are, when you get 
down to it, men are men.
The national discussion must be for us summed up 
with this question: Prance must be France.!
De Gaulle combines Cartesian principles with the Bergsonian 
principles of realism or what de Gaulle calls "elementary common 
sense." He thus rejects a priori reasoning. Scientific and 
philosophic progress must be based on the consideration of 
individual problems, not grandoise general theories or univer­
sal terms either. Only instinct and imagination are guides to 
order, while intellect and intuition provide truth. There 
is no absolute truth, only the relative truths determined by 
circumstance.^ Specifically, de Gaulle did not believe in 
formulating unalterable plans to be followed regardless of 
circumstances. He would say instead: "political formulas
can wait— this is a practical issue, the solution of which 
can not be postponed."3 Still his writings contain a strong 
thread of Thomist philosophy and Cartesian thinking. His 
Universe is both spiritual and secular.
^Quoted in DeGramont, The French, p. 323.
^De Gaulle, Memoirs, p. 804.
BOeGaulle, ’’Speech," Free French. 5(No. 8), p.286.
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De Gaulle's views of the world is a cataclysmic
vision. The Universe is violent, subjected to constant terrible
threats.^ The existence of the modern world is in danger, a
brutal fact, for "bitter incitements lead . . . to a universal
cataclysm."2 De Gaulle’s view of the nature of international
conflict is a Rousseauen one, not unlike the letter's
comments relative to the European states’:
jjrheyj touch each other at so many points that 
no one of them can move without giving a jar to 
all the rest; their variances are all the more 
deadly as their ties are more closely woven3
De Gaulle's theory is pervaded by a sense of doom, but not
without hope. For although the world is mediocre and life
in general and international life in particular are struggles
and dangerous,^ there is the possibility of salvation.5 He
believes that the world could be reorganized by undertaking
"constructive work of a material, intellectual and moral
nature."G The promise of a better world requires order.
Address on the Evening of the Referendum on the Con­
stitution, September 26, 1958; "Address on the Algerian Political 
Situation, Radio and Television," November 4, I960; "Tenth 
Press Conference," Elysee Palace, July 23» 1964.
^"Economic Program for Algeria," Constantine, October
3, 1958.
3jean Jacques Rousseau, Peace Through the Federation of 
Europe and the State of War, tr. C. E. Vaugh (London: Constable, 
n.p.), p. 47.
^"Innaugural Address," January 8, 1959.
^"Address on the Algerian Political Situation," November
4, I960
^"Speech," Free French, p. 287.
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for "nothing can be done without order. . . Woe to him who 
acts against national unity.I n t e r n a t i o n a l  solidarity, 
then, must not be a "vain word," but realized in a practical 
way, "in the interests of all, and with due respect for the 
rights of all."^ There are but two paths— war or brotherhood.3 
The essence of life, however, always holds the potential of 
going "higher, faster, {an^ f u r t h e r . B u t  there must be 
a peaceful climate for objective solutions to come into 
view. War, of course, does not provide for this as it has 
very few essential principles and no universal system. Only 
circumstances and personalities prevail.5
Here is where de Gaulle obtains his political phil­
osophy, from a philosophy of history and one of action.& 
History never repeats, "the past never resumes as it was."? 
Rather, what is important is the sense of history. Theodore 
H. White in his most recent study. Breach of Faith: The Fall
llbid., p. 285.
2pree French, July, p. 97.
^Address on Economic Program on Algeria," October 3, 1958. 
^"Prance's Future," Television Address, January 30,1959 
^See his Memoirs, passim.
^Clark, however, terms it a philosophy of command,
Clark, The man who is France, pp. 72-73
?De Gaulle, August 20, 1964 quoted in Andre Passeron,
De Gaulle Parle 1962-1966, (Paris: Fayard, 1966), pp 222-46.
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of Richard Nixon, explores this vital element. He contends 
that Richard Nixon's cardinal sin and ultimate downfall 
resulted from a total inability to comprehend American History 
and the nobler ethical traditions of our country. In other 
words, he did not have the cultural boundaries or mores that 
a sense of history provides, however, de Gaulle did.
History is not only what is - reality, but cause and 
effect too. "In life of a people each action of the past 
enters into consideration for the future. There is only one 
history of Prance."1 That history has formed a French nature 
that transcends the divisions of its society. But history 
to de Gaulle is a force of gravity that can be eluded, thwarted, 
and suspended. Still it is "almost impossible to resist the 
powerful stream of e v e n t s . The essential of life is to live 
through its events and to do so with a coherent plan or struc­
ture.^- This is not be be confused with a priori thinking.
Since it is the nature of things to change, there is a necessity 
to change one's immediate goals and the means to attain them. 
Ends are not changed in this process and in adjusting: "we must 
take the world as it is, and act and live in that kind of world.
^De Gaulle, Sept. 6, 1964, In Passeron, De Gaulle 
Parle, p. 239.
2
Lacouture, De Gaulle, p. 231.
^"De Gaulle Sj^aks," State Department Bulletin, (May 
16, i960), p. 774. Emphasis supplied.
^Launay, De Gaulle and His France, p. 32.
^Quoted in Galante, The General, p. I88. "Radio 
Broadcast, Presidential Election" (December, 1965).
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The only proper course is to leave things as they are. Still
de Gaulle admits that times do change and his:
. . . concepts change with changing circumstances. 
Universal education at higher and higher levels has 
produced a higher class of citizen, who requires 
and is worthy of more explanation, persuasion and 
association with the leaders of the nation.1
Time is the "vehicle of spontaneous creation. 
History is a stormy sea composed of cycles of time that go 
from the valleys to the mountains.3 De Gaulle's concept of 
history then is traditional. It is seen as a series of 
struggles and wars and includes geographical considerations 
along with past history and the vision of the future. Human 
affairs, therefore, are of a "perpetual return"^ so that an 
individual has only to wait out adversity and circumstances 
will change. This is a view that always includes Grandeur, 
Gloire, and Patri.5 He is concerned with certainties rather 
than probabilities. Indeed the "eternal law" seems to be 
self-evident facts and independence. The cognitive or ex­
istential base of his theory, that which reveals how things 
actually are in the real world, is grounded with the concrete
^Conversation with Schoenbrun about Edge of the Sword 
in David Schoenbrun, The Three Lives of Charles De Gaulle, 
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1966) ,p . ÏÏÏT.
2see Hughes, Consciousness, pp. 117-18
^De Gaulle, Edge of the Sword, p. 128; pp 239-^0 of 
French edition. See also his Army of the Future.
^See the last page of his Memoirs.
5a 1s o legitimacy and self respect. See Robert Aron, 
De Gaulle Before Paris: The Liberation of France June-August
194^. tr. Humphrey Hare (London: Putname, 1962), p. 64.
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more than with abstractions. But occasionally de Gaulle
neglected empirical data. Still he was a realist. For
example, his recognition of China was based on the self-
evident fact that :
China exists. She appears in all atlases. Even 
if one does not like the Chinese one can not ignore 
geography. Since we have a knowledge of geography 
we might as well recognize China. . .a simple 
statement of factî
For de Gaulle, there was "no policy . . .worthwhile apart
2
from realities." Yet to come full circle, he said that
"reality is, in part, what one makes it." Material events
are not always the sole nor significant facts. Sentimental
or spiritual values can be more important, as patriotism is
based on sentiment not reason.
Men "must consider the cold, hard realities on
which action is based, no matter what may be their sorrows 
o
or desire." Thus any entity that precludes action, what
de Gaulle called "unproductive machinations," must be done
away with at once. He explained this in his analysis of
the Fourth Republic political system::
It is not a question of men. . .Those who, today, 
take their turns in the government, I know them.
. .1 know how much they are worth. But I say 
they are caught in a system which does not permit 
them to act.
I960.
^Quoted in Galante, The General, p. 185.
^Address on African and Algerian Realities," June 14, 
^See Free French, 5 (8), p. 283. Emphasis supplied.
^Le Rassemblement Ouvrier (November 19* 19^9) quoted in 
"De Gaulle and the RPR.** Journal of Politics, p. 106.
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Thus even war with its inevitable action tends to be glori­
fied by de Gaulle, who says: "Government is a painful, difficult, 
delicate business. War, War, you see is horrible, but peace is 
a deadly b o r e . A c t i o n  then in whatever form is the logical 
conclusion of thought.
There is within man's struggle, the pressure and 
dangers of his universe, a revelation of common interests.
De Gaulle views "problems" as worldwide, a part of the whole
2
which must be solved in their entirety, not piecemeal.
Global strategies are therefore needed, hence the importance 
of international relations. There must be order, a peaceful 
climate, for objective solutions to come into view. He viewed 
this as an evolutionary process which is both toward and a- 
way from natural opposition. It is a process which favors 
those leaders who alone remain on their feet and those nation­
states, such as Prance "who have in the past risen above
•3
disaster and have great future potential." This is a dia­
lectic, a combination of order and anarchy in a unity of
opposites. This anarchy results from the presence of disorder
4
and chaos rather than the mere absence of government. Human
^Quoted in Tournoux, Petain. p. 3^3.
2
See his various comments on the Algerian situation 
dating from 1959.
^See Free French, 5 (8), p.284.
^See Waltz, "The Relation of States to Their World,"
pp. 7-17.
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affairs, then, inevitably lead to struggle and conflict.^
This is the "natural order of things" and a natural, in­
evitable process caused in part when there is an established
order of interdependent elements in an unstable international 
2
system. This instability or lack of world balance is due 
to the international domination of the two so-called super­
powers. Stability would result when a third world power
emerges, particularly if that is a "new Europe," loosely
confederated of states from the Atlantic to the Urals. How­
ever, even then the supreme collectivity of the international 
system are the nation-states.^
In this concept of the nation-state, de Gaulle 
expounds a universal doctrine in the highest moralistic 
tones. But basically international relations is the nation­
state’s struggle for power and survival. He considers a 
realistic conception of international relations as based 
primarily on bilateral relationships and thus implies a 
bilateralism of national interest exists. These relation­
ships are based on the indlspenslble use of force:
Is it possible to conceive of life without force?
. . .in some form oi* another, it will remain indls- 
pensible, for, without it, thought would have no 
driving power, action no strength. It is the 
prerequisite of movement and the midwife of pro­
gress. . .G'orce isj the bulwark of authority, the
p. 198.
^Tenth Press Conference, July 23» 1964.
2
See Schoenbrum, Three Lives of Charles de Gaulle, 
^Sixth Press Conference, May 15» 1962.
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defender of thrones, the motive power of revo­
lution (and the begetter o Q  . . .both order and 
liberty. Force has watched over civilization in 
the cradle; force has ruled empires, and dug the 
grave of decadence; force gives laws to the 
peoples and controls their destinies.
A nation-state's status in the international community then
results from its power. This power is more than mere force,
it is a combination of past history and future potential, for
"logic and sentiment do not weigh heavily in comparison with
the realities of power." In other words, ideologies are
unimportant as a power base. They can not alter the basic
uniqueness of a people. This unalterable uniqueness is
reflected in a nation’s history. Indeed, de Gaulle considered
history a study of nations and their peoples, not the study
of ideologies or idealism which are merely covers for a will
to power.
De Gaulle believed that the nation-states, molded 
by history, incorporate irreconcilable systems most evident 
in the mechanical and material progress of two countries, 
the United States and the U.S.S.R.:
The human race has never been more threatened 
than it is today. Mechanisms now dominate the 
earth. It has brought forth gigantic material 
progress. But at the same time, it has produced 
two apparently irreconcilable systems, each of 
which claims it possesses the only workable way 
to transform society.^
^De Gaulle, Edge of the Sword, pp. 8-10, Part I: 
"De l ’action de Guerre." Force can even "create the event."
^De Gaulle, Memoirs, II, p. 114.
3"De Gaulle," State Department Bulletin. (May 16, 
I960), p. 774.
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De Gaulle thus recognized the technical evolution. He saw 
change as a continuous process characterized by "competition 
of efforts in the condition of life."^ To this was added 
the reality of cultural differences and economic pressure.
All of these seemingly contradictory propositions boil down 
to what de Gaulle called an "irreversible evolution." How­
ever, this is a philosophy-style not necessarily openly 
alluded to, for he said:
Let's attempt to present as an act of will what 
appears to be an irreversible evolution. . . We 
live in a world that is undergoing enormous 
changes. From one year to the next it is not the 
same. New forces are emerging.
Here again the evolution is in the natural order of things
•3
and thus takes shape little by little. Still this evolution 
would influence every form of human activity. Some would 
term this a "revolution." De Gaulle, however, believed the 
latter had a dual meaning. Revolution could mean "exhi­
bitionism and loud, scandalous and finally bloody riots" or 
"profound change, especially in the status and condition of 
the workers."^ Indeed, included in his corporate ideas was 
the establishment of an elite specialist corps,.the "masters," 
who would teach the uses and techniques of the technological 
evolution to the French peasant.
^"Principles of Foreign Policy Address," May 31, I960.
2
1965 Annual Press Conference quoted in Galante, The 
General, p. I88.
^"Economic Program for Algeria Address," October 3, 1958,
^Quoted in Galante, The General, p. 240.
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But here again the technological evolution enhances
the abuses of Ideologies, which de Gaulle called labels,
transient, and the most unstable elements In the world.^
Lacouture even quotes de Gaulle as saying that Ideologies
are mere Illusions, originated In the East or In shoddy rags
2
borrowed from German philosophy. Yet even within this In­
stability there can be found stability. A stable world 
balance Is possible by transforming the existing state system.
De Gaulle's alms then were both clear and consistent, even 
when muddled by his tactics. For within the political uni­
verse he believed a world order can exist, "a structural 
harmony of multiple uniqueness." Throughout his writings, 
de Gaulle seems to be searching for harmonies or a balance, 
not unlike Rousseau's balance of man and nature or Lévi-Strauss' 
Structuralism. He considers the supreme law to be the welfare 
of the state. The eternal law, then. Is the rights of nations 
and respect for human beings. De Gaulle's political universe 
has a single Justice and a single code of International 
morality. But this justice Is not the abstract Idea of the 
philosophers, for It would then have no place In the politics 
of the State. Rather, de Gaulle seems to mean a highest good 
which Is somehow grounded on a psychological and moral
^Ibld., p. 198.
2
Lacouture, De Gaulle, p. I8I.
^Quoted In Robert G . Neumann, "Formation and Trans­
formation of Gaulllsm In France," The Western Political 
Quarterly 6 (June, 1965):273.
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foundation and manifested in whatever furthers the greatness
of France. An implication of the Catholic idea of truth as
that which is determined at any moment also prevails in his
writings. There is no absolute truth, whether in economics,
politics, or strategy - only circumstances:
. . . [th^ only basic principles that hold truth for 
all circumstances are the principles that apply to 
all national affairs, the determination of a people 
to succeed, a willingness to die for an ideal and 
a realistic assessment of all the factors that make , 
a nation stronger or weaker than its neighbours, (si^
The Individual Image
Serfaty writes that de Gaulle considered the nation­
state as the only recipient of human endeavor, since all human
2
activity revolves around that entity. Indeed, de Gaulle's 
primary concern does not include a wide range of social in­
stitutions. What the family, religion, economy, etc. "should 
be" are not readily apparent in his writings.^ In fact, it 
would seem that if the political sphere would only be what it 
should be, everything else would be fine. Man could then live 
socially together if habitual and institutionalized social 
instincts existed, an argument for social solidarity. De Gaulle 
does allude to the basic nature of man and his capacities 
throughout his writings. But he means more by "man" than 
mere men or women. Rather, mankind and "it's honor" are a
^Discorde quoted in Schoenbrun, The Three Faces of 
Charles de Gaulle, pp. 36-7. Emphasis supplied.
2
See page 144 of his dissertation.
•a
^Restrictions to our topic preclude exploring these areas 
in depth. For example, however, de Gaulle divided business into 
"domaine réservé" and "intendance."
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prevalent consideration.^ The ultimate goal of man is the 
good of mankind. Humanity and its future is served by
2
international cooperation and a balance-in-power for peace.
The "only quarrel worthwhile is that of mankind. It is
mankind that must be saved, made to live and enabled to
a d v a n c e . T h i s  may be done in the spirit of liberty, equality, 
4
and fraternity.
In the Kantian manner, de Gaulle believed man ac­
quired knowledge by three faculties; sense, understanding and 
reason. Although the heart or emotions may "speak," it is 
the "voice of reason" or "elementary common sense" that must 
make itself heard.^ He further followed Bergson’s theory of 
initiative, imagination, movement and duration which pivoted 
on the belief that "I am a being which endures," with elan 
vital rather than established doctrines. Man then must strive 
to adapt to the precise reality of individual problems which
can be understood best by learning the true nature of things
with an intuitive philosophy rather than analytic intelligence.
De Gaulle’s historical thesis is that man is first
of all a national animal linked to a homeland, product of a
collective temperament and a traditional culture.^ Man finds
^’’Economic Program for Algeria Address," October 3,1958. 
^"Television Address on Presidential Election, 1965."
^Pirst Press Conference, March 25, 1959*
^"Referendum on Independence," March 26, 1962.
^"Toast at Mexican Luncheon," March 17, 1964.
^See de Gaulle's comments on Stalin in Lacouture,
De Gaulle, p. 133.
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happiness in stability:
Men, in their hearts, can no more do without being 
told what to do than they can live without food, 
drink, and sleep. As political animals they have 
the need for organization, that is, for an estab­
lished order and for leaders. . .the natural 
equilibrium which lies at the base of all things 
£is3i order . . .masses. . .now give recognition 
to those who assert themselves .
Men do not change so quickly or so completely, nor does
human nature move by leaps and bounds, to preclude this need
for stability and order. But this stability also incorporates
economic security, personal independence and a degree of
2
social importance or prestige. Man's common lot is to be 
"free, dignified, proud and prosperous." His inheritance 
includes "the fighting spirit, the art of war, and the 
virtues of the soldier."^
Man is at his best when results are obtained from 
initiative and action rather than abstract thinking. This 
means action or resistance rather than merely performing 
in some purely creative function. Action, then, is the 
governing law of conduct. Inaction, whether the "normal" 
pace of political "deliberation" or involuntary political 
retirement such as during most of the 1950's, de Gaulle con­
sidered a cardinal sin. He also followed the Nietzschean
French.
^De Gaulle, Edge of the Sword, p. 57 or pp. 73-4 in
2
See Padover, French Institutions, pp. 3-4.
Second Press Conference, November 10, 1959.
See Edge of the Sword, Hopkins tr.
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premise that man seeks to obtain power in order to dominate
all obstacles. But action is meaningful only when placed
in lofty perspectives. For this he often used the word
"adventure." But action may be practically inappropriate
at times. In which case, substitute action may be possible,
such as writing personal tracts.
De Gaulle viewed man in the Christian tradition of
humanitarianism, for "men are men everywhere," although some
are good and some are evil, all can be rational.^ De Gaulle's
emphasis, as readily apparent in Edge of the Sword, is on
justice, liberty, and the inherent dignity of individual man.
But man, even when a leader, is frail, although his is a
capacity for moral goodness. There exists equality in the 
2immortal soul, although de Gaulle often speaks of the "high
intellectual and moral elements" in Prance, implying an elite
•a
apart from man. But hierarchical societies on earth are to 
be expected. Still man is an element in all, including 
politics. In de Gaulle's case this includes a very simpli­
fied form of dividing society into leaders, the masses, and 
"certain ambitious men and . . .demagogues."^ He still has 
respect for the people, which becomes more communicable with
^Speech at Amiens, June 12, 1964.
2
A Frenchman has two souls, his individual soul and 
that soul as a member of a unified community. The latter 
soul is represented by the French President according to de Gaulle,
^"De Gaulle Speech," Free French 5(8), p. 290.
il
Television Address, December 3, I960.
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universal suffrage and the Increases in compulsory edu­
cation. In the latter, reasoning is refined, for de Gaulle 
disdained illogical propositions. One of his favorite 
expressions was "It's absurd." Still he recognized the 
prevalence of individual egoism. Individuals universally 
hold desires which contradict rule and reason.^ They are 
prone to "theoretical preferences, private interests and 
partisan attachment," which de Gaulle considered vices to 
be put under control by a strong government. He scorned




class rivalry." Private interest must not prevail over the
general interest:
. . .it is more important to safeguard the future 
than to préserve temporarily various vague interests 
of private citizens.
Pure individualism creates anarchy. That is, in a country
that is often divided to an extreme degree, it is necessary
to think as a coherent and harmonious whole rather than along
personal or political lines. He thus prefers a "collective
individualism." Wealth must be garnered and directed not to
^"Address to the French People," Television, April 16,
1964.
2"Second Address on Referendum on Algeria," December 
31, i960, television.
^"Speech," Free French, 5 (#8), p. 291. 
n
"Economy, Atomic Force, European Policy, Algeria," 
Addresses on February 5, 1962 and October 2, I96I, television.
^De Gaulle to U.S. Ambassador quoted in personal 
papers of Launay, De Gaulle and His France, p. 36.
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private advantage, but to the common interest, the Nation, 
with direction and control of this wealth by workers and 
employers. As Alfred Grosser notes, de Gaulle viewed 
economic progress only as a means, a material basis for the 
prosperity which would guarantee French independence.^
There is no place for the huge private monopolies such as 
we have in American Telephone and Telegraph. But this does 
not mean an abolition of private property, although de Gaulle 
did not trust the French bourgeoise and peasantry because of 
their legendary strong beliefs in the value of private prop­
erty. Still property is connected or associated with what 
is mean or common in lesser mortals, such as the persiflage 
and irresponsibility of many Frenchmen. Only what is lofty 
in purpose is admired in the people. Those people who live 
to cooperate and build are important— not those who seek to 
hate or destroy. Yet even here de Gaulle recognized that 
bloodshed in war can advance "the cause of reason and justice 
in the hearts and minds of men."
Because of modern events, however, de Gaulle believed 
man lives in a condition which is becoming alike everywhere:
. . .people put in contact with progress are assailed 
with a growing desire to see their own living standards 
rise; . . .As a people becomes independent, it needs 
the help of ot&ers. This is something which is only 
human, that is to sav, very natural and which may be 
acknowledged freely.~
^See Grosser, France, Germany, and New Europe.
2
"Address on Algerian Political Situation," November 4,
i960. -
"Address on Principles of French Foreign Policy," May
31, i960.
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Whether man Is alike or diverse, his general inter­
est is impartially represented by the State, the Republic, 
and the Head of the Republic. De Gaulle believed the public 
authority is legally and factually valid, but "only when it 
conforms to the superior interests of the country."^ He 
seems to agree with Plato that order is the common good and 
that order depends on the character of the Leader-Hero.
National sovereignty, however, belongs to the people, although
2
this may be exercised through representatives or référendums. 
De Gaulle preferred to exclude any "intermediaries" or repre­
sentatives between the Head of the Republic and the people 
because such tended to emphasize French cleavages as voices 
of discord. These cleavages and the French reaction to them 
often caused de Gaulle to call "his" people such names as 
"cattle," "slackers," "fools," "cretins," and "rabble.
His comments on the fact that people have vices, are weak, 
fickle, ungrateful and prone to "scowling, howling, and 
growling" are well known:
Frenchmen are brilliant producers of ideas who 
yet had not the urge or the need to carry them 
out, a man who planned his life logically and 
then proceeded to break all his own rules, a man 
who had a passionate love for his homeland, which
^Bayeux Speech, June 18, 1946.
2
"Television Address on Referendum on Constitution," 
September 20, 1962.
^See Second Press Conference, November 10, 1959i 
Tournoux, Petain and de Gaulle, p. 329i and Crawley, De Gaulle, 
p. 293.
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was everything in life, yet who set out for the
ends of the earth to found colonies which he attempted ,
to make into Prance itself - a "hardworking lazybones."
Here again, this does not preclude the fact that de Gaulle 
considered the individual or what he termed the "human contin­
gencies and events" as major factors in determining what and
2
how the institutions of a society function. He therefore had 
contempt for many people, but not hatred. "Though severe in 
his judgments of men, he does not despise them," he wrote.
He merely disliked human weaknesses. And one such weakness 
was to put daily necessities above long-range goals and thus 
accept mediocrity. Another was to compromise where principles 
were concerned or with wartime enemies. Still, Man has virtue 
in active Hope and the creative excellence which seems to be 
inherent in human nature, although dormant unless cultivated. 
Man then is free to develop and master his own personality,
4
to seek freedom and equilibrium and to exercise his rights.
This characteristic de Gaulle called "la querelle de 1 * homme'. " 
Man can be united, a "union Sacre" of minds and souls where 
the differences of religion or class or political belief are 
unimportant.^ This sacred union results when the sword is
^Quoted in Clark, The Man Who is France. p. 84. 
^Fourth Press Conference, April 11, 1961.
^De Gaulle, France and Her Army, p. 25.
^Fress Conference, March 25, 1959.
^Free French, #8, p. 284; France and Her Army, p. 15.
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drawn in every fervor, i.e., war. Although de Gaulle sought 
this unity in an expanded form as "Europe" as it was under 
Napoleon, he believed that the force of personality rather 
than arms could do it.^ Still he recognized that the 
Europeans and Frenchmen in particular had an "old. . .pro- 
pensity for divisions and quarrels."
Yet de Gaulle had a deep love for the French people 
and French soil, not unlike the fervor of P^uy. He be­
lieved the French were somehow destined to be an "elite 
people," master of their fate and thus above others. This 
idea is not unlike an "Elect of God," but without any traces 
of racism or anti-Semitism. French history has always re­
vealed a deep love for Prance by other peoples. Even with­
out "political" power, this fact is a justification for 
France’s special status in world affairs. Apparently, part 
of this "favor" is found also in de Gaulle’s belief that 
Greco-Latin civilizations are the highest of all civilizations
Ifnelther age nor experience has rid this people 
of its shortcomings, disaster has been unavailing 
against its inextinguishable vitality and faith 
in its destiny. . . ,A great people, fit to show 
others the way, fit for enterprise and combat, for 
ever playing the leading role in the drama of his­
tory, whether as tyrant, as victim, or as champion 
of the opBpessed; a people whose genius, whether in 
eclipse or in glory, has always found^its faithful 
reflection in the mirror of its army.
Ij. H. Huizinga, "Which Way Europe?" Foreign Affairs 
43 (April 1965):487-500.
p
Bayeux Speech of June l6, 1946.
^See his 1964 speeches in Latin America.
^De Gaulle, Prance and Her Army, p. 104.
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Realistically, and as a student of human behavior, 
de Gaulle admitted that not all Frenchmen were "good."
"Good" Frenchmen are those who in their social, economic, 
and political life always subserve their individual inter­
ests and desires to the superior interests of France.^ He 
carried this idea to his consideration of all people. "Bad" 
Europeans, those who seek to build Europe, are those 
"building" as a means to an unknown or unarticualted end.
This is one further reflection of de Gaulle's dualism so 
evident in his thought : the French and Europeans are a di­
verse people, yet a united people, a good people but with 
some "nongood" people.
He considered at length many of the "nongood:"
politicians. They, like some voters, were only concerned
with "their own little soup pot on their own little fire
2in their own little corner." The politicians incurred his 
deepest contempt and such epithets as: "imbeciles, drivellers, 
slobberers, whiners, cheats, cowards,eunuchs, drug-addicts 
of politics, pitter-patters) anaesthetists, puppets, gigolos, 
dwarfs," and several "expletive deleted" phrases. Through­
out his theory, de Gaulle sought to mute the political powers 
of such individuals in his ideal French Nation-State.
^De Gaulle, Salvation, Documents, pp. 185-6. 
^Time, May 2, 1969, p. 21.
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The Nation-State
As advocates of world government might be Informed 
by adherents of a certain other ideological creed, the 
withering away of the state is not lightly to be presumed.
Inis L. Claude, Jr.
Human survival in our belligerent world is only
possible within "a solid State, a modern defense and a
1 2 united nation." The soul of Prance is mirrored in her
army, an instrument of the State:
. . .our armies have but one soul. . .and . . .this 
soul is. . .nobly submitted to the wishes of the 
nation,^n>.d humbly devoted to the service of 
Prance.^
De Gaulle reorganized that army. In fact, he believed the 
entire nation-state needed to be strengthened, rebuilt 
and modernized, since there had been a general decline and 
weakness in the State from WWI to WWII. By reform, conflicts 
and discord within the nation and the state would be mini­
mized .
De Gaulle viewed the nation-state as existing only 
after some maturing, to an unspecified age, although he 
infers that this is at minimum a period of several centuries. 
Many so-called newly developing countries would not then be
1966. p. 235. 
2
^August 20, 1964 in Passeron, De Gaulle Parle 1962-
See the Brazzaville Manifesto. 
3pree Prench 5 (#B), p. 285.
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considered nation-states. Great Powers are those with
established continuity, prestige, and security. He
further implies that the ideal nation-state is comprised
of only one "race" of people.^
De Gaulle draws the Maurrassian distinction between
pays reel and pays legal. Pays r e ^  are the people or the
2
Nation as an entity, but not as a legal definition. All 
classes and all beliefs are incorporated in this Nation.
De Gaulle's "nationalism" reflects his desire to bring to­
gether the juridical reality of the State and the sociological 
reality of the national group. It represents a dual heritage 
of Jacobin patriotism and its slogans of liberty, equality 
and fraternity and the nationalism of the French right found 
in the works of Maurice Barrés and Jacques Bainville. This 
is a nationalism of grandeur, power, self-respect, and legit­
imacy. It is a conception of destiny that requires a national 
dream to maintain its authority and preserve its cohesion. 
Importantly, for a Nation such as France or the United States 
to be a leader in international affairs, the Nation must first 
believe in itself.- Launay quotes de Gaulle as saying:
Since the death of President Kennedy, America worries 
me. . . she is losing her grip; she has no real policy; 
one has the unpleasant feeling that she doesn't even 
believe in herself.3
IWerth, De Gaulle, p. l8l.
^This is similar to Bergson's theory.
3Launay, De Gaulle and His France, p. l88. Quote 
is from Launay's personal papers.
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A similar expression relative to France is that doubt is 
the "demon of decadence. . .a France who believes in her­
self. . .opens her way to the future."^ Pays re^l or the 
Nation personifies the pays legal, the institutions or State.
The State is only worthy of de Gaulle's concept of 
the Nation, a Louis XlVth type, when it embodies "the contin­
uity of the national interest." One precondition to this 
is rising above political party politics. De Gaulle regarded 
the State:
. . .not as it was yesterday and as the parties 
wished It to become once more, a juxtaposition 
of private interests which could never produce 
anything but weak compromise, but instead an 
instrument of decision, action and ambition, 
expressing and serving the national interest 
alone.
The national interest is essentially oriented toward foreign 
policy and evident as whatever the French President says 
it is. Thus it is not a vague, ambiguous concept as employed 
by the U. S. Executive in recent times to cover a multitude 
of sins. Rather it is specific and knowable at any particular 
time. This national interest is represented by the President 
but unconsciously conceived by the French people in much the 
same fashion as Rousseau's general will.
^Launay, De Gaulle and his France, p. 231.
2
De Gaulle, Memoirs, (Salvation). p. 780.
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By implication, de Gaulle considered the Prench
Nation as having a personality and a Soul.^ Even the
2
history of France is an entity. This "cult of the French 
Nation" includes considering France as an ideal (like Hegel), 
a personalized image that does not mean the French people 
or their daily activities. Rather, "Prance" is distinct from
3
the sum of the people who are all engaged in its service. 
France belongs to everyone, and no one, a unique blend of 
what "is" and what "ought" to be. There is an incommunicable 
uniqueness of values and virtues evident in every Nation.
The Nation, then, is the highest or supreme collectivity, 
molded by the nuances of history and the collective conscious­
ness of her people. It is important as a living spiritual 
entity that gives character and courage to its citizens.
De Gaulle's related belief that there can be no separation 
of the Nation from military might has a religious fervor.
No artifical community can do this. That is, any other entity 
has no political effectiveness and no authority to act. How­
ever, there may be some technical value in so-called supra­
national entities or mega-states.
The State then is the only "valid legitimate and
^First Press Conference, March 25, 1959.
2
See his Bergsonian vision of France in his Memoirs.
^Alfred Grosser, French Foreign Policy Under De Gaulle 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 17.
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capable of achievement" unit in the international system.^
Or as Grosser states it: "The Nation State represents the
supreme political value," although it is not the sole re-
2
pository of justice. There is therefore little value in
such entities as the United Nations:
The states . . .are the only entities which have the 
right to give orders and the power to act. To 
imagine that something can be built up which can 
act effectively and be approved by the peoples _
outside or over and above the states is an illusion.
The States are the most stable of world elements and do not 
disappear. They can not integrate either. World order, 
therefore, is possible only within a "structured harmony 
of the multiple uniqueness" reflected in the individual 
Nation-States. Therefore de Gaulle’s ideas of a new world 
order is one keyed on alliances and modified by the exis­
tence of Prench nuclear armaments. It would then be possible
to have an international equilibrium based on the realities 
of power rather than ideologies. This leads to peace, which 
de Gaulle considers the having and maintaining of relations 
based on "reason and sentiment" with all countries. There
^Sixth Press Conference, May 15, 1962; Third Press 
Conference, September 5, I960.
2
Grosser, French Foreign Policy, p. 15.
^Third Press Conference, September 5, I960.
^Radio Address, Presidential Election Evening, 1965.
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could then begin international cooperation and the union 
of Europe.^
The State's origin is in the necessities of national
defense, for the basic law of the State is independence from
2
political or economic oppression. National defense in con­
temporary terms requires nuclear armament, the force de frappe 
or de dissuasion. "A great state which does not possess them 
while others have them, does not dispose of its own destiny.
The ability of a state to remain independent and to make 
authoritative judgments for other states hinges ultimately 
on its ability to enforce those judgments. International 
authority, then, is derived from one's own efforts and own 
military power besides the necessary strategic strength, 
political maturity and diplomatic skill and economic and
4
social stability. In addition, independence is a pre­
condition for grandeur, a concept de Gaulle never adequately 
defined, although presumably he meant "grandeur" in the typical 
French cultural milieu context. Independence and integrity 
as wholeness and faithfulness are intertwined.' There can be
See Speeches No. 239, February, 1966; April 5,
1965 in Passeron, De Gaulle Speaks 1962-66; Fifth Press 
Conference, September 5, 1961, among others.
^Free French 5 (#8).
^Speech at Strasbourg, November 23, 1961 in Passeron, 
De Gaulle Parle, Vol I., p. 357.
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no Integrity whether as self-respect or dignity without
independence. And of course dignity is a central element
in grandeur. So here is the rationale for force, the
necessary element for the State to flourish and survive.
Once again de Gaulle reiterates his contention that
regimes or ideologies are unimportant, even waning. When
present, they are negative forces just as political parties
are. Rather de Gaulle believed national consciousness is
increasing regardless of various anti-statists' denials. He
points to the fact that the U.S.S.R. and Marxist ideology
did not fight WWII, but the Russian people engaged in a
national war against Hitler.
The primary goal of the State is to enhance its
power^ in order not only to survive in the Inevitable chaos,
struggle, and conflict of the world scene, but further to
flourish. Each Nation seeks its own power and glory or
status in its own particular way, although friendship with
others seems to preclude a State being worthy of its name.
Ideologies, therefore, are merely "cover-ups" or labels to
this elementary will to power or "external ambition" and
2
are used against the State. But this will to power is
^Speech of November 3, 1959 quoted in Roy C. Macridis, 
De Gaulle; Implaccable Ally (New York: Macmillan, 1966).
2
The term is Grosser's. See his French Foreign Policy,
p. 15.
235
subjected to limitations. By power, de Gaulle does not 
mean territorial expansion, but rather economic expansion. 
The French solution to her economic problem is in collec­
tive individualism. That is, he viewed improving the con­
dition of the individual and national prosperity as a means 
to enhance the power of the nation-state.^ Prance is the 
objective.
The realities of power are evident in a Nation's 
status in the international community and includes the past
history of the country, its unity, and the role of the modern 
2
military. Relations between individual states are as differ­
ent as their divergences of interest: "More than the distance
•3
between States, what counts is the difference in civilization." 
When these relations require the use of force, it must be
il
employed on the side of liberty. Liberty and authority are 
inseparable. A State based on complete liberty is set a- 
gainst all authority, but liberty can not exist without that 
authority. To separate the two results in the demise of the 
State.
Power then can not be unbridled ambition to dominate 
others, for such "may win more or less brilliant and prolonged
^Message to National Assembly, December 11, 1962.
p
August 20, 1964 Speech in Passeron, De Gaulle Parle,
II, p. 235.
•3
Conversation between de Gaulle and Adenauer from 
Launay's personal papers quoted in Launay, De Gaulle and his 
France, p. 154. ^See De Gaulle, Edge of the Sword,passim.
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successes, but the end is always a downfall."^ Every
State has the right to live in and with its uniqueness and
not be destroyed. The American concept of ideological war
is thus repugnant to de Gaulle. Rather than fighting wars
2
in the name of a civilization, de Gaulle believed that wars 
are fought in the name of nations at most or are confronta­
tions of historical visions at least. War then is not a 
means to spread any doctrine or ideology such as "democracy." 
Rather war is merely a governmental policy that can be changed 
at will. It is "of no avail save as an instrument of policy." 
Thus the United States was "defeated" in Vietnam by American 
standards, but not by the Prench standard that holds that a 
nation's vital interests determine its activities and such 
do change. In part the divergence of these French and 
American beliefs may be found in de Gaulle's concept of the
4
Leader-Hero, who is an essential part of the political 
stability required in a powerful State. In other words, 
de Gaulle's concept of the State and its primary goal of 
external ambition provides one explanation of his vision 
of the Hero-Leader, that one person possessing the power 
of the State in its external relations.
^De Gaulle, "United Nations Victory," p. 159.
p
See Dean Acheson in Foreign Affairs 4l (January
1963), p. 248 for a good example.
3
4
De Gaulle varied his emphasis on this concept so 
that at various times it could be Hero-Leader or Leader-Hero.
^De Gaulle, France and Her Army, p. 7.
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The Leader-Hero
De Gaulle’s concept of "leadership" (there is
actually no equivalent term in Prench) includes a leader who
decides what is right, then provides a living example for
others to follow. He considers two "types" of leaders, the
peacetime statesman and the wartime warriors.^ Both are
"champions of authority," and seem to have a vital activating
energy that recalls Nietzchean theory and a combative will
that draws on Clauswitz. As such, they are perpetual and
contending candidates for power. Yet one should never
dominate the other, for the ideal is the interdependence
of both authorities. Indeed, the State necessitates a
"balance of tendencies" of the inherent conflicts between
1}
the statesman and the military chief.
De Gaulle sees the political leader as having a 
precarious authority, since it emanates from the popular will 
of the people, the sovereign power. Therefore the statesman 
must dominate public opinion, which is an "inconstant mis­
tress" at most.^ His end is to captivate men’s minds, while 
being a servant of the public. In reality this is merely a 
guise to become its master. The political leader’s career, 
therefore, is committed to general ideas and public speaking:
Great or small, historic figures or colorless 
politicians, he comes and goes between power and 
powerlessness, between prestige and public in­
gratitude."
^De Gaulle, Edge of the Sword, p. 103.
^Ibid., p. 126 ^Ibid., p. 115. ^Ibid., p. 108.
5lbid., p. 104 ^Ibid., p. 105.
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In fact, the modern leader Is so pressed with his public 
life that he does not have the time or inclination to con­
template anything other than the immediate problem before 
him. Yet de Gaulle considers the ideal individual leader 
as one who takes decisive political action on his own 
initiative.
In contrast, the soldier wields absolute authority
and thus can be, indeed is, direct in his character and
method. He is characterized as having a "taste for system
. . .self-assurance, and . . .rigidity:"^
The passion for acting on his own is naturally 
accompanied by a certain roughness of conduct.
. . jwhicQ his subordinates have to put up with.
. .Such a chief will be distant. . .for authority 
is not to be had without prestige nor prestige 
without aloofness.2
But the military in general has as its essence discipline
and loyalty to political offices, regardless of the regime.
The Army should be nonpolitical and subordinate to the
authority of the State. Still in periods of a grave national
crisis, de Gaulle believed that military leadership could
conceivably take over the control of all policy. In other
times, however, the military habit of obedience means little
opposition to political incumbents. In the end the statesmen
^Ibid. p .  107.
^Ibid., p. 106-7 .
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and warriors have the mutual respect of authority for 
authority. Self-control and patriotism then restrain 
extreme conflicts. Still de Gaulle sees the need for a 
balance, an "ordered pattern"^ which must exist above 
the compromises that the two types of leaders admit, in
order to act in concert. What de Gaulle recognized is
2
a difficult relationship. "Systematic adjustment" of 
the relations of "disharmony" between the civil and military 
branches would require divorcing, for example, the conduct 
of the war which is the statesman's realm from the fighting 
of the war which is the domain of the soldier. This would 
be unwise. The preferrable way is to keep the situation 
fluid. Still de Gaulle believed an "enlightened State" 
should train potential wartime leaders, a body of military, 
administrative, and political elite, side-by-side. Even 
here de Gaulle admits that formal instruction does not 
necessarily increase understanding. Only "enlightened 
views. . .supreme wisdom. . .intuition. . .character £and]
. . .enthusiasm" can do that. Harmony and understanding comes 
only when individuals think "along the right lines." In 
brief, then, de Gaulle believed that "nothing great will
^Ibid., p. 116 
^Ibid.. p. 125. 
^Ibid., p. 119. 
^Ibid.. p. 127.
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ever be achieved without great men, and men are great only
if they are determined to be so."^ And for this the leader
must have faith in his own destiny, or predestination.
De Gaulle's leadership theory from the writing of
his tract and actual political tenures did change ever so
slightly. He explained this to Schoenbrum:
I have learned in practice that a chief must be
closer to the people than I had thought at the
time of writing Edge of the Sword . To move 
masses of people to accept the general interest 
over and above the individual egoism it is neces­
sary to be at one and the same time above the crowd, 
pointing out the higher, wider horizons, and yet 
close in among the people, infusing them with one's 
own faith and drawing strength from them. A chief 
must be farsighted, but if he is too distant from 
the people he risks marching all alone. Decisions 
must be taken alone, but there must be followers 
close by, ready to understand and willing to march 
ahead.2
Thus de Gaulle's concept of the leader evolved as his leader­
ship experiences grew. Throughout, however, are evident 
traces of his parental love of the monarchy, his purely 
symbolic role as Head of the Free French, and the almost 
fascist concepts evident in his role as President of the 
Provisional Government (1944-46) and the disaster of the 
Rally of the French People. His original philosophy was 
actually more a philosophy of command wherein equilibrium 




Schoenbrum, The Three Faces of Charles de Gaulle,
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the military leader and the political representatives 
of the people. His lectures and writings on the role of 
the leader echo Clauswitz,particularly relative to the 
influence of the leader's will to fight and the belief 
that action in war is accidential. But this leader is a 
superman who has been tempered by Jesuit teachings. Still
the leader-hero is one who can disobey under "false disci­
plines" even to the point of being an enemy of laws. But 
this does not mean the indiscriminate use of force. Force
must be used only on the side of justice.
De Gaulle's hero-leader of men, whether as Chief of 
State or a military leader, has three essential character­
istics: a doctrine, character, and prestige. The doctrine 
or principles a leader must have are not based ideally on 
abstractions, a priori thinking or planning, but rather an 
adaptation to the particular circumstances of any given 
situation. This includes the economic, military or political 
realm. The essence of doctrine is found in the leader 
understanding the character of the time. This way of thinking 
is in marked contrast to the typical French way of preferring 
abstractions and systems, the absolute and the categorical. 
Rather, de Gaulle visualizes a leader who makes decisions with 
an open mind according to the circumstances. Yet even here 
his actions would be tempered by the instructive disasters and 
successes that a knowledge of history brings. This adaptation 
to particular circumstances is not a novel idea, as de Gaulle
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acknowledged. Napoleon’s procedural method with the Grande 
Armee was to understand the situation, adapt to that situ­
ation, and then exploit it to his own advantage.^ De Gaulle 
applies this not only to military strategy, but leadership 
theory. The essential leadership element, however, is in 
the character of the individual leader.
Character is a "divine spark" or creative touch.
This Bergsonian initiative is most evident in times of crisis:
. . .when danger threatens. . .all men at heart 
realize the supreme value of self-reliance, and 
know that without it there can be no action of 
value. . .for nothing great has ever been achieved 
without that passion and that confidence which is 
to be found only in the man of character.
Great leaders possess many different faculties. It is not 
sufficient to have character alone, or even purely intellec­
tual abilities. It is also necessary to commence "great 
things" and then see these undertakings through to their 
conclusion. That is, the Leader-Hero has a particular con­
cept of his own destiny that includes a certainty of having 
an exceptional role to play. For when the "man of character" 
is challenged by events he has recourse only to himself. It 
is his own strengths that result in decisions. There is an 
instinctive response to take action, "to take responsibility 
for it, to make it his own business.” Once given a task or
^De Gaulle, Edge of the Sword, p. 83. 
^Ibid., p. 44. ^Ibid., p. 4l.
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responsibility, the ideal leader desires to be left free to
carry it out. Rather than taking refuge in textbooks, or
making laws or regulations bear the responsibility for any
decision he may make, the Hero-Leader takes a firm stand and
looks the problem straight 4n the face:
He is ready to enjoy success on the condition that 
it is really his own, and that he derives no profit 
from it.
[Without the leaded there is but the dreary task 
of the slave; thanks to him, it becomes the divine 
sport of the hero.l
De Gaulle sees a leader's prestige as "largely a
matter of feeling, suggestion, and impression" depending
essentially on the possession of an elementary gift. It
is a natural aptitude which defies analysis. Prestige is
a quality of "exuding authority, as though it were a liquid,"
though it is impossible to say precisely of what it consists."
De Gaulle believes prestige and the emotion of love are of
a common thread. In toto, prestige exists only when mystery
is present also, for familiarity breeds contempt:
All religions have their holy of holies, and no 
man is a hero to his valet. In designs, the 
demeanor, and the mental operations of a leader 
there must be always a "something" which others 
cannot altogether fathom.3
De Gaulle admits that prestige comes from successes. Con­
fusion or erratic behavior only brings forth doubts, not 
greatness. But this does not mean inaccessibility to others.
4bld.,p. 41-2. ^Ibid., p.57. ^Ibid., p. 58.
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If a leader Is to lead he must know his fellow beings and
this is possible only by being among his fellows. However,
this does not mean externalization of thought. In other
words, silence is a necessary precondition for authority
and thus prestige. Silence is a preliminary to the ordering
of one's thoughts: "To speak is to dilute one's thoughts,
to give vent to one's ardor, in short, is to dissipate
one's strength."^ This silence is a concealment of strength
of mind and determination, not a cover of or for weakness.
The Leader-Hero then must be one who has the power
to not only dominate events but to "leave his mark on them"
while always assuming responsbiility for the consequences of
2
his own actions. In so doing, there inevitably is a positive
effect not only on the leader's own career but the policies
and glory of his country as well. Since action occupies his
entire being, the Leader remains "within bounds" and does
not savor the revenge which would seem natural for one who
is unpopular except in times of crises. His actions, then,
must be on a grand scale, a visionary aim:
. . .all leaders of men, whether as political figures, 
prophets, or soldiers, all those who can get the best 
out of others, have always identified themselves with 
high Ideals, and this has given added scope and strength 
to their influence.3
The leader is aloof, has character, and personifies greatness.
But not all men can perform this mission. The task involves
^Ibid., p. 59. ^Ibid., p. 62. ^Ibid.. p. 65.
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Incessant self-discipline, constant risk-taking, and a 
continual inner struggle. It is in essence a balance be­
tween the citizen-soldier and the cabinet minister-colonel. 
Therefore the leader in this task often wears the "hair 
shirt of the penitent," for he must remain isolated from 
other individuals and the simple pleasures such as friend­
ship or other freedoms of nonleaders. This ideal of the 
Hero-Leader is operational as the major element in de Gaulle’s 
concept of the ideal political model.
The Ideal Political System
De Gaulle's ideal model of how a political system 
or government should^be structured may be inferred through­
out his speeches and writings before 1946. However, on 
June 16, 1946, he presented a speech in Bayeux, Prance.
That speech forms a comprehensive basis for his political 
doctrine from that time.^ The political system outlined 
there is basically nonideological. It no doubt results in 
part from de Gaulle's knowledge of the Machiavellian dictim 
that :
Whoever obtains the government of a city or a state, 
above all, when his power is based on weak founda­
tions. . .has no surer method of maintaining himself 
on the throne than to renew, at the very outset of 
his reign, all the institutions of the state. . .in 
a word, there should be no rank, order,employment, g 
nor riches which is not known to stem from him alone.
See Le Monde, June 17, 1946; Discours et Messages, 




When de Gaulle was in a political position to effect change, 
various aspects of his ideal political system were imple­
mented. Other aspects were modified for the sake of prac­
ticality, as may be seen in the completed draft of the Con­
stitution of the Fifth Republic. This constitution has been 
analyzed in great depth. Unfortunately, it is difficult to 
differentiate in the finished copy the ideas of Michel Debre, 
the primary drafter of the document, and those of Charles de 
Gaulle. Many reform proposals in the Constitution are ante­
cedent to de Gaulle and did not intellectually originate 
with him.
Most of de Gaulle’s political theory is based on 
the early Twentieth Century apprehensions derived from liberal 
economics, authoritarian politics, and military patriotism.
He wanted a government that would be working, effective, and 
united. His ideas pivot around his belief that France was 
seeking the decline of republican institutions, in part thé 
result of the French tradition of assembly government. De 
Gaulle believed that there were four political system possi­
bilities for Prance: communism, European confederation, 
"Gaulllsm," and capitalism. Communism and capitalism he 
dismissed as making "the worker nothing more than a member 
of an ant colony."^ Neither answered what he considered the
^Quoted in Galante, The General, p. 240.
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greatest question of the century: How can we find a human 
balance for modern mechanized society? He chose Gaullism, 
or what he himself called "democracy," a disciplined form 
that precluded dictatorship and whose purpose was to re­
store French grandeur and sense of duty. It could be 
called a "social democracy" as its primary purpose was to 
insure everyone:
. . .the right to freedom of work, and that will 
guarantee the dignity and security of all through 
an economic system planned with a view to developing 
our national resources.1
The core of de Gaulle's political idea is a rigorous 
separation of political powers in a "parliamentary" system 
and a system of checks and balances which gets overlooked due 
to the emphasis on the Executive. His reasons for advocating 
such a system coincide with Debre's arguments that the Fourth 
Republic was illegitimate. This theoretical slogan was as 
follows: France needed radical institutional change in order
to effectively organize power to serve the national Interest,
2
the cardinal purpose of a truly legitimate political system.
The public powers have no validity, in fact or in 
law, unless they are in accord with the superior 
interests of the country and repose on the con­
fident approval of the citizens.^
This is the idea of legitimacy over and above legality. De
Gaulle also incorporated Gapitant's belief that the very
^Free French, p. 290. Friedrich would call it neo-
liberalism, with the State necessary for there to be citizens
2This idea can be traced to Carre de Malberg.
^Bayeux Speech, June, 1946.
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roots of the institutional forms of the Fourth Republic 
were undemocratic, therefore requiring "new” techniques 
such as the referendum. Once "Gallism" was established 
in Prance, European Confederation would be instituted.
De Gaulle's ideas are certainly not "democratic" 
in the Anglo-Saxon sense of the term. His original ideas 
provided for a loose federalist French Union with all real 
power in France, since she alone could be personified in the 
form of a President. Thus the nation-state of France would 
have "pre-eminent responsibility" for overseas territories, 
although the latter should have economic and political de­
velopment suitable for them individually.
The most important position in this ideal system is 
an all-powerful Head of State, the President. De Gaulle’s 
philosophizing on the type of leader Prance needed, wanted, 
and would accept was evolutionary as the three "requirements” 
were not necessarily synonomous. Later institutionalized in 
Article 5, this one concept of the Head of State as one who 
finds the means to effect change and reform appears to be 
totally de Gaulle's own.
He envisioned this Chief Executive as an integrating 
fourth branch or power of government above the legislature, 
judiciary, and ordinary executive. It is not a figurehead 
position or what de Gaulle characterized as designed only 
to "inaugurate chrysanthemums."^ Rather, the position may
^Quoted in Carroll, The French, p. 47.
2H9
be easily cast as a republican monarch apart from the normal
executive and having political authority which by Implication
results In the legitimacy of an action permitting the leader
to execute his functions. In fact, de Gaulle often said what
Prance really needed was a king:
. . .a special being. . . to be brought [ouQnow and 
again In difficult moments. But that has all been 
destroyed, and you can’t put It together again.-*-
In reality the position Is one of an "emergency executive"
who when the situation demands can dominate with what appears
to be unlimited power. Since de Gaulle considered politics
Ideally to be action, "an ensemble of decisions which are
2
made, things which are done, risks which are taken," his 
Idea of the Chief Executive is one who can effectuate this 
action:
. . .a guide. . .In whom the nation could see beyond 
Its own fluctuations, a man In charge of essential 
matters and the guarantee of Its fate.3
Wahl likens this concept to John Locke’s fourth or federative
power of government. Still, unfettered emergency powers are
unusual In French republican history. It would be possible to
Interpret these powers as essentially those charged with
foreign affairs, since de Gaulle’s use of domestic policy Is
one which Ideally unifies the nation, a precondition permitting
the primacy of foreign policy. He considered It unthinkable
^Quoted In Tournoux, Petaln and de Gaulle, p. 363.
Emphasis supplied. 
2
Tenth Press Conference, July23, 1964.
^De Gaulle, War Memoirs(Salvation), p. 941.
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that at certain times a man should not be the repository of 
sovereignty.^ Indeed the leader embodies the "national legit­
imacy" like the "savior" regimes of the two Napoleons. De 
Gaulle thus saw this Chief of State as a powerful executive 
required to counterbalance the natural weakness that a divided 
France has in times of crisis. The position then is to pre­
vent national disaster, whether involving economic issues or 
national prestige. It is also de Gaulle's idea that every 
Frenchman has two souls: the soul of an individual and that 
soul as a member of the united community represented by the 
President, who symbolizes the continuity of the State. The 
President in this capacity defines a single national interest.
De Gaulle's original plan presented at Bayeux in­
cluded a corporative parliament idea with a tripartite upper 
house, each having a separate legislative and representative 
function: territorial, federal and corporative with repre­
sentatives of economic, social or intellectual, and familial 
interests.^ This idea is not unusual, but rather is in the 
Christian social tradition ef corporatism. De Gaulle's ideas 
also incorporate the ancient cameralist tradition of the 
French monarchy combined with modern légistes or "state
republicans" who held that the "Republic must be a govern-
2
ment," that is, it must be able to function.
^August 11, 1958 quoted in L *Intransigeant.
2
Other corporative characteristics include his con­
cept of an association of capital and labor, which in simpli­
fied form is merely a profit-sharing device.
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The particular powers of the President and Premier 
were only superficially considered by de Gaulle. The Premier 
would be appointed by the President and would be responsible 
for the government's policy. As Head of Government, the 
Prime Minister and other ministers would be collectively re­
sponsible, not personally responsible, to the Assembly for 
their ministerial actions. But their essential functions 
were viewed by de Gaulle as ultimately part of the overall 
French policy. There are three key foreign policy posts: 
Foreign Affairs, which expresses the policy, the War Office, 
which upholds it, and the Police, which protects it.^ The 
Minstry of the Interior is viewed as functioning to preserve 
the public order necessary to conduct foreign policy. Even 
so-called domestic policies, such as social security, are
conceived by de Gaulle as inspired by the "power of France,"
2
necessary once again for foreign affairs.
The Chief of State, as also the Chief of the Ex­
ecutive or President heading the Community and the Republic, 
was all-powerful. Elected by a "college" that was more than 
just an assembly to indicate the position was President of 
the French Union, not just France, the President was not 
dependent on the National Assembly. He had wider authority 
than a democratic head normally enjoys and could thus govern
^De Gaulle, Salvation, Documents (i960), p. 363. 
^De Gaulle, War Memoirs, (Salvation), p. 779.
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regardless of whether he had a majority in the Assembly or not 
He provided continuity to government, which was assured by 
decrees and direct communications with the people via référ­
endums. This particular technique of direct democracy was 
a Bonapartist feature instituted to maintain an implicit 
understanding between a leader and his people.
De Gaulle believed the President should chose his' 
ministers as he pleases and have unrestricted power to dis­
solve Parliament. Presidential control of the Assembly 
would even extend to the initiation of the budget, formerly 
the domain of the legislative body. In fact, the President 
not only makes decisions but determines measures.^ Parti­
cularly when the nation is in peril, the President would 
function as a "guarantor of national independence and of 
the treaties concluded by France," for de Gaulle believed 
that exceptional times required exceptional powers for 
exceptional tasks. When the peril was internal, as it 
often is in Prance, the President’s position would be one 
above politics, where he could function as an arbiter among 
political parties. The executive structure, then, would be 
a strong government that does govern but one based on order 
and legality. The overall structure of the system provides 
for a strict separation of powers with a deliberate attempt 
to subjegate political parties to a role below the State.
^Ibid., p. 780.
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De Gaulle believed that party rivalries weakned the govern­
ment and potentially bring about the rise of dictator­
ships. Thus it is necessary to insure that the parties 
function in a subsidiary role.
De Gaulle was less concerned with the structure of 
the Parliament once the strong executive was established. 
However, this strong executive concept grew in part out of 
his perceptions of the vices of the French parliamentary 
system. Among his criticisms of the legislative branch 
was that the Chamber of Deputies had a parliamentary sover­
eignty that had replaced popular sovereignty until there 
really was no separation of powers as Montesquieu envisioned. 
This usurpation of the people's sovereignty and further of 
State power was by a self-interested parliamentary elite 
which interferred with the need for strong leadership. In 
essence, the Parliament was based on what divided the French 
nation, such as the quarrelsome nature of Frenchmen, rather 
than what unites it.^ To correct this situation, de Gaulle 
called for a parliament that sits for debate and deliber­
ation but does not govern or make decisions. Rather, it 
only "controls" the government's actions.
Being a political realist, de Gaulle necessarily 
changed his concept of the Parliament during the 1950's.
At that time he proposed a bicameral chamber: one chamber a 
"political" body and the other an "administrative" body to
^September 27, 1947 quoted in Journal of Politics.
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amend what the political chamber had done. The latter 
would bring into law-making the administrative order that 
a purely political chamber neglects. This second chamber 
would be chosen primarily by the Municipal Councils to 
represent economics, intellectuals and the family. The 
Senate, in contrast to normal French procedure, would be 
instituted so as to provide a possible source of government 
support in case the Executive had direct conflict with the 
Assembly. There were thus attempts to strengthen it, pri­
marily by causing election to be by local French organizations 
and functions specifically designed to permit "corrective" 
actions. It would include representatives of all forms of 
local interests and have powers in foreign affairs, defense 
and trade.
As previously indicated, de Gaulle was often vague 
and ambiguous on the details of his id eal political system.
But he did seem to believe that the Leader-Hero and the 
ideal Nation-State were, more important than technical de­
tails. Indeed, it could be argued that there is little 
originality in his theory, which like most thought, was 
formulated and polished during periods of crises and re­
flects his personal response to the perceived conditions 
of his environment. Lacouture most succinctly presents the 
viewpoint of de Gaulle's critics:
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He replaces facts with a representation of facts, 
and objects with ideas he wants to propose for them; 
he forages in history for the basic matter of 'his' 
history, snatches at that portion of the real which 
coincides with his dream, and employs his talent, 
his will, and his arrogance to make of it another 
form of reality.!
But to de Gaulle, the symbols and concepts of his personal
and political philosophy are real. This is readily apparent




A content or value analysis of a random sample of 
speeches, press conferences, books and articles is an 
organized plan which permits examination and interpretation 
of de Gaulle's key political symbols. It is yet another 
framework that seeks to aid our understanding of leadership 
behavior.
Practioneers of this form, such as Ralph K. White's 
Value Analysis, have evolved their metholodogy from a core 
of fifty values and value symbols to hundreds of "goal-words" 
and more complex interpretative procedures, such as Q sort 
scaling and multi-varlate analaysis. The following analysis
^Lacouture, De Gaulle, p. 231.
2
The analysis is intended primarily to verify or deny 
the intuitive selections of the concepts discussed above. A 
content analysis of even selected documents de Gaulle "pro­
duced" in his sixty years of public life would be staggering.
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Is based on the simplest procedures. The aim was to deter­
mine the relative emphasis de Gaulle placed on the following 
values and their opposite or counterpart concept: nation­
state, order, independence. Justice, action/force, grandeur, 
reason, and the international images of friends, enemies, 
and neutrals. Only de Gaulle’s words, not actions, were 
analyzed. The random sample was divided into four three- 
year periods, each of which provided de Gaulle with a crisis 
situation: 1941-44, the London years of "exile” and Head of 
the French Provisional Government; 1951-53, the debacle and 
demise of the Rally of the French People; 1958-60 Algeria 
and the Fifth Republic and; 1966-69 the Period of Internal 
French Dissent.
It was immediately apparent that a content analysis, 
however primitive, produces as many problems as it solves. 
Employing a pure random sample in order to preclude pre­
judicing the data often resulted in evaluating a formal 
"toast" given at a state banquet or personal but public 
letters written to other political leaders. Then there was 
the fact that often de Gaulle's articles and books were 
written during periods of political inactivity. However, 
even in these instances a pattern of priority ordering is 
evident.
Even in the briefest of communications, de Gaulle 
made some reference to the Nation as France and the State. 
Often this becomes a very extended discussion incorporating
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the values which he considered emanating naturally from 
this concept— order, force, grandeur and independence. At 
other times his concept of the leader and his role in the 
State predominant. But in all instances there seems to be 
a circular attempt to return to the predominant concepts 
discussed above, even in those rare occasions when a speech 
or comment was extemporaneous. The only rank-ordering of 
priorities appears to be a direct correlation with the par­
ticular historical crisis de Gaulle was attempting to re­
solve at that instant. For example, the 1941-44 period 
communications were essentially public relations documents. 
The terminology and reiteration of constant themes indicate 
that de Gaulle considered his primary task to restore French 
spirit and unity, which in turn would restore the integrity 
and independence of France and the Republic in general. But 
because his personal and political philosophy included an 
exhaltation of the State, it is understandable that the docu­
ments of this period are devoted also to a tortured justi­
fication of "legitimate" rebellion. These values and their 
concomitant concepts prevail at a time when it would seem 
more natural to exorcise the "enemy." Interestingly, from 
this period through the other time-frames surveyed, the 
terms "friend, enemy, and neutral" are virtually undefinable. 
True, from 1941-44 the documents contain references to 
"Germanism," "fascism" and "Stalinism." Vichy is usually 
referenced with a qualification "as under the enemy." But
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In his discussions that include such terms, it seems that 
de Gaulle's criteria for the nomenclatures rests entirely 
on some perceived threat to the French Nation or State. Thus 
it would be possible to divide his concept of "enemy" into 
the totalitarian forces against whom he waged military battles 
and the "enemy allies" such as the United States and Great 
Britain to whom he was brutal and unbearable in a generally 
nonphysical way. "Friends" then were those who supported 
the French Nation and State, while there, is no measurable 
reference to "neutrals." After all, de Gaulle's personal 
philosophy precluded compromise and since he had decided the 
right and the wrong rather rigidly during these years, "neutrality" 
was impossible.
After the War and during the period 1951-53, de Gaulle's 
communications bear the imprint of his battles against the 
Fourth Republic and his consequent attempts to "reform" the 
State by various proposals of a system of indirect govern­
ment. He was out of political power during this time, a 
fact reflected in the frustrated and pessimistic terminology 
of his speeches. The war years, for example, found his stress 
on "unity" or "grandeur" while the early 1950's reversed this 
to talk of "disunity" and "shame" or "disgrace." Because 
many of his frustrations of this period can be traced directly 
to the opposition of the Communists, de Gaulle's emphasis 
understandably was on these "enemies." However, he coined a 
new phrase to describe them - "separatists" - for their cardinal
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sin was to owe allegiance and authority to a foreign nation 
and a foreign state rather than to France.
From 1958-60, a period when de Gaulle was once a-
gain in political office, the prevailing consideration was
the Algerian situation and all this entailed. As during
the other time-frames, de Gaulle's political vocabulary
was centered primarily on the Nation and the State and the 
*
effects the crises were having on these entities. A pre­
ponderance of "value" words centering on confusion and 
disorder or disunity are evident, a natural phenomena since 
his theme was the need to re-establish discipline in the 
State. There is thus much emphasis on the necessity for 
State reform, respect for Republican institutions and the 
waging of a main battle against the politicized Army. The 
impotence of the government during this period resulted in 
his emphasis upon the degradation of the regime, something 
which is not as evident in previous periods. With the estab­
lishment of the Fifth Republic Constitution, de Gaulle turned 
to the institutionalization of this "reformed State" in much 
the same way and with the identical language he had used 
during the war years to forge public opinion.
Of the selected time periods, the years from 1966 to 
1969 are the most confusing. Perhaps because of his advanced 
age or more readily the sheer volume of decisions required 
in his capacity as leader of a modern nation-state, de Gaulle's 
political communications are confusing. A study of the 
terminologies used at this time continues to show the emphasis
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on France, the need to strengthen the State with some con­
stitutional changes, and the cult of the Nation in general. 
However, he seems to have returned to some of the negativism 
of the 1951-53 period in that the concepts or value words 
used are "anti”-oriented rather than positive in emphasis. •
In general, however, the diversity of his communications 
and the particular words or phrases employed do not provide 
an adequate basis to determine what his priorities were then. 
Perhaps he himself did not know. What /little data can be 
drawn from his communications indicates that he sought pri­
marily to insure the survival of a strong executive for 
the French State, in recognition of his imminent political 
demise. The pessimistic communications in 1968-9 seem to 
be indicative of an attempt or at least wish to exit the 
political scene on his own terms. More than anything else, 
this period is a good example of the extremes of his political 
style.
CHAPTER V
DE GAULLISM: A POLITICAL STYLE
Introduction
What is excessive does not count. Talleyrand.
We have previously noted the theoretical contention 
that foreign policy predictability Is enhanced when the 
Idiosyncratic variable changes as one political leader re­
places another as a formal office-holder.^ Discussion has 
centered on the cultural factors (Chapter 2 above), person­
ality (Chapter 3 above), and political philosophy (Chapter 4 
above) constituting elements In this Idiosyncratic factor. 
Another Independent variable Is found In the public aspects 
of leadership, or "political style." This last concept Is 
considered by some to be the best concept for "describing,
analyzing and evaluating leadership, the role of . . .
2
personality and Cfch^  relationship to the system." Rather 
than what de Gaulle thought, political style Is concerned 
with how things were accomplished, the personal way an In-
■3
dividual responds to the demands of a political role. Rustow 
calls this "the recurrent Interplay between private personality
^See Rosen, "Leadership Change," and Grosser, French 
Foreign Policy, p. 13.
^See John Horace Kress, "N. S. Khruschev’s Political 
Style," PhD Dissertation, University of Washington, 1973.
^See Putnam, "Studying Elite Political Culture* APSR, 
pp. 656 and 659.
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and public performance.”^ To borrow from Tyler, political
style is a continuing process, "an individually unique way
2
of political living and goal striving." In this respect 
it is not unlike the "mode-of-being-in-the-world" concept of 
the exitentialists.
Political scientists such as Barber, however, em­
ploy the concept "political style" to designate the inter­
acting dualism of a collection of habitual action patterns 
evident in meeting the demands of a political role. These 
patterns incorporate not only the overt or observed charac­
teristics of the leader’s political performance (active or 
passive), but an inner or emotional context which Barber 
defines as a "bundle of strategies for adapting, for pro­
tecting and enhancing self-esttem," and which are either 
positive or negative. A political leader then attempts to 
cope with the political environment by employing the tech­
niques he has found effective in similar situations. There­
fore regularities or habitual patterns in political style do 
exist.
^Rustow, "Ataturk," Daedalus, p. 683.
^"Individual Psychology," lESS, p. 215.
^Barber, "Adult Identity and Presidential Style, 
Daedalus, pp. 938-9.
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Unfortunately, the analysis of a political style 
variable is fraught with perils. There is the conceptual 
problem of separting personality, political situation and 
political role from each other. And once accomplished, if 
indeed that is ever possible, the matter turns to the lack 
of sufficient quantity and quality of data adequate to 
prepare an "objective" empirical study.^ However, such 
marked disadvantages should not preclude the analytical 
attempt to add to our knowledge of a French monstre sacre, 
Charles de Gaulle, and his particular, even peculiar, 
political style and the organizational relationships through 
which this style was manifest.
The Press Conference
De Gaulle’s political style was marked by the use
of three distinctive elements: the press conference, the
referendum, and the interpretative use of organizational
relationships surrounding the French Presidency. Indeed,
as Carroll remarks, de Gaulle's personal policies were
2
enforced by the use of these tactics. Through these 
vehicles de Gaulle was able to associate himself with the
^Kress, "Political Style." 
^Carroll, The French, p. 4?.
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sacred symbols of French culture;
. . .the stilted rhetoric of his speeches re­
sembled the rhythms of Richelieu, the stiff­
ness of his gestures evoked the dignity of 
Henri IV, the mystery and ritual of his public 
appearances suggested the pomp of Napoleon, 
and the panache with which he defied the world 
brought to mind the antics of Cyrano de Bergerac. 
The General was thus able to draw upon himself 
the mantle of myth.
The press conferences, or "press performances" as
2
they were sometimes called, were summoned when de Gaulle
had something to say. As with all of his public appear-
?
ances, timing was important. Still, during his political 
tenure de Gaulle usually held a press conference every 
winter and spring. An electronic address, either radio or 
after 1958 television, or simultaneous transmission, occur­
red in the spring, summer, and autumn. The press confer­
ences were the best source of foreign policy information, 
as long as Hayward's admonition is remembered. That is, 
foreign policy is "a field where publicity is the public 
relations facade that conceals rather than reveals the ser­
ious discussions between the select few..
^Thompson,, Pledge to Destiny, p.. 256.
2
Schoenbrun, The Three Lives of Charles de Gaulle,
pp. 80-1.. '
o
See Werth, De Gaulle., p.. 52 for specific examples 
^Hayward, Parliamentary Affairs, pp.. 234-5.
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The press conferences were ritualized to perfection. 
Questions were required to be submitted beforehand, and 
then "arranged” by de Gaulle’s press officer. Questions de 
Gaulle considered unworthy or unwelcome were either sluffed
off completely or when It was necessary to consider them,
1 2 some bit of "sardonic wit" sufficed as an Incomplete answer.
When he had something to say that he had not been "asked," 
de Gaulle would "extend" one of his answers with the comment, 
"Oh yes, somebody also asked. . The President’s re­
sponses usually added up to a calculated "affirmation of a 
policy to arouse the national spirit."^
De Gaulle did require time to prepare for the press 
conferences and to memorize his answers. His "prodigious 
memory" may have been less a cultivated trait than the re­
sult of dedicated labors In writing and rewriting and thus 
learning his speeches. His writing In any form was slow, 
primarily because he constantly sought precision In per­
fection. His policy was to spend two hours every day In 
complete Isolation writing. His Flon editor reported that
^Crozler, De Gaulle, pp. 9-10.
2
De Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope, pp. 290-1. 
^Werth, De Gaulle, p. 361.
^De Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope, pp. 289-90, 291. 
^Grlnnel-Mllne, Triumph of Integrity, p. 300.
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de Gaulle’s habit was to revise his writings incessantly. 
This constant rewriting even extended to the expensive 
process of changing the galley proofs of his Memoirs.^
There were no ghost writers. The only aid de Gaulle used 
was one or at most two research assistants who, upon
2
specific instructions, searched for requested documents.
The normal press conference began at 3 p.m. sharp. 
De Gaulle had a fetish for punctuality that even extended 
to the length of time State banquet courses could be con­
sumed, with plates removed regardless of a guest’s ’’stage" 
in eating. In attendance at most conferences were media 
representatives, ministers, and officials, usually about 
a thousand people in all. Crozier goes so far as to term 
these events as pure "theatre. The Hoffmanns extend this 
view by calling the press conference a ritualized form of 
de Gaulle’s gift and love of "drama, acting, and performing 
on a s t a g e . I n  whatever forum he chose, de Gaulle was a 
powerful orator. But unfortunately, he was also:
^Hatch, Biography of de Gaulle, p. 212.
^Werth, De Gaulle, p. 231.
^P. Viansson-Ponte, The King and His Court (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin, n.p.).
^Janet Planner (Genet) reports that the "normal" 
autumn and spring press conferences held in the Elysee ball­
room were attended by 700 to 800 journalists alone, plus 
government officials, secretaries and other listeners and 
observers. See her Paris Journal, II (New York: Atheneum, 
1971), pp. 281-3.
^Crozier, De Gaulle, p. 592.
p. 856.
^Hoffmann and Hoffmann, "The Will to Grandeur," Daedalus,
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. . .a man who U a i ^  wise things In a foolish 
manner [so that the) provocative brutality of 
his speech and the arrogant aggressiveness of 
his tone remove 03 . . .any curative power from 
his proposals.1
De Gaulle's television appearances were even more 
"crafted," to a pristine perfection. This was further en­
hanced by his virtual monopoly of the electronic mass media 
for political purposes during his formal power-holding. The 
television presentations were usually pre-recorded, again 
with no notes or "Idiot cards" employed. Every mannerism, 
gesture, Intonation and cadence was carefully calculated 
In deliberate, slow movements. To Insure the maximum 
effect of his appearance, de Gaulle even took diction lessons 
from an actor of the Comedle Française. These same "tech­
niques" were utilized most successfully In de Gaulle's 
various referendum "crusades."
The Referendum
As employed by de Gaulle, the referendum Is best 
described as a suspense drama Invoked for diverse political 
and personal reasons. Theoretically, the Constitution of 
the Fifth Republic (Article 11) provides the referendum Init­
iative as a Government perogatlve, but only the President 
used It for such specific purpose. As such, the referendum 
rejuvenated de Gaulle-the-man while demonstrating his popular
^Lacouture, De Gaulle, pp. 190-1 
^Werth, De Gaulle, p. 361.
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support among the French people. De Gaulle believed it 
strengthened the special bonds which should exist between 
a leader and his people. The technique permitted the 
periodic - five in ten years - reaffirmation of his personal 
authority, while confirming what de Gaulle called his 
"profound legitimacy." Politically the referendum was a 
means to legitimize public policy, an alternative to the 
"evils" of permitting the "intermediaries" sitting in Parlia­
ment a more active part in this process. Thus, when the 
politicians would not support him on what ^  considered a 
vital issue, de Gaulle would rally the masses through a 
masôive public opinion campaign, and with a referendum 
victory "guarantee" a popular mandate for major policy 
innovations. The referendum provided a means to solicit 
the Rousseauean "general will" of the sovereign people, 
an overt manifestation of de Gaulle’s implicit preference 
for direct democracy. De Gaulle, of course, like the 
Bonapartes before him. Interpreted this general will him­
self.
One referendum also provided an exercise that from 
some appearances was an unnecessary event leading to de 
Gaulle’s "fall" from political power. Perhaps in this case 
the technique was employed as a means to escape from the 
political scene, although this belief is not without its 
opponents. Those who disagree with this political suicide
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thesis^ contend that de Gaulle was a crisis leader who 
was finally cast from power when France entered a period 
when crisis leaders were unnecessary, a time of relative 
stability.
Although de Gaulle used the mass media prior to 
the referendum, he also often traveled to all areas of
2
Prance for "spotlight" personal visits. Werth reports 
that in these local speeches, de Gaulle always made 
specific note of the importance of the area he was visitng. 
More interesting, however, is that he carried his public 
perfection even further. Therefore the length and content 
of his comments were dictated by the size of the entity he 
was visiting. A village warranted only a few words on a 
domestic topic while medium-sized towns deserved a three- 
to-six minute speech, here again on domestic concerns. How­
ever, a city was "granted" a twenty minute discourse on 
both domestic and international topics. In all areas, after 
the "speech," de Gaulle would go into the usually friendly 
crowd and "press flesh" as so many U.S. Presidents are wont 
to do, here again drawing personal strength from a political 
technique. The importance of these various verbal presen­
tations was expressed best by the General himself:
See Bon, Revue Française de Science Politique 
(April, 197); Lancelot and Weill; Hoffmann in Edinger, Po­
litical Leadership.
^Werth, De Gaulle, p. 360.
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Politics, you know - the real stuff of politics 
on the grand scale, which changes the course of 
events, the destiny of peoples, the future of 
nations - politics Is a matter of the Word. In 
the beginning was the Word. On the l8th of June 
I changed History by an appeal of forty lines.^
Organizational Staff Relationships
Yet another Indication of de Gaulle's political 
style Is found In his use of the organizational staff 
relationships of the French Presidency. A leader's Indi­
vidual style and personal preferences are most evident here, 
where general rules, communications received and acted up­
on, and subordinate relationships are exclusively the func-
2
tlon of the Idiosyncratic variable.
The Elysee Staff under de Gaulle was composed of 
four organs :
1) the Private Secretariat or Cabinet responsible
for the scheduling of appointments and general political
dally life.
)
2) the Secretariat-General, often considered a 
"parallel government," of fifteen Intellectual technocrats 
heading departments or ministries such as foreign affairs, 
finance, education, etc. Working long hours, this group 
was not noted for being mere "yes-men."
Tournoux, Sons of Prance:Petaln and DeGaulle, p. 215, 
The reference Is to de Gaulle's first BBC broadcast appeal 
to the French from his London exile.
p
See Rosen, "Leadership Change,"p. 7.
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3) the Department of African and Malagasy Affairs 
theoretically watched over the relationships of Prance and 
her Community or ex-Community as it came to be termed.^
4) the Private General Staff which was responsible 
for all military affairs. These organs were in the French 
tradition, however, and not exclusively the de Gaulle 
innovation found in the Council of Ministers meetings and 
the "restricted councils."
The Conseil des Ministres is not a cabinet in the
traditional parliamentary sense insofar as it worked with
the President, its official Head, rather than the Prime 
2
Minister. The agenda for these meetings held twice a 
week (at least) were decided in advance by de Gaulle, who 
insisted meetings be held in a room of totally bare walls 
to prevent distractions. In the Council de Gaulle used 
the Lincolnésque technique. He permitted individuals to 
speak, even have lively debates. After that he presented 
his viewpoint, along with an explanation. Then he issued 
his "verdict." Even the cabinet communiques were formulated 
by the President and the Minister of Information and often 
had little relationship to the actualities of the particular 
meeting. Here as always, de Gaulle made major decisions
^However, this Department was more often considered 
a cover for various security and intelligence operations.
2
See Crozier, De Gaulle, pp. 6-9.
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alone, in his determination to dominate in his role as one 
who had assumed the burden of La France. At one time de 
Gaulle noted that although it was necessary to seek out in­
formation and opinions, after ministers had stated their 
views a Leader should "listen only to yourself" - a French 
variation of democratic centralism. Launay even quotes de 
Gaulle as saying:
When a minister asks to speak it is because he has 
done something that needs to be forgiven. When a 
minister says nothing, he is afraid he may have to 
tell the truth. When a minister offers excuses, 
it is because there is a decision to make.l
In reality the Council was faced with decisions that had
been decided in advance. The meetings were primarily to
ratify fait accompli decisions and discuss policies and
problems that might result from implementation.
The Council of Ministers meetings seldom discussed
foreign and military affairs, although they were made
cognizant of them in merely ratifying what de Gaulle had
decided beforehand. However, it appears that de Gaulle did
leave many social and economic questions to his ministers
and top civil servants. Yet in his last memoir, Hope, he
wrote that all public policy was important to him with none
2
reserved especially for his consideration. Foreign and
1
Launay, De Gaulle and His France, pp. 233-4.
2
De Gaulle, Hope, pp. 286-7. His ministers in 
their writings disagree with de Gaulle on this point. How­
ever, it is important to note the following discussion of 
"de gaulle" and DE GAULLE.
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defense policy was de Gaulle's exclusive domain. However, 
too often his foreign policy was "prepared at the Qual d 'Orsay, 
decided . . .at the Elysee and Implemented nowhere." This 
is particularly true as de Gaulle grew older, when as far as 
action was concerned the system came to a grinding halt. When 
performing at Its best, however, de Gaulle's International 
policies were the result of his own philosophy and the use of 
Intermlnlsterlal committees and "Restricted Councils."
Although Conseil Interministériels had existed In 
previous French governments, the extent of their use as 
Conseils Restreints under de Gaulle Is without parallel.
These Restricted Councils were small groups of various per­
sonalities, Including civil servants, ministers, and anyone 
de Gaulle believed should attend. There were no records or 
written reports kept of the meetings, contrary to de Gaulle's 
usual dlctlm that everything Important had to be in writing. 
Indeed, It Is often Impossible to determine who was present, 
except for de Gaulle. There was no agenda and the sessions 
usually were called when a presidential decision was in the 
offing. In many respects, the Restricted Council and the 
lesser Interministerial committees anticipated and duplicated 
the work of the ministries, particularly on such topics as 
the military and the Community, perhaps less so on other 
topics. It Is In these highly secretive meetings that de 
Gaulle relied heavily on the experts who advised him. Here 
Pompidou notes, that In working with de Gaulle In general.
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"personalities disappear and only functions remain."^
In his use of the Restricted Councils de Gaulle's
intent and purpose was to deny any one ministry exclusive
control over any issue or policy area while permitting the
President to exercise close control over those decisional
areas of most interest to him. Ministers who were not in
on these meetings were merely informed of decisions reached
without them and without recourse to review or objections.
The importance of this group may be seen in de Gaulle's
comment on his meetings and use of various political groups.
In a seven year period he met with the Council of Ministers
302 times, the limited interministerial councils 420 times,
the Premier 505 times, and the President of the Assembly 78 
2
times. Of course, in exclusively foreign policy issues and 
decisions, the decisional triumvirate theoretically included 
the President, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs.
The Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
De Gaulle's use of the Premiership followed the basic 
tenets of his political philosophy. He noted that he had 
always chosen conservative Prime Ministers and then did not
-3
go against what the Minister disapproved. The truth was
^Quoted in Launay, De Gaulle and His France, p. 223 
2
Twelfth Press Conference, September 9, 1965. 
^Hayward, Parliamentary Affairs, p. 82.
276
that de Gaulle choose men with whom he agreed, or rather 
who agreed with him and with whom he had a "close Identity 
of v i e w s . S t r o n g  personalities rarely survived in a 
Gaulllst regime, since de Gaulle always assumed credit. In 
the name of France, for subordinate's Ideas while disclaiming 
failures. Ultimately most of his achievements were based 
on groundwork laid by others, but made successful by his 
particular political style.
In all, it was de Gaulle and not the Prime Minister 
who directed "the action of the government" through the
presidential secretariate and the interministerial councils
2
thereof. Still, de Gaulle had a great respect for office, 
including his own. He insisted upon the maximum authority 
for himself and others. His confidence in his premier was 
less complete, according to the degree in which he allowed 
him more independence. The prime minister's actions were 
closely watched.
For the system to work well according to de Gaulle's 
conceptions, the prime minister had to share the views of the 
head of state on the main lines of general policy. Essential 
policies would not permit divergent opinions. As de Gaulle 
consolidated or institutionalized his leadership, he even 
used the premiership to enhance France's movement toward a
^Hayward, Parliamentary Affairs, p. 82. 
^See Le Monde, April 23, 1969.
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perfected presidential regime. The Prime Minister was 
ideally one without past Parliamentary ties. Theoretically 
he would answer to Parliament, while realistically being 
devoted to de Gaulle and his cause.^ When conflict existed 
between de Gaulle and his Prime Minister, or the letter's 
popularity approached that of the President, the Prime Min­
ister was summarily replaced. Still, de Gaulle’s personal 
preference of leaving details to others, his contempt for 
contingencies, and the belief that he did not "save France" 
to concern himself with the "macaroni ration" necessitated 
the Prime Minister's important role in integrating the 
activities of the government. De Gaulle provided political 
guidance of the most general kind. But here again the 
Prime Minister's role was viable only as long as confidence 
by de Gaulle was retained. And even with the near revo­
lution of 1968, de Gaulle did not take on the responsibilities 
of his subordinates. The importance of the Prime Minister's 
role was more evident in domestic policy, although he also 
coordinated de Gaulle's foreign policy decisions in the 
government and defended his policies in Parliament. The 
latter was done in conjunction with the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs.
See M. Bromberge^, Le Destin secret de G. Pompidou 
(Paris: 1965). Hence Debre was replaced by Pompidou because 
the former's ties with Parliament were too strong, even 
though he was loyal to de Gaulle.
^Tournoux, Sons of France: Petain and de Gaulle, p. 2l6,
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The appointment of the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
also was based primarily on de Gaulle’s personal confidence 
in the individual, with such factors as political standing, 
etc. secondary. De Gaulle established the major directions 
of foreign policy and then let the Minister have some lat­
itude of action, here again his usual governing technique.
De Gaulle seemed to give only intermittent interest to any 
given political problem. Perhaps this was partially the 
result of Blum’s observation that de Gaulle could not be 
concerned "with more than one idea at a time, one plan, one 
belief."^ When he had a belief or plan, however, he sur­
rendered himself to it.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Secretary-
General were responsible then for the detailed implementation
of de Gaulle’s policy, along with more routine duties such
as the normal diplomatic workload. Interestingly, de Gaulle
2
never did trust diplomatic personnel since he could not 
control them as well as he did his immediate staff* Too, 
they seemed generally opposed to his blunt "great quarrel" 
style. De Gaulle met with his Foreign Minister regularly 
every Friday morning.^ Even with such "frequent" meetings 
and responsibilities, the reality was that the ministers
^In Fragments, p. Il4; Werth, De Gaulle, p. BO; 
Aron, De Gaulle, p. 115.
2
See his War Memoirs (Unity), passim.
^See Couve de Murville, Une Politique Étrangère: 
1958-69 (Paris: 1971), pp. 9-10.
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were held responsible for the policy which the President had 
decided and for which his political skills were directed.
Political Skills
Crozier in his monumental study of de Gaulle, notes
that the General:
. . .had many of the attributes of the statesman: 
the character, the intelligence and the charisma. 
Between his first and second periods of power, he 
had even taught himself patience. He was an out­
standing technician of power.^
The "techniques" de Gaulle employed were as well-thought 
out as his personal and political philosophy. In fact, 
most were outlined in general form in de Gaulle’s earliest 
writings. Indeed some of his tactics are viewed as part 
of and included in his philosophy of command. It was only 
after de Gaulle acquired political power that his skill 
in using the traditional instruments of political authority: 
propaganda, manipulation, and force, subsequently charac­
terized as Machiavellain, was evident. These techniques 
ranged from the ceremonial and rhetorical to the organizing 
ability so typical of the military mind. But above all, how 
de Gaulle did things brings to mind Pareto’s warning that 
Paris is the domain of foxes, where those in power rely 
on guile more than brute force.
De Gaulle’s initial major political activities were 
those connected with his leadership of the Free French from
^See Crozier, De Gaulle, Chapter 1.
280
London during WWII. With a tenuous political legitimacy and 
virtually none of the typical resources Heads of State normally 
possess, de Gaulle turned to the use of theatrical devices 
to accomplish his self-imposed task on the political "stage."
As a student of the French theatre with extensive experience 
in acting,^ de Gaulle began to "perform" the role as the 
rightful leader of a country which he considered still waging 
war against Hitler, even as the flag of Vichy flew in Paris.
By his political behavior toward the Allied Powers, reinforced 
by his talents as an orator, de Gaulle was able to change 
the disbelief in his political legitimacy held by most of 
his audiences to belief. His strategy was one based on
2
illusion, oratory or mere talk, and psychological pressures.
The tactic is succinctly described by Kriegel-Valrimont as
"Operation Seduction." Used for various purposes, such as
getting parliamentary action during the June, 1958 crisis,
de Gaulle surprised many with his ability to "sweet-talk:"
No one had expected that he would or could exer­
cise such skill, and show such gifts of diplomacy 
and psychological understanding.3
Thus he was able to twist the detested politial party system
il
and its politicians around his little finger. A less direct 
example of his use of flattery is evident in the formal state
While a military man, de Gaulle often had his 
soldiers stage plays, among the more typical disciplinarian 
tactics.
2
Lacouture, De Gaulle, p. 53*
^Kriegel-Valrimont reporting speech of June 2, 1958 
in Le Monde.
^See Werth, De Gaulle, p. 51.
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receptions given during the de Gaulle tenure. Diplomats 
were greeted universally with the comment that their par­
ticular country was liked very much, "as you well know." 
Writers of all kilt were left with the impression that de 
Gaulle was one of their faithful readers, while priests 
were enjoined to "pray for us in our need." The older 
guest was assured that his experience was of great value, 
while the young were admonished that the future of France 
rested with them, to be worthy of it. De Gaulle rarely 
deviated from this basic "script." In all, de Gaulle's 
political theatrics were:
. . .a grand spectacle, fast moving, stage-managed 
with care, epic in proportion and designed in the 
seductiveness of its dreams and illusions to a- 
rouse the passions and morale of the audience. .
. stagecraft was suspenseful, a rousing tale of 
personal initiative, narrow escapes, dangers and 
pitfalls and ultimate success.!
This was particularly evident in de Gaulle's radio trans­
mission to France. In these speeches he polished the 
language skill he commanded so well. Whether in a press 
conference or other public appearances, one is struck'by 
de Gaulle's use of the French language. In private, par­
ticularly during times of stress, de Gaulle's lanaguage 
was often abrasive, a "barrack-square coarseness." In
^Thompson, Pledge to Destiny, p. 256.
2
Crozier, De Gaulle, pp. 9-10.
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public, however, his speech was more noble, although he
was still able to employ linguistic subtiles for his own
purposes. For example, typically he addressed most of
his subordinates as Monsieur, a levelling phrase indicating
their "lesser" and mere mortal position relative to Mon
General. Yet in contrast, on a German visit de Gaulle
addressed local miners as "Gentlemen" (Meine Herren) rather
than the condescending " d u . A linguist and "master of
2
the equivocal statement," de Gaulle often used outdated 
terminology, but always the mot .juste. His language was 
classical and ancient in style, rather than modern. He 
preferred the "rhythms and words of the tribe." Termin­
ology was concise and correct, although it was his cross 
to be misunderstood and mistranslated. Here too this use 
of language appears as a deliberate attempt to extend the 
aura of mystery, for de Gaulle did not always want others 
to know what he said. He would then not be liable or 
responsible for doing or following what he said. But most 
of all he disliked the language "franglas" and "volapuk." 
The latter is an old term he dredged up just as he did 
many others, a prime indication of his love of letters and 
the bon mot.
^Galante, The General, p. 183•
2
Grosser, French Foreign Policy, p. 23. 
^Lacouture, De Gaulle, p. 183.
^See Grosser, French Foreign Policy, pp. 26-7.
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The tone and structure of de Gaulle's language were 
borrowed from Barres and Included the often stilted rhe­
torical rhythms of Richelieu with the nationalistic phrases 
of Maurras. The latter is a special form of nationalism, 
an "oral shock treatment" where symbols replace realities 
and it is believed that mere words can change events, re­
mold and reshape facts, and even create the crises or drama 
necessary for a crisis-leader such as de Gaulle to continue 
in power. De Gaulle then was an illusionist, skilled at 
the magic of creating a sense of achievement that factually
il
never existed. However, as Aron explains, de Gaulle's 
ability to change events with words is the style the French 
see as giving significance to events.
pe Gaulle, then, created events as a historian- 
dramatist, rather than placidly accepting " f a c t s . F o r  
example, in a conversation with the British Ambassador after 
WWII de Gaulle admitted that his pursuit of glory was delib­
erate: "Every day I spend five minutes thinking how what I
7
have to do will appear in history." He then behaved
^See Thompson, Pledge to Destiny, p. 256 and others.
2A good example is his famous Quebec speech.
o h
Crozier, De Gaulle, p. 665. Ibid., p. 5.
^R. Aron, Realities (May, 1967), p. 90.
^Although upon occasions, events occurred over which he
had no control, in which case his tactic was to take advantage
of whatever opportunities existed, as in the Sino-Soviet conflict
^John S. Ambler, The Government and Politics of France 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1971), p. 135.
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according to what history would say, and found it expedient 
to cultivate a charismatic aura for that purpose. This 
necessitated the polishing of other political techniques.
These major "skills" of instinct, mystery, and intransigence 
are most evident in de Gaulle's relationships with other 
Heads of States, such as Churchill and Roosevelt.
De Gaulle's entire political style was colored by 
an unbelievable instinctive self-sufficiency. He wrote 
of this "need" in Edge of the Sword: "confident in his 
judgment and conscious of his strength, he [the Leader} 
yields nothing to the desire to please." De Gaulle had 
this instinctive confidence in his own superior judgment, 
giving the impression that he alone knew right from wrong 
and following Polonius' dictim "to thine own self be true." 
His decisions were governed by his own conceptions, for 
which there are no precedents or predecessors. At times 
this was as much an illusion as many other devices he 
employed. Yet his instinct for leadership, which he des­
cribed as "the practical, particular, and concrete feel 
of. . .what i^”^ and faith in himself was so strong that it 
was often characterized as mere arrogance. Since he further 
insisted on maintaining mystery as part of his style and the 
character he had created, the defamation was usually accepted 
unequivocally.
^De Gaulle, Edge of the Sword, p. 20. Emphasis supplied,
285
Mystery
De Gaulle was secret and aloof In part because he 
had consciously renounced personal happiness for the iso­
lation of French grandeur. This solitude and aloofness he 
believed necessary for the "true leader." He had great 
patience and could remain silent, an unusual attribute for 
a political being. To extend this aura of mystery, de Gaulle 
maintained a social distance from others, believing prestige 
exists only with mystery, "for people revere little what 
they know too well." Sometimes moody, he actually made rel­
atively few public appearances, which by his entrances, with­
drawals and exits to his political behavior heightened the 
aura of his presidency. When de Gaulle did speak, it was in 
what the majority of Frenchmen would call "riddles." They 
could not always understand the general loftiness of his 
thinking, a fact compounded by de Gaulle's belief in the 
validity of using deception.
, There are actually two aspects of de Gaulle's 
mystère, which seemed to follow Descartes' comment, larvatus 
prodeo, "Masked, I advance." First, there is the ambiguity 
which de Gaulle developed into an art for the purposes of 
drama. This followed his belief that one's intentions 
should be deliberately obscured until the time was right for
^Ibid.
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a decision or action, meaning after the goal had been
achieved. Silence then was necessary so that official
pronouncements would not be misquoted and misinterpreted,
thereby committing him to an untenable policy position.^
Too, the leader of a truly great Prance had to be aloof,
secretive, and unfettered by emotional bonds such as
gratitude or other sentiments. And as de Gaulle grew
older, his view was not unlike that of Ho Chi Minh, who
noted that he was:
. . .an old man, a very old man. An old man 
likes to have a little air of mystery about him­
self. I like to hold on to my little mysteries.^
The second aspect of de Gaulle's mystery was his 
deliberate use of Pythian formulas, the existence of con­
flicting alternatives or what Werth called "facing-both- 
ways-policy." Heraclitus would have admired this working 
model of his dictim that the only thing permanent is change. 
The General preferred to have, simultaneously, several 
action-alternatives available so that if one measure failed 
another might work. This resulted in a constant, or so it 
seemed, change in direction, usually unexpectedly. As 
Aron notes, de Gaulle did not go in à straight line, so
4
that no one would know where he was going until he arrived.
p . 22.
^See Grinnel-Milne, The Triumph of Integrity, p. 329. 
^Stated in 1962, quoted in Time (September 12, 1969),
^Werth, De Gaulle, p. 105•
ii
Aron, De Gaulle, p. 132.
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In combination with his love of ambiguity, this political 
tactic could be termed "ambiguous spontaneity."^ De Gaulle's 
ultimate policy decision was a "chance objective" coming 
forth from noncommitted generalities and all part of a 
deliberate unpredictability of political actions and pro­
nouncements.
Intransigence
In politics, particularly when vital national inter­
ests were concerned, de Gaulle for all intent and purposes 
refused to compromise. This factor, coupled with his de­
liberate inculcating of political quarrels, is best described 
as a psychological tactic of insurgency or intransigence. 
True, de Gaulle had a rigid and inflexible personality as far 
as permitting no compromise, a factor which often resulted in 
his ignoring or removing from power politically important 
people. If a policy encountered difficulties, he would use 
threats and arguments. If this did not work, he ultimately 
adjusted his policy to that fact. But more importantly, de 
Gaulle used intransigence or "the great quarrel" in order 
to gain public attention and then mold that attention as he 
willed it. This intransigence was often "explained" as pure 
obduracy, although the tactic was to try to tame imponder­
ables by verbal action. His most famous quarrels were those
^Pierre Nora in Lacouture, De Gaulle, p. 209.
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with Churchill and Roosevelt. De Gaulle once explained his
relationship with Churchill as being along purely tactical
lines. Churchill's temper was manifested when he was wrong
and de Gaulle’s when he was right. Consequently, they were
often angry with each other:
I always quarreled violently with Churchill but we 
always understood each other very well. I never 
quarreled with Roosevelt, but we never understood 
each other at all.l
The conflict with Churchill was on the common level of 
"spirit," whereas Franklin Roosevelt's clash was a deep, 
philosophical one. Churchill recongized de Gaulle’s de­
liberate use of this tactic of intransigence:
He had to be rude to the British to prove to 
French eyes he was not a British puppet. And 
he certainly carried out this policy with per- 
serverance. He even one day explained this 
technique to me, and I fully comprehended the 
extraordinary difficulties of his problem. I 
always admired his massive strength.3
Political intransigence resulted in systematic or 
constructive opposition to various elements in the political 
process. The Rally of the French People symbolized the 
extremes such a technique can generate; although even here 
it is possible that de Gaulle was using this neo-fascist semi­
organization as a means to obtain American aid, since at that 
time the United States was on the road to McCarthyism with
^De Gaulle quoted in Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1965).
2
Lacouture, De Gaulle, p. 95.
^Winston Churchill, Second World War, IV(Boston:Houghton 
Mifflin, 1948-54), p. 611.
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Its red witchhunts. But de Gaulle always seemed to be re­
belling against something, whether against the military 
hierarchy in his youth or the United States in his old age. 
The latter, of course, harkens to the old diplomatic tra­
dition that weaker nations should challenge the strongest 
nation.^ Too, another reason for this tactic was de Gaulle’s 
emphasis on his own, and thus France’s, need for freedom of 
action. His primary short-term but consistent goal was the 
desire for maneuverability and thereby flexibility of po­
litical action. This required the necessity of taking the 
initiative rather than merely reacting in foreign policy, 
whether in the form of expedient or transitory alliances or 
crisis politics in general. De Gaulle warned:
Never let yourself get tied down, and when an out­
sider offers you something, always begin by answering 
no. There will be time enough to accept when you
have thought it over.
Aron appropriately termed such action as ’’ballet” policy, 
always in motion. Such a tactic is understandable consid­
ering de Gaulle’s early extolling of the virtue of the 
"insuperable urge to act.” However, it led to his charac­
terization by detractors as typical of a petty dictator 
in verbal democratic clothing. In many respects de Gaulle
did impersonate the French Kings of old relative to style.
^See Aron, Realities, May, 1967.
^Quoted in Galante, The General, p. 109.
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But de Gaulle's end was a modern and efficient state.
The means to this end and some aspects of his personal 
approach obscured some of his more "radical" beliefs. Re­
gardless, his decisions were boldly made. His method was 
authoritarian-laden, or what Hayward called those of a 
"Charismatic Caesarism."^ However, this was not so much a 
passionate following of the Weberian concept of charisma as 
a unique charisma which is manifested primarily during 
periods of foreign and domestic crises. Tucker and Erikson 
have pointed out that the charismatic leader's role is en­
hanced when people experience deep distress shattering their 
rituals of existence. The term is "existential dread." Such 
is a valid characterization for de Gaulle's two political 
entries to French power. When the "dread" was removed, so 
was de Gaulle. Yet his status among the French was viewed 
more the lesser among evils in situations where the French 
people sought escapes from drastic change, and thus supported 
him. From 1958 when he returned to power, de Gaulle had 
threatened to step down as France's leader no less than four 
times— unless he had popular electoral support. Once this 
support was accepted on the basis of his symbolism, it was 
de Gaulle's tactic to then make the feared drastic changes
^Hayward, Parliamentary Affairs
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himself. But de Gaulle was a "man of storms,"^ pre­
ferring the drama of crisis. He therefore maintained the 
aura of crisis or controlled anxiety by always requiring 
a quarrel in one form or another. One of his basic tactics 
was to condemn the "rot" in its various forms that was de­
stroying the Republic. Then the French people would be ad­
monished that the restoration of the people’s faith in
France could be evidenced by support for him on a particular 
2
issue. He felt that France’s problems were always resolved 
in crisis situations. If a problem existed, therefore, it 
was only necessary to insure its growth into crisis pro­
portions for resolution.
de gaulle and DE GAULLE
One of the more complex techniques Charles de Gaulle 
used, and one that is commonly misunderstood, was his de­
liberate linguistic differentiation between "me,""de gaulle," 
and"De Gaulle." These perceptual distinctions provide an 
important understanding of his role as a decision-maker as
much as his personal philosophy facilitates the comprehension
■3
of his political goals.
p. 209.
^Crozier, De Gaulle, p. 663.
2
Schoenbrum, The Three Lives of Charles de Gaulle,
^See Parsons and Shills, Theory of Action, p. 23; 
Gerth and Mills, pp. 425-6; and Edinger, pp. 674-5 for 
further discussions of political "role." Succinctly, Eulau, 
Political Analysis, p. ix notes this importance in that by 
"his multiple role-taking the politicians mediates between 
collective demands on government."
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Often speaking of himself In the third person, 
de Gaulle was viewed by some as practicing either childish­
ness or genius. In reality, the differences are deeper.
When he spoke of himself as "I" or "me,” Charles de Gaulle 
was referring to a person. In contrast. De Gaulle was 
either the public-political head of the French Nation and 
State, or a personage, a public-historical role played on 
the International stage and a means to discuss his own 
work as a historical figure embodlng the goals of France.
It would even be possible to extend this division to La 
France, which he often attributed with his views and senti­
ments. The personage de Gaulle "role" dominated the other 
two personalities. General de Gaulle was very conscious of 
this technique. He once commented that "De Gaulle Interests 
me only as a historical personality."^ It appears also to 
be a means de Gaulle used to get an "outside view" of events. 
Thus he Instituted a sharp cleavage between de Gaulle-the- 
mere-man and de Gaulle-the-symbol or even Institution. This 
division of his personality Into the personal. Inner being 
and the popular myth of a figure or symbol added to his aura 
of mystery. However, It required an Increasing consciousness 
or self-watch to maintain this separation and the distinctive
^Quoted In Launay, De Gaulle and His France, p. 53.
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words and actions emanating from each.^ De Gaulle-the-man
2
In fact became almost the prisoner of de Gaulle-the-figure:
Before I made a speech or reached a major decision 
I had to ask myself, 'Will de Gaulle approve Of 
this? Is this the way people expect de Gaulle to 
act? Is this right for de Gaulle and the role he 
plays?'3
De Gaulle-the-man then was restricted in what he could do 
by the ever-presence of General de Gaulle, who had assumed 
the role and burden of Prance. Interestingly, the "man" 
did not always approve of what General de Gaulle did. This 
is most evident throughout the Memoirs, which are usually 
considered an autobiographical exercise at most and a justi­
fication or rationale of a political doctrine or tenure at 
least. A close study of the Memoirs, however, reveals the 
inevitable conclusion that the writings are autobiographical 
of the personage, a monument to his perception of France, and 
a contribution to French literature, not a more typical ex­
ample of an individual's life or political history. How de 
Gaulle felt about his work is indicated by the dismissal 
of any possibility of permitting them to be serialized in 
newspapers :"one can hardly imagine Saint Simon allowing de-
4
tached pieces of his work to appear in Paris daily." Within
^See Grinnel-Milne, The Triumph of Integrity, op. l66,
303.
p
See Schoenbrun interview, Saturday Review (May 16,1959). 
^Schoenbrum, Three Lives of Charles de Gaulle, pp. 4-5. 
^Quoted in Tournoux, Tragedi^, p. 234.
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this unmistakable context, the so-called "errors," omissions, 
or contradictions in the writings are understandable. De 
Gaulle did not intend them to be impartial. Further, the 
Memoirs contain rather scathing criticisms of "De Gaulle."
His political leadership is on occasion called a "dictator­
ship," albeit a temporary one, and a variation on the absolutist 
monarchies of French history.
The perceptive distinctions of these "roles" are 
important. In part, their existence may be traced to the 
General's classical educational background. He considered it 
repetitive and immodest to use "I" or "me" continuously. For 
style he would insert "de Gaulle," depending on the context 
and rhythm of the sentence. More important, however, he 
early discerned that the French people distinguished be­
tween himself as an individual and the public person named 
de Gaulle. Perhaps this resulted in part because initially 
few came to know the leader of the Free French except through 
faceless radio broadcasts from London. De Gaulle made the 
discovery of this distinction at Douala:
. . .which was my first contact with the French people 
since my call to resistance. I landed there after the 
expedition to Dakar had failed. There were thousands 
of people and they began to shout, 'de Gaulle! de 
Gaulle! de Gaulle! I was taken aback. Until then, in 
London, my contacts had all been personal and indi­
vidual, with ministers, soldiers, attaches, and so 
forth. But here was the voice of the people, the 
[yoic^ of the crowds. And I suddenly realized for 
first.time what a heavy burden I bore, what a 
responsibility I had to all these people who were 
counting upon a man named de Gaulle to liberate them, 
to give them back their freedom and independence.
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I realized then that General de Gaulle had be­
come a living legend, that they had formed a 
certain image of him, that they expected many 
things of him, that they thought of him as be­
having in a certain way.l
Once de Gaulle realized a most indestructible element, a 
legend, had been created, he contributed consciously to 
its continuation and growth.
As Barber and others have indicated, a political 
style is forged at the time of a leader’s first independent
political success. The London years were de Gaulle's first
such success and explain the continuation of the style he 
found to be so successful then. These role differentiations 
as part of de Gaulle’s particular political style are im­
portant factors, regardless of typology employed for their 
study.
Summary
One of the early attempts to devise a cross­
classification system for analyzing politicians’ behavior 
in general is David Barber’s dichotomous political types, 
ultimately resulting in four character variations. Barber 
believes that two variables are most important in predicting 
political decisional behavior. The overt level of political 
activity invested in a political office, either active or
^Quoted in Schoenbrum, The Three Lives of Charles de
Gaulle, pp. 94-5.
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passive, contrasts with the Inner or emotional stance to­
ward life and one’s activities in it, manifested as being 
positive or negative.
Barber's thesis and its typology have inherent 
weaknesses, as Greenstein and others have readily indi­
cated.^ The typology is incomplete, contains unproved 
assertions, and permits the arbitrary or subjective 
assigning of a political individual to any one category. 
This does not preclude its potential for our discipline 
when less intuitive methodologies such as content analysis 
are employed, for example, to determine the degree of 
political activity a politician exercises. It is too early 
to dismiss completely Barber's admittedly crude character 
types, particularly since it provides a further means to 
study intensively the behavior of those decision-making 
actors who as Chief Executives can have the greatest effect 
on us all.
De Gaulle cart be described best as one of Barber's 
"active-positive" types. He was primarily concerned with 
substantive political achievements or productiveness and 
therefore emphasized the rational mastery of problems. Un­
fortunately this "type" often fails to take into consider­
ation the irrational in politics. For example, de Gaulle 
seems to have completely misjudged the mob activity of the
^See Knutson, Handbook, among others.
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1968 near-revolution in France. Further, the typical 
general lack of anxiety of the "active-positive" often 
results in an inability to take the fears and hopes of 
others into consideration, i.e., a general lack of empathy.
In de Gaulle’s case, the problem was partially his de­
liberate subverting of all emotions publicly, combined 
with the blunt disciplined demeanor of a military mind.
Many examples of de Gaulle’s lack of empathy are evident. 
Werth reports de Gaulle’s visit to Marseilles immediately 
after World War 11.^ The locals staged a parade in his 
honor. Wearing rags, with flower bedecked rifles, the 
Maquisards pulled a German armored vehicles upon which 
scantily dressed females waved flags. De Gaulle was not 
amused at the attempt at humor and muttered "what a masquer­
ade" and "that rabble." Yet he was aware of French problems 
and how his people suffered as individuals and as a Nation. 
But as Crawley notes:
. . .it was always from a mountain that he descended 
among them. He could not laugh with them or let 
them see that he suffered. Inevitably people came 
to • feel that he neither understood nor greatly 
cared about their lives.2
The "passive-positive" type primarily seeks to win 
the affection of others, feeling himself generally unloved. 
Political involvement is slight, with enjoyment of political
^See Werth, France: 1940-55, P» 228. 
^Crawley, De Gaulle, p. 282.
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behavior superficial. In contrast, de Gaulle felt the 
public-historical personage role he affected was loved.
Once he became politically involved in the 1930*s, de 
Gaulle was "quicksanded" by his political philosophy of 
the French Nation-State into more, not less, political 
activity. As the personage, de Gaulle, he relished the 
political role he had as "the" representative of the 
French. Nation.
Barber sees those who are politically active be­
cause of some call or duty, but perform minimally in that 
role as "passive-negatives." They reluctantly enter politics 
and because of a lack of flexibility tend to withdraw from 
political activity after relatively short periods of time.
De Gaulle never performed minimally in any role he assumed.
In some respects his lack of compromise may be interpreted 
as a lack of flexibility. However, de Gaulle’s realism 
did result in some of the same types of change that would 
have resulted from compromise.
The "active-negative" variation is personally 
ambitious, with compulsive characters and perfectionistic 
consciences. Politics performs an ego-defensive function 
for these individuals. As we have seen in Chapter 3 above, 
de Gaulle’s political activities must be viewed as examples 
of his realistic approach in the political arena. His view 
of international politics and the changes he did make in his 
political behavior negates such a view. He had two
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opportunities to take dictatorial power and each time re­
fused it. He never made use of France. His political roles 
contributed little in personal wealth. Even the proceeds 
from his Memoirs went to charities or the parish church at 
Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises.
Barber has elaborated these basic categories further 
in analyzing the American Presidency. He found it expedient 
to consider an individual's expressiveness or rhetoric, how 
he conducts the business of political office, and what per­
sonal relations exist.
We have seen that, de Gaulle’s rhetoric was usually 
serious and full of the abstract concepts of his personal 
philosophy, many borrowed from Maurras and Barres. The 
business of his Presidency was conducted with the disciplin­
arian orientation and organization he had learned in the 
military. The presidential staff was greatly expanded 
during his tenure to include dozens of highly skilled po­
litical counselors and high civil servants whose primary 
duty was to summarize reports and develop position papers.
De Gaulle rarely concerned himself with the details of 
governmental decisions. Perhaps an episode as early as 
192A best demonstrates de Gaulle's staff technique. The 
Commanding Colonel of a field battle exercise asked the 
young de Gaulle where "the baggage train of the left-hand 
regiment of your right-hand division" was during the maneuver 
De Gaulle asked his Chief of Staff to answer the question.
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wherein the annoyed Colonel pointedly stated that the 
question was directed at de Gaulle. De Gaulle's answer 
then held true during his later political tenures. He 
replied;
Colonel, you gave me the responsibilities of an 
army commander. If I had also assumed those of 
my subordinates I should not have been able ad­
equately to fulfill my mission. De minimis non 
curat Praetor. The law does not concern itself 
with small matters. Chateauvieux, please reply 
to the colonel.1
Although he worked primarily with those he himself 
had appointed or nominated, there were few intimate personal 
relationships during his tenure. After all, as President 
he personified the French Nation. He once noted that al­
though "a man may have friendships, a nation never. . .don't
2
forget that our allies are also our adversaries."
In all, de Gaulle was a true-to-life representation 
of one of Andre Malraux' figures, "characterized by a need 
for grandeur, a feeling of tragic loneliness, and a constant 
power of will and disdain." This is evidenced in his per­
sonality, his philosophy, and his political style, and is 
not contrary to French tradition.
^Quoted in Lacouture, De Gaulle, pp. 26-7.
p
Tournoux, Sons of France: Petain and De Gaulle, p. 1^5 
^Serfaty, SAIS, pp. 15-21.
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS
Political leadership is a complex, multi-dimensional 
field of study that is rapidly growing and theoretically 
immature. In the United States, studies have traditionally 
resulted in an areal concentration on "shared" or "group" 
power to the general neglect of academic efforts directly 
researching "individual" leadership. Yet the crisis-centered 
orientation of contemporary governments and the continuing 
centralization of executive power make those factors tra­
ditionally characterized as individual "personality" of 
prime consideration in understanding international political 
behavior. Although studied by more and more social scientists, 
what has been termed herein as personal/positive individual 
leadership and its variables has not yet achieved recognition 
as a field of specialization, either in political science or 
as an interdisciplinary endeavor.
The basic proposition of this dissertation has been 
that until such specialization occurs, an essential part of 
our science suffers. The ability to go beyond merely ex­
plaining events to prediction, that is, theorizing on general 
tendencies and probable trends, is notably lacking. For 
such endeavors, this study has advocated an eclectic construct, 
a multi-methodological approach combining often opposing theo­
retical directions plus intuitive considerations. Necessarily
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such an unorthodox means requires a critical consideration 
of both the methodologies available, their inherent problems, 
and the volume of material on this one leader, Charles de 
Gaulle. This particular leader not only governed France, 
but his attitudes, beliefs, values, and habits are reflected 
in the institutionalized structure of political Prance under 
the Fifth Republic. Yet his "operational code," as that of 
other major political leaders, has been neglected.
In many respects this study has been an inno­
vative application of the more popular decision-making 
approach. That is, the "situation" of decision-making 
analysis is viewed as shaped primarily by the values of 
the individual decision-maker. Goal-choice then is bound 
Inextricably to the political psychology of the individual. 
Applied to an incumbent chief foreign policy maker of a 
nation-state, predicting aspects of "international" be­
havior during a particular political tenure is possible (See 
Chapter I above). Unfortunately, the potential breadth of 
this study is more conducive to the collegiate research of 
"pure" behavioral studies than doctoral exercises by any 
one individual. This factor becomes more poignant when the 
leader being researched not only is removed from power but 
dies, thereby making "prediction" a moot construct. However, 
de Gaulle's Republic "lives," as does the applicability of 
our method to other political leaders, however emphemeral 
their tenures.
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All political ideas and styles are ultimately 
"culture-bound” or culture-relative and thus impose limi­
tations or mores on a leader in his political decision­
making processes (See Chapter II above). Cultural vari­
ations or general social forces then produce different 
foreign policies by setting boundaries for the individual's 
overt behavior. We have explored the explicit influence 
of the French concept of le foyer, reinforced in the classical 
Roman Catholic educational system. In this, de Gaulle was 
not so different than his contemporary countrymen. He too 
was socialized in, and rarely deviated from,the French 
cultural norms that emphasize privateness, dyadic relation­
ships, externalisation of conflict through verbalization, 
self-control and discipline, and the "golden mean" of balance 
or harmony of extremes. This balance is reflected as a 
need for order and is evident in the constant search for 
stability, permanence, moderation, equilibrium, and resistance 
to the total implications of the machine age. In this search, 
the French seek the leadership of complex statesmen-perscnalitles, 
older men who in their political style can best be described 
as authoritarian-laden intellectuals well-versed in Cartesian 
thought patterns.
These cultural variables, combined with the exper­
iences of his individual life, help account for many of the 
peculiarities of de Gaulle's thought and political action 
(See Chapter III above). For once established, an individual's
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personality and values remain stable during his adult life. 
Aspects of de Gaulle’s personality and motives for his quest 
for political power were analyzed by using Abraham Mas low's 
schema. That is, individual motivations are viewed as 
changing patterns of basic human drives: physiological, 
security or safety, affection and belongingness, self/social 
esteem and self-actualization. Charles de Gaulle was a 
Self-Actualizing individual, motivated to political power 
by the early inculcation of such cultural values as order, 
self-respect, honor, integrity or truth and fidelity. He 
was not, therefore, a power-compensatory creature. The 
character traits he brought to his political role included 
erudition, prescience, linguistics, tenacity of purpose and 
a unique conscious division of his personality into de Gaulle 
the "person" and de Gaulle the "personage."
The main ideas of de Gaulle's individual theory or 
thought, his world images, affected the way he behaved and 
help explain his political actions (See Chapter IV above).
A Cartesian by training and a Bergsonian realist by choice 
de Gaulle's thought incorporates a sense of history seen 
as a series of struggles and wars that preclude absolutes, 
including the existence of any absolute truth. Inter­
national relations understandably are seen as part of a 
violent universe in need of order and balance. This "order" 
is obtainable through his "great plan," actuated by that 
ultimate virtue, action. This "trait" is important not only
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for the "common" Individual but the nation-state person­
ified in the Hero-Leader or President. An analysis of 
selections selections from his speeches and writings re­
flects the consistency of de Gaulle's major thought-concepts. 
Unfortunately, political style often obscured the rationality 
of this thought.
How de Gaulle did things, how he responded to the 
demands of a political role, constitute his leadership 
style (See Chapter V above). An active-positive President 
by Barber's typology, de Gaulle's essential rituals included 
the expert use of press conferences, the revival of the 
Bonapartist plebiscite as the referendum, and employing the 
Restricted Councils as a parallel government. In responding 
to the demands of his political role, de Gaulle consciously 
and actively employed an expert command of the French language, 
an aura of mystery, and an overabundance of intransigence as 
means to his ultimate goal of reforming the French State 
during and after the periods when he personified the French 
Nation.
Given his cultural background, personality and ex­
periences, personal philosophy, and political style, what 
in a general sense could be expected in French foreign 
policy during de Gaulle's political tenure was done. In­
deed it would appear that present French policy still reflects 
de Gaullism at its best and worse. The keystone of this 
policy is the overwhelming importance of a powerful independent
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French State in a chaotic universe characterized by an 
unstable international system dominated by the United 
States and U.S.S.R. To maintain State stability, it is 
necessary to have an established continuity, prestige, 
and security keyed on bilateral alliances. But foreign 
policy makers must also consider that world progress or 
evolution is an inevitable, self-evident fact. As there 
is constant change in parts of the whole, the universe, there 
must be a coherent wholeness to international relationships. 
Change signifies action, requiring the endless adjusting 
of means. Thus a French foreign policy does not exist.
There is only the continuity of the national interest 
verbalized by the French President at any particular time.
It is the President's duty to employ elementary common 
sense in a deliberately negative political style. That 
is, an uncooperating demeanor plus a lapse in time results 
in change in the decisional circumstances. The French 
leader may then exercise his powers at the optimum time as 
he perceives it. In this respect K*e nch leadership deter­
mines the situation by employing this wait-and-see attitude. 
That is, prevailing social and political forces are recognized, 
but dealt with only after some delay and then on a leader's 
own terms. This is evident not only during de Gaulle's 
tenure but in that of the subsequent two leaderships.
Our analysis of de Gaulle concludes that in his 
case political leadership was an individual attribute 
or trait. Indeed what may best be termed the "call to
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destiny" appears at this rough research stage to be a 
universal trait of the personal/positive political leader­
ship of Individuals like de Gaulle, Churchill and Roosevelt. 
It would also appear that a possible correlation between 
physical and mental traits or abilities and political leader­
ship role-taking exists. For example, so-called "Great 
Men" of Europe have tended to be "non-average" physically. 
There seems to be something that sets the Individual a- 
part from his peers during early childhood. In calling 
attention to this characteristic, such as de Gaulle’s 
unusual height, an Initial opportunity to take advantage 
of the spotlight for exercising leadership exists. Being 
viewed by others as "different" and then acting as a 
leader appears to permit the early development of leader­
ship abilities. Interestingly, this development seems to 
occur more readily In those Europeans who have literary, 
philosophical, or arts backgrounds rather than the American 
leadership norm which emphasizes lawyers and businessmen.
Another conclusion that can be drawn from this study 
Is that In considering the basic factors In world politics—  
the forces of Ideologies, economics, and the "power of 
Individuals"— de Gaulle represents the latter. True, 
Ideologies or economics In various guises may provide the 
means to a political leadership position. But once estab­
lished In a political role, the power of the Individual
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constitutes the greater force. As such, "great" individuals 
exert considerable influence even to the point of being 
able to "change" the course of history. Prance without 
de Gaulle would be radically different today. She would 
no doubt be a third-rate world power rather than merely 
the second-rate power he made her. More important, however, 
without de Gaulle France would have been occupied by American 
and British military forces after World War ii, a factor 
that would have altered the course of French history and 
possibly the map of Europe. De Gaulle's historical in­
fluence is evident also in the events of 1958 returning 
him to political power. Had he not been available, France 
would probably have turned to military government and all 
that entails. Whether indeed the institutionalization of 
his leadership survives in toto does not preclude this 
importance.
It is hoped that the theoretical shallowness ne­
cessitated by the breadth this study sought to incorporate 
has not obscured a vital point. That is, it is now time 
to extend our research from the necessary studies of 
voting behavior or political attitudes of political leaders 
to the consideration of the individual as an independent 
element in all political systems. Even given the boundaries 
or restrictions of personal privacies and the fear of "Big 
Brotherhood," the state of our discipline would permit ex- 
hustive studies of the six to twelve potential leaders in
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all contemporary: nation-states. In essence, such a task 
would bring together many areas of political leadership 
study, necessarily in collegiate and computer analysis. 
Until such an unlikely time when all Presidential aspirants 
are screened and monitored for their individual "mental 
health," social scientists are left with less than perfect 
ways to study our leaders and their political behavior.
APPENDIX 
Major Events in de Gaulle’s Life
1890 - Born in Lille, France on November 22, I89O.
1894 - Dreyfus case.
1903 - Organized a troop of Scouts.
1909 - Entered St. Cyr Military Academy, drafted for one year
as an ordinary soldier with 33rd Inf. Regiment at Arras.
1910 - Two years at St. Cyr, among first ten in class.
1912 - Second Lieutenant under Petain at Arras.
1913 - Promoted to First Lieutenant.
1914 - World War I, wounded at Dinant, Belgium frontier, pro­
moted to Captain.
1915 - Wounded at Champagne.
1916 - Wounded at Verdun, captured by Germans, Legion of Honor
"Posthumously."
1916 - 1918 Prisoner of War
1919 - Freed, active combatant then military college instructor
in Poland, promoted to Major by Poles.
1921 - Assistant Professor of Military History at Saint Cyr,
married Yvonne Vendroux as French Captain.
1922 - Entered War College, Paris.
1924 - Published first book. Discord Among the Enemy.
1925 - Personal staff of Staff Marshall Petain.
1927 - Lecturer at War College, Army of Occupation in Rhine­
land, promoted' to Major.
1928 - Commanding Officer Light Infantry Battalion at Trier.
1930 - On General Secretariat of Ministry of National Defense,
two years in Middle East.
1932 - Edge of the Sword published. Conseil Supérieur de
Defense Nationale for five years.
1933 - Lieutenant Colonel.
1934 - Army of the Future published.
1935 - Campaign for an Armored Corps.
1936 - The Popular Front.
1937 - Commanding Officer tank regiment at Metz.
1938 - Published France and Her Army, joined Catholic leftist
club.
1939 - Commanding Officer 5th Army Tanks.
1940 - Colonel, 4th Division Armored. To London: formed French
National Committee then Free France to manage public 
affairs of Free France, Brigadier General, temporary 
rank. Had been Under Secretary of State for War and 
National Defense in Paul Reynauld^Cabinet.
1943 - Co-President with Giraud of Comite Français de Liberation
Nationale, which became Provisional Government of France.
1944 - Brazzaville: foundations of future French Community.
Liberation of Paris on August 25, 1944.
1945 - Confirmed by Constituent Assembly as Head of Government.




1947 - Founded Rally of the French People.
1951 - Partial success of RPF, de Gaulle withdrew from 
public life.
1954 _ Volume I of Memoirs published. Dien Bien Phu falls.
1956 - Algerian rebellion becomes full scale war.
1956 - 1957 - Traveled abroad.
1958 - Army assumed authority in Algeria and Corsica, becomes
Prime Minister and goes to Algeria, September 28,
1958: Fifth Republic instituted.
1959 - President of Republic, self-determination to Algeria.
1960 - First atomic bomb in Sahara.
1961 - "Putsch" of Generals in Algeria.
1962 - Referendum for election of Chief of State by universal
suffrage.
1964 - Récognition of Communist China. Evian Agreement.
1965 - Elected President of Republic by universal suffrage,
first western Head of State to visit Russia.
1966 - "Quits" NATO.
1968 - Student and Worker Revolt.
1969 - Referendum on Reform Bill for regional government fails,
de Gaulle resigns.
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